Moral luck and the Good Samaritan : law, morality, and the duty/protection of volunteer rescuers by Maydon, Gary
  
 
 
 
 
 
Moral Luck and the Good Samaritan:  
Law, Morality, and the Duty/Protection of 
Volunteer Rescuers 
 
 
 
 
 
Gary Maydon 
 
 
 
 PhD  
 
 
School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London 
 
2017 
 
 
 2 
Declaration 
 
 
It is hereby declared that this Thesis is the Candidate’s (Gary Maydon’s) 
own work, and is the Thesis on which he expects to be examined upon 
 
 
 
Signed   ……………………………………………………………… 
 
Name of Candidate ……………………………………………………………… 
 
Date   ……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Words       79641     (incl’ Footnotes, excl’ Bibliography and Appendix) 
 
 
 
 3 
  Moral Luck and the Good Samaritan:  
Law, Morality, and the Duty/Protection of 
Volunteer Rescuers 
  
The Good Samaritan1 
 
25 A teacher of the Law came up and tried to trap Jesus. “Teacher,” he asked, 
“what must I do to receive eternal life?” 
26 Jesus answered him, “What do the Scriptures say? How do you interpret 
them?”  
27 The man answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all 
your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind’; and ‘Love your neighbour 
as you love yourself.’”  
28 “You are right,” Jesus replied; “do this and you will live.”  
29 But the teacher of the Law wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, 
“Who is my neighbour?”  
30 Jesus answered, “There was once a man who was going down from 
Jerusalem to Jericho when robbers attacked him, stripped him, and beat him up, 
leaving him half dead. 31 It so happened that a priest was going down that road; 
but when he saw the man, he walked on by, on the other side. 32 In the same 
way a Levite also came along, went over and looked at the man, and then walked 
on by, on the other side. 33 But a Samaritan who was travelling that way came 
upon the man, and when he saw him, his heart was filled with pity.  
34 He went over to him, poured oil and wine on his wounds and bandaged 
them; then he put the man on his own animal and took him to an inn, where he 
took care of him. 35 The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to 
the innkeeper. ‘Take care of him,’ he told the innkeeper, ‘and when I come back 
this way, I will pay you whatever else you spend on him.’”  
36 And Jesus concluded, “In your opinion, which one of these three acted like 
a neighbour towards the man attacked by the robbers?”  
37 The teacher of the Law answered, “The one who was kind to him.”  
Jesus replied, “You go, then, and do the same.”2  
                                           
1  The Good Samaritan, Hogarth,  (1737) St Bartholomew’s Hospital, London   
2  The Bible, The New Testament,  Luke 10: 25-37 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This Thesis has been prompted by a concern for the position of First Aid volunteers 
(as Good Samaritans) who, when responding to emergencies act as Rescuers. The 
project essentially considers the concept of Rescue and particularly the Failure to 
Rescue as a very important sub-set of the jurisprudence of Omissions. It explores 
the unusual factors at play in relation to Rescues and uses these as a means to re-
examine some of the elements in the persistent confrontation of Law and Morality. It 
asks especially whether there is a fundamental Duty to Rescue? and if so, the nature 
of that Duty?. Is it a legal duty (Criminal and/or Civil) or is it simply a moral duty? or 
is there no duty at all?  The question of how Moral Luck impinges in this area is 
specifically examined given the wide ranging factors that come together to create a 
Rescue situation (most, or many, of which are entirely matters of luck - and ill luck at 
that).  From a review of previous literature, the concept of Rescue does not appear 
to have featured to any significant degree in the debates about Law and Morality, 
and, in particular, the question of whether and to what extent Moral Luck should 
influence the Duty to Rescue appears to be an original line of enquiry. The project 
also reviews the current position in relation to English Law and compares this in 
outline to the position in some other leading Western jurisdictions. It also looks at 
various initiatives relating to the law of negligence in England & Wales and considers 
the degree to which volunteer rescuers are/ should be protected under English Law. 
The project hypothesises that a specific ‘Good Samaritan Law’ is required to protect 
volunteer rescuers, despite the very recent enactment of the ‘Social Action, 
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015’.  
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1. Introduction to the Problem and a Potential Solution   
1.1 General 
1.1.1 Preliminary 
My interest in carrying out this research stems from my position as the General 
Counsel for a large First Aid charity within England and Wales. Providing First Aid is 
a vital service to the Community and evidence indicates that up to 140,000 lives are 
lost each year where First Aid could have made the difference3. It is in this important 
sense that I describe the provision of First Aid in an emergency as a Rescue i.e. if a 
member of the public is confronted by a life-threatening accident or injury (perhaps 
they are choking), and they are not in or near a Hospital, or in the proximity of a 
Health Care Professional (e.g. a Doctor/Nurse) then unless someone with 
appropriate First Aid skills intervenes to Rescue them, they are likely to die.  
 
Voluntary First Aiders are therefore a particular class of Rescuer. However, they are 
becoming increasingly concerned regarding potential liabilities arising from carrying 
out a rescue (as described in more detail below). It is this Problem, and possible 
solutions to it, which comprise this Thesis 
 
There are significant Moral Issues present in the area of the Duty to Rescue, and 
Protecting Rescuers from Liability, and Chapter 2 of this work looks at the age old 
debate regarding the degree to which Law and Morality should, or should not, 
coincide on any particular topic, in any specific Social System. It importantly 
introduces the question of how a possible Duty to Rescue (Legal or Moral) may 
contribute to this discussion, and especially what part might be played by the concept 
of Moral Luck.  
 
                                           
3 St John Ambulance Annual Review 2010 (quoting NHS A&E data) 
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A Literature Review has been carried out in the development of this thesis, and the 
relevant works were critiqued as the project proceeded and these criticisms appear 
within each of the respective Chapters/Sections below. Fundamentally, the Review 
indicated that the possibility of their being a Duty to Rescue has not been pursued to 
any great extent as a means of throwing light on the age-old debate as to what extent 
aspects of Morality should be enshrined in the Law of a given Jurisdiction. In 
particular, there does not appear to have been any specific consideration of how 
Moral Luck (first described by Bernard Williams4), and its effect on the Duty to 
Rescue, contributes to the debate. These aspects are therefore considered to be an 
original line of enquiry and provide an opportunity for this project to add a new 
element to the Literature in this area. 
 
This research project therefore investigates the questions of whether there is a Duty 
to Rescue and how Rescuers might be protected. It does this generally in relation to 
the interaction of Law and Morality (including a detailed consideration of the influence 
of Moral luck, and also the so-called Acts and Omissions Doctrine) and in particular, 
it considers the current position in England and Wales, and also (in outline) in some 
other Western Jurisdictions. The project then seeks to make out a case for the 
Protection of Rescuers in English Law. The research proceeds under the following 
Headings: 
1) Introduction to the problem and a Potential Solution 
2) Law and Morality  
3) Moral Luck and Rescuers/Good Samaritans 
4) Causation, Responsibility and Omissions (and Failure to Rescue) 
5) The Law of Rescue in England & Wales, and various ‘Western’ Jurisdictions 
6) Recent Initiatives on Liability for Omissions/ an English Good Samaritan Law 
7) Summary, Conclusions and Recommendation    
                                           
4 Williams B, 'Moral Luck', Proceedings of the Aristotolelian Society: Supplement ,50 (1976) 
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1.1.2 The Problem 
Unlike the position in a number of other common law jurisdictions (e.g. parts of the 
USA; Canada; and Australia –analysed in Chapter 5), the status of a Rescuer under 
English Law is ambiguous. Whilst there is no general legal duty to rescue5, specific 
obligations devolve upon certain categories of individuals e.g. parents, or bodies 
such as the Fire Service6. In addition, if a volunteer chooses to attempt a rescue then 
they are expected to meet a certain standard of care. If there is a possibility that this 
standard has not been met and the ‘victim’ suffers additional harm, then there is a 
real risk that the victim may sue the volunteer7. There is some protection for such 
volunteers, but historically this has generally been in terms of a right to recover, if 
they themselves are injured or suffer loss. There was previously little protection 
against them being sued for negligence (unlike in many jurisdictions overseas). 
However, during the course of producing this thesis the position has been changing, 
and in fact this work has contributed, albeit in some small part, to a limited form of 
Good Samaritan Act appearing on the Statute book in England & Wales: The Social 
Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, which received Royal Assent on 12 
February 2015. 
 
The need for such a Statute is long-standing and it was not surprising that in the 
absence of any such Legislation, the number of volunteer leaders in the UK had been 
in decline over the first part of the 21st century. More specifically a leading spokesman 
in the Sector went on record as stating that 69% of his front line volunteers quote the 
‘fear of being sued’ as the predominant reason for reducing numbers of voluntary 
                                           
5   Halsbury S, Halsbury’s Laws of England,(London, Butterworths, 1997) Vol 33 
6   Roger W, Winfield and Jolowicz on Torts (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) pp 142-145 
7   Cattley v t John Ambulance. In. (87/NJ/1140/QBD)   
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leaders8. In addition, the number of first aid volunteers in the UK’s leading First Aid 
Charity fell by some 10% in the years 2000 to 20109.  
 
It is in this sense that the fear of liability, or the so called Compensation Culture, can 
be said to have had a chilling effect on the level of volunteering, with another leading 
spokesman having reported to Parliament that up to one million individuals may be 
considering giving up volunteering because of the fear that they may be litigated 
against10.  This cannot be a good thing for volunteers, or for Society generally, 
especially in the light of the growing trend to rely more and more on the Charity Sector 
for delivering part of the provision of various public services11 It is very much hoped 
that the new 2015 Statute will lead to a reversal of these trends. 
 
1.1.3 Context 
 
As referred to earlier I am especially concerned about the effect that the uncertainty 
in English Law has had on First Aid Volunteers, and particularly in relation to the St 
John Ambulance Charity12. This organisation carries out a number of charitable 
activities including: providing First Aid training/education to some 800,000 individuals 
each year; attending public events and providing first aid cover (up to 5 million hours 
each year); operating a ‘back-up’ ambulance service to the NHS (involving 1100 
vehicles); providing training and development to a large adult and youth membership 
(including nearly 20,000 young people aged between 5 and 18). 
 
                                           
8 Derek Twine, Chief Executive, The Scout Association, in his evidence to the  
 Parliamentary Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Compensation Culture, Third 
 Report of Session 2005-06, Volume II, Ev 33. 
9   St John Ambulance Annual Reports and Accounts 2000-2010 
10  Justin Davis-Smith, Deputy Chief Executive, Volunteering England (Op Cit No.8  Ev 33) 
11 Charity Commission (June 2006) Policy Statement on Charities and Public Service 
 Delivery 
12 A Company Limited by Guarantee, No. 3866129 / Registered Charity, No. 1077265/1  
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In total St John Ambulance utilises some 40,00013 volunteers in providing services to 
the community and in many cases these are delivered under emergency conditions 
(e.g. the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005). It is very worrying that these volunteers 
(and volunteers generally) feel a lack of confidence that they cannot perform a public 
service and provide assistance to victims, without worrying that they might then be 
sued.  
 
1.1.4 A case for Protecting Volunteer Rescuers? 
As can be seen, there are very compelling Public Policy reasons as to why Rescuers 
should benefit from some degree of protection under the Law. If they are not, then 
the deterrent effect both in terms of performing a rescue, and also in terms of 
maintaining membership with, or becoming a member of voluntary aid organisations 
will become evident. In the Charity Sector in particular, the Charity Commission 
oversees Regulation and ensures that charities not only exist to further Charitable 
Purposes, but also to provide a Public Benefit14. The tax concessions available to 
charities are predicated on these general principles. One of the prime charitable 
purposes under the Charities Act 2011 is “The Advancement of Health or the Saving 
of Lives”15. It is therefore illogical for the State to encourage the formation of charities 
to pursue this purpose, whilst at the same time leaving the position ambiguous as to 
whether such volunteers might be sued if they attempted a life-saving act (i.e. a 
rescue) which turned out to be unsuccessful. 
 
There is another argument for Protecting Volunteer Rescuers and this is associated 
with the concept of Moral Luck. The peculiar nature of rescue scenarios, is that they 
are unexpected, they happen by chance and are generally a matter of ill-luck. It is 
                                           
13 St John Ambulance Annual Report and Accounts 2010 - 2014 
14 Charities Act 2011, Chapter 25, The Stationery Office S 4 
15 Charities Act 2011, Chapter 25, The Stationery Office, S. 3 (1) (d) 
 16 
particularly in this type of situation that the Paradox of Moral Luck16 comes into play. 
In his work “Moral Luck”, Thomas Nagel posits four categories of Moral Luck: 
 
(i) Constitutive Luck (the kind of person you are) 
(ii) Circumstantial Luck (the kind of problems you face) 
(iii) Causative Luck (determined by Antecedent Events (the Factual Matrix)) 
(iv) Consequential Luck (in the way things turn out (the outcomes that result)) 
     
 
In the case of an emergency, which raises the prospect of rescue (say a drunkard 
falling into a river), all four elements of Moral Luck can arise: the potential rescuer 
might be a brave person and a strong swimmer; the river might be very shallow at 
the point the drunkard fell in; the potential Rescuer may be present at the scene 
simply because he/she walked home, rather than took a bus; and the rescue might 
be termed successful if the drunkard recovers consciousness’ 
 
Conversely: the potential rescuer might be timid and a non-swimmer; the river might 
be very deep and fast flowing; other (braver) rescuers might also be present; and the 
rescue might be considered unsuccessful if the victim is resuscitated but with 
catastrophic brain damage. 
 
Consequently, the particular Moral Luck ‘Matrix’ which might impact on any particular 
situation, could of itself act as a significant deterrent to prevent a specific individual 
from deciding to attempt a rescue. However, if, regardless of this (and with no thought 
as to whether the victim, or the victim’s family might sue if the rescue goes wrong), a 
Good Samaritan attempts a rescue, then it would seem that the least Society could 
do to reward the individual for their bravery would be to insulate him/her from any 
(unjustified) adverse repercussions.   
 
 
                                           
16 Nagel T ‘Moral Luck’ in Mortal Questions, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1979) 
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1.1.5 Recent Developments in English Law 
On the 25th July 2006 the Compensation Act 2006 received Royal Assent after a 
particularly difficult passage through each of the Houses of Parliament. The key part 
of the Act in relation to this Research is Part 1 dealing with the Standard of Care 
which individuals owe their neighbours. The wording of Section 1 is as below: 
 
1. Deterrent effect of potential liability 
 
A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in determining 
whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a standard of care (whether 
by taking precautions against a risk or otherwise), have regard to whether a requirement to 
take those steps might- 
 
(a) prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent or in a 
particular way, or 
 
(b) discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. 
 
The section introduced the concept of “desirable activity” into English Law, and the 
thrust of the Legislation is that if a court is faced with a negligence claim it should be 
mindful in reaching a decision on liability, as to whether (and to what extent) the 
defendant was carrying out a desirable activity. If in order to completely avoid the risk 
of injury, the defendant would need to entirely withdraw from providing that activity, 
then this is unlikely (generally) to be in the wider public interest. Any decision on 
negligence needs to weigh the desirability of the defendant’s activity fully into 
account. 
 
The term “Desirable Activity” had not been previously defined in English Law (as 
confirmed by the Minister promoting the Legislation, during the various debates 
recorded in Hansard17). In fact, the term was deliberately chosen for this very reason 
so as to provide the courts with a clean slate upon which to work. As a consequence 
there was considerable expectation as to how the courts would apply the term, and 
what type of activity they might consider to be “desirable activity”. 
                                           
17 Hansard, House of Lords, 15 Dec 2005 (51215-43) Col GC 213 
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I maintain that the action of an individual providing First Aid to a victim is simply one 
example of a person carrying out a Rescue, which activity itself is clearly a ‘desirable 
activity’. It may have been expected that over time the courts might have defined 
categories of activity which meet the standard of being desirable activities.  
 
However, by 2014 no such categories of Desirable Activities had emerged from the 
Courts, and further efforts were made with the UK Government (including by the 
writer and St John Ambulance) to have a more specific piece of Legislation 
introduced to make the position clearer. This had some success in 2015 when the 
Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act received Royal Assent on 12 February 
2015. I and a colleague from St John Ambulance had a number of meetings with the 
Minister for Justice, and Statutory draughtsmen at the Justice Ministry, and were able 
to successfully persuade the Government that the Section of the Legislation relating 
to Heroism needed to be more far reaching than initially drafted.  
 
This success is evidenced by the comments made by Mr Chris Grayling MP, the then 
Lord Chancellor, and Justice Secretary, during the Third Reading of the Bill in the 
House of Commons on 2 February 2015: “We debated a proposed amendment that 
emanated from St John Ambulance … I did as I undertook to do and went away and 
thought carefully about the measure. I listened to debates in the Lords and decided 
there was no reason not to accept the St John Ambulance recommendation”18 
 
The Act received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015, and turning to the wording of 
the Act itself, Sections 1 and 4 are the pertinent ones for my thesis: 
“1 When this Act applies 
 
                                           
18 House of Commons, Hansard, 2 Feb 2015 (Cm150202-0002) Col 78 
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 This Act applies when a court, in considering a claim that a person was 
 negligent or in breach of statutory duty, is determining the steps that the 
 person was required to take to meet a standard of care. 
… 
 
4 Heroism 
 
 The Court must have regard to whether the negligence or breach of 
 statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by 
 intervening in an emergency to assist another individual in danger”.  
 
This provided an encouraging outcome to this Thesis, and it is very much hoped that 
the reference in this Act to “heroism” in connection with a person intervening in an 
“emergency to assist another individual in danger” (see my definitions of various of 
these terms in the Glossary forming Appendix 1) will be more effective than the more 
obscure reference to “desirable activity” in the earlier Compensation Act. 
 
However, based on previous experience a more explicit Good Samaritan Act would 
still be more beneficial in dealing with the unfortunate perception which has hitherto 
acted to dissuade volunteers to act as rescuers (the perception that if something 
goes wrong they will be sued for negligence!). 
 
1.16 Conclusion 
As this thesis progressed it became increasingly clear to me that English Law might 
continue to leave matters of Rescue very much in the Moral sphere, rather than 
enshrine them in Law. There emerged various reasons for this and these are 
discussed in the subsequent Chapters/Sections of my work: In Chapter 2, I 
concentrate on the traditional Jurisprudential approach of maintaining a separation 
of Law and Morality and use this as a theoretical Framework to assist my work. The, 
albeit, synoptic review of various writers has been carried out to indicate how the 
longstanding Law and Morality debate may influence, and be influenced by, a 
discussion concerning a Good Samaritan Act for England & Wales.  
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I continue to track this tendency to separate Moral and Legal approaches throughout 
the thesis and in Chapter 3, I consider how the paradox of Moral Luck contributes to 
that separation; and in Chapter 4, I look at how the so-called Acts and Omissions 
Doctrine reinforces the separation. 
 
Chapter 5 includes a somewhat cursory review as to how some other ‘Western’ 
jurisdictions approach the matter, and given their greater willingness to provide Legal 
protections to Rescuers (and sometimes, Legal obligations to attempt Rescues), I 
move in Chapter 6, to look at how potential changes in English Law are being brought 
forward and at the various developments that have been arising. 
 
This caused me to consider a draft Good Samaritan Act for England and I did this 
because, as I mention later, I was not satisfied that innovations such as the Social 
Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (whilst welcome) were likely to provide 
a sufficient response to negate the chilling effect that the Compensation Culture was 
having on Volunteer Rescuers (and in particular, First Aid Volunteers).  
 
My final draft for such a Good Samaritan Act appears as the closing page of this 
thesis. However, I reproduce it now, at this point, by way of a hypothesis as to how 
the Problem posited in the first part of this Chapter might be resolved. The draft 
initially contained three operative Sections (covering 1) A Duty to Attempt an Easy 
Rescue, 2) An Immunity for Rescuers from Suit, and 3) Compensation for losses. 
 
This three-section approach is an ideal, and it will be seen following Chapters 3-6 
that the eventual draft Statute that I recommend only has two operative Sections, (for 
reasons which will emerge) 
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Hypothetical Good Samaritan Act 
Section 1. Duty to Attempt an Easy Rescue  
Subject to no unreasonable risk to themselves, anyone who fails to attempt the 
Rescue of another person in an Emergency, shall be guilty of an offence 
punishable by a fine not exceeding level [2]* on the Standard Scale. 
 
Section 2. Protection of Volunteer Rescuers 
Any Volunteer who attempts to Rescue another person in an Emergency, shall not 
be liable for any loss or harm so arising provided they have acted reasonably and 
without Gross Negligence. 
 
Section 3. Compensation for Volunteer Rescuers   
Any Volunteer who, acting reasonably, attempts to Rescue another person in an 
Emergency, and who suffers harm or loss, shall be entitled to Compensation. 
 
 
Interpretation 
“Emergency” means an unexpected and/or uncontrolled situation which involves 
danger or serious harm to human life.  
  
“Rescue” means a response to an immediate emergency, whereby a human 
being is saved (or might be saved) from the danger of loss of life or serious harm. 
Such response includes, as a minimum, the summoning of the Statutory 
Emergency Services, where the Rescuer has a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
   
“Volunteer” means an individual who acts without expectation of payment or 
other remuneration. 
 
* Level 2 on the date of drafting this specimen Act was £500.      
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1.2. Limitation of this Thesis in terms of Emergencies and Rescues 
As referred to above this thesis is concerned with the question of whether there is a 
Duty to Rescue in this Country, and if so whether this (and the Protection of such 
Rescuers) should be a matter of Morality, Law, or both. However, before the detailed 
analysis of this, and the impact of Moral Luck, it is necessary to define the parameters 
of my work. In particular I need to specify which types of Emergency I was concerned 
with, and also which types of Rescue I have investigated. 
 
This is dealt with in considerable detail in the general Appendix to the Thesis, which 
represents a Glossary in relation to “Emergencies” and “Rescues”. With the 
assistance of this Glossary I can set out the limited definitions of these two concepts 
which have been used throughout this Work: 
 
Emergency: 
“An unexpected and/or uncontrolled situation which involves danger to 
human life or the danger of serious harm to human beings”. 
 
Rescue: 
“A direct response to an immediate emergency whereby a human being is 
saved (or might be saved) from the danger of loss of life or serious harm, by 
a Volunteer”. 
 
In terms of Emergencies I have limited my research in the manner described above, 
and have done this to exclude situations involving events that do not threaten human 
life/ serious injury (e.g. threats to Animals or Property etc.) and to exclude situations 
which are foreseeable, or recurring (e.g. cyclical famines etc.). As explained further 
in the Appendix, I am not being callous in excluding such eventualities, but do this to 
ensure an appropriate focus to my project. 
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Turning to Rescues, I have also limited my thesis to exclude situations which do not 
apply to Human Beings (e.g. Animals, and Property again); and to exclude situations 
where the danger to the individual is neither life-threatening, nor likely to cause 
serious harm; and also to exclude situations where there is a pre-existing duty to 
provide assistance e.g. by the State Rescue Services (such as the Fire Service), or 
by individuals in Special relationships to those in danger e.g. Employers; Parents; 
Doctors etc. Each of these situations is described in more detail in the Appendix, but 
they do not form the focus of my project, which is concerned with Volunteer 
Rescuers. 
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2. Law and Morality 
 
This Chapter is in two parts: the First discusses the general debate on the 
Relationship between Law and Morality, the second indicates how the following 
Chapters of this work, are influenced by, and contribute to that debate. There is a 
long history to the discussion about the separation of Law and Morality, and in 
developing this thesis I not only wanted to investigate how this separation might 
influence Good Samaritan Laws, but I also wanted my work on Good Samaritan Laws 
(and my review of Moral Luck) to inform the wider Law and Morality debate. 
 
Part 1 The relationship between Law and Morality 
 
2.1 General 
 
The question of the relationship between Law and Morality comprises a monumental 
Literature and can be traced back to classical philosophers such as Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle, and no doubt to the earliest point when human beings first thought 
about their relationship with their peers in their Society. This thesis does not set out 
to review this literature in any great detail, but does touch on the works of a number 
of the most well-known commentators and particularly refers to the work of Herbert 
Hart, who I consider to have established the most satisfactory description of a legal 
system to date. Hart espoused that there is no necessary connection between Law 
and Morality”19, and it is this separation of Law and Morality which I identify as one 
of the main reasons why I believe there is currently no specific Good Samaritan Act 
in England and Wales. It is at the heart of the theoretical framework that I used to 
guide my work and I refer to this in more detail in the following pages. 
 
Interestingly when Hart wrote just before the posthumous publication of the second 
edition of his “The Concept of Law” he particularly addressed a number of criticisms 
of his work and demonstrated how a number of these could be accommodated in his 
theory. This accommodation became the postscript to that second edition. I 
personally consider that in doing this Hart remains as the Philosopher who has 
provided the most complete and effective Concept of (Morality and) Law, and one 
which maintains that these are fundamentally separate concepts with no necessary 
connection of any predominant kind.  
                                           
19 Hart H, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press 
1961, 3rd Edition 2012) 
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I maintain this despite the challenges of the later Jurisprudential Movements, and 
particularly the Post-Modernists whose deconstructionalist ideas nonetheless throw 
light on the need for a flexibility of approach when considering Law and Morality at 
the margins. In my view the primacy of Hart’s Positivist theory tempered with the 
recognition that flexibility is required both in terms of Interpretation and Approach 
(when novel or unusual situations arise), was cemented further when the third edition 
of his “Concept of Law” was published in 2012. 
 
Having stated this, it is important that I track the chronology of the Law and Morality 
debate in a little more detail and in doing so I wish to emphasise some of the 
differences between Morality and Law, and most importantly I wish to indicate that 
there are many things which Society may consider immoral, but which do not result 
in Laws being passed to address them. One of the archetypal examples often quoted 
in this regard is the act of lying: it is generally considered to be immoral to lie, but this 
is not generally unlawful (although in extreme circumstances, such as perjury, it is 
both unlawful and a crime). 
 
I will assert by the end of this thesis that the Failure to Rescue is generally another 
area where moral disapproval is not necessarily translated into legal disapproval. In 
contrast I will make the argument that Protecting a Rescuer from liability towards the 
Rescuee (or his/her family) is both a Moral and Legal imperative. 
 
In developing these assertions in relation to Rescues I will rely heavily on the concept 
of Moral Luck to reinforce my conclusions. My review of Moral Luck forms Chapter 3 
below. 
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In the following sub-sections I have included one or two extracts from the writings of 
the Philosophers mentioned earlier, to indicate the principle which exemplifies their 
views in this area. It is not the intention to review their philosophy in any further detail 
as this not the subject of this particular thesis. 
 
2.2 St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
At his simplest, and concentrating on this aspect of his writings, Thomas Aquinas 
asserts that human beings discover law by applying Practical Reason drawing on 
Eternal Law (i.e. the moral precepts of the Divine Law of God). Hence he states: 
 
“Wherefore the very idea of the government of things in God the ruler of the universe, 
has the nature of a law. And since the divine reason’s conception of things is not 
subject to time but is eternal, according to proverbs viii 23, therefore it is that this kind 
of law must be called eternal”20 “…since all things subjected to divine providence are 
ruled and measured by the eternal law, it is evident that all things partake somewhat 
of the eternal law … and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature 
is called natural law”21 …“As Augustine says ‘that which is not Just seems to be no 
law at all’ … Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right according 
to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature … if it in any point 
it [Law] deflects from the law of nature it is no longer a law but a perversion of law”22. 
 
Aquinas thereby introduced the long recurring idea that: if a law is not just, it is not 
law (lex injusta non est lex). In other words if a law is not moral it is not law - thereby 
propounding an essential connection between Morality and Law.  
 
2.3 Niccolo Machiavelli 
 
Whilst Aquinas was writing around 1270, Niccolo (‘Prince’) Machiavelli writing c.1510 
is credited as being one of the first philosophers to insist on the differentiation of 
human reason from divine will, and thereby establishing political thought as a branch 
of science, or the advent of Secularism. In particular, Machiavelli advised that a State 
should be built on how things are (i.e. as evidenced by fact/science) rather than as 
things should be (i.e. as may have been divined as morally or naturally good): 
                                           
20 Aquinas T (1274) ‘Summa Theologica Q91 A1’ in Jurisprudence Texts and Commentary” 
 ed. By Davies H & Holdcroft D, (London, Butterworths 1991) 
21 Ibid Q91 A2 
22 Ibid Q95 A2 
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“How we live is so different from how we ought to live”23 
 
It can therefore be seen that Machiavelli was one of the first thinkers to differentiate 
the “is” from the “ought”, and this underpins the later Positivist approach that there is 
no necessary connection between the law as it is, and morality i.e. the law as it 
perhaps ought to be. 
 
Machiavelli was also adamant that human beings could not be left to habitually order 
their affairs in line with what was considered morally Right or Natural, because 
human beings are not innately good: 
 
“Whoever desires to found a State and give it law, must start with assuming that all 
men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, whenever they may find 
occasion for it”24. 
 
2.4 Thomas Hobbes 
 
Thomas Hobbes picked up Machiavelli’s theme about the innate immorality of man 
in his pivotal work “Leviathan” published in 1561. He believed the Natural state of 
human beings was not one based on the principle of the ‘greatest good’ (summum 
bonum) but one of “Continual fear and danger of violent death … (with) … the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”25  
 
Hobbes’ solution to this state of affairs was to assert that if men were to be able to 
live together then they needed to subsume their personal drives and appetites, and 
accept an imposed system of ‘control’ which would lead to the better good of all i.e. 
a ‘Social Contract Theory’. In Hobbes’ words, the creation of a “Commonwealth”: 
 
                                           
23 Machiavelli N (1513) The Prince, (London, Penguin, 2001) Chapter 15 
24 Machiavelli N (1517) ‘Discourse upon the First Ten Books of Livy’ in The Discourses 
 (London, Penguin, 1998) 
25 Hobbes T (1651) Leviathan,(Oxford, World Classics, Oxford Univ Press, 2008) Part I 
 28 
“The design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others), in the 
introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in 
Commonwealth, is the foresight of their own presentation and of a more contented 
life thereby26”  
 
Hence Hobbes established the approach of creating a Social (or Legal) system 
whereby men and women would sign up to a system of conscious rules to govern 
them in a Society and thereby ‘Posit’ a legal system based on ‘Reason; rather than 
Moral Pronouncement, i.e. a legal system based on “is” statements rather than 
divined “ought” statements. 
 
The question remained as to who imposes this system for the benefit of the greater 
good, or Commonwealth, and Hobbes was quite clear that in his view the system 
was imposed by a Sovereign, being either a single Ruler, or an assembly of 
individuals exercising powers as the Ruler (what Hobbes termed his ‘Leviathan’): 
 
“I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly 
of men, on the condition that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise his actions 
in like manner”27. 
 
 
2.5 Jeremy Bentham 
 
Whilst Hobbes laid the foundation of the Social Contract theory, and established that 
this should be imposed by a Sovereign, this did not guarantee that the Sovereign’s 
system of Rules would necessarily be benign.  In Machiavelli’s eyes a State system 
would be more likely of success if it was authoritarian and imposed by force, with the 
Ruler’s (the Prince’s) will ensuring that his ends were achieved. Machiavelli is often 
held as originating the idea that “The End Justifies the Means”28  
 
                                           
26 Ibid Part II 
27 Ibid 
28 Op Cit Note 23  
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This precept has been widely misinterpreted as suggesting that any course of action 
(however immoral) is justified if it achieves the desired outcome or consequence. 
Consequentialism, related to Determinism, features significantly in my Thesis (not 
least in the discussion on the idea of Moral Luck). However, at this point I wish to 
concentrate on the work of Jeremy Bentham who espoused a more balanced (and 
Moral) version of Consequentialism when introducing his, well known, theory of 
Utilitarianism.  
 
Bentham did not especially propound a form of legal system per se, rather he was 
suggesting a method of deciding whether a particular proposition should form part of 
a legal system and also how the Rules in that legal system should be applied i.e. that 
if there was a choice in application of a specific law, then that choice should be the 
one which produces the greatest benefit for the greatest number. Bentham 
specifically described this Utilitarian approach as the Happiness Principle, and 
defined Happiness as the surfeit of Pleasure over Pain: 
 
“Mankind is under the Governance of the Sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do”29  
 
This is therefore an essentially Moral proposition in that Bentham was not suggesting 
that Law and Morality should be the same, but that Law was what the state had 
defined as Law, but the question of whether that Law was Morally Good (or Morally 
Bad) was a separate enquiry, and one which in his eyes could be established using 
Utilitarianism as the relevant tool for the job. This approach also left open the idea 
that what might (or might not) be a moral position, need not necessarily result in (or 
find itself within) the prevailing Legal System. 
 
                                           
29 Bentham J (1789) ‘Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ (Mineola 
 New York, Dover Philosophical Classics, 2007) Section 1 
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I will look at Utilitarianism in more detail later in this project, but suffice it to say at 
present that I will argue both that the Duty to attempt certain Rescues is a Moral 
Imperative (using a Utilitarian argument), but also that to attempt some Rescues 
would involve too much risk and leave too much to Luck (Moral Luck) such that it 
would not be appropriate to translate it into a Legal Duty. 
 
2.6 John Locke 
 
Alongside Bentham’s development of Utilitarianism, John Locke is credited with the 
birth of Liberalism and he developed this as a corollary of the Social Contract theory, 
mentioned earlier when introducing the ideas of Thomas Hobbes. In particular, Locke 
qualified the Social Contract theory by emphasising that in subjugating total authority 
to the creation of a Society structured by the Sovereign, each individual should retain 
the right to defend his “Life, Health, Liberty, and Possessions”30  
 
2.7 John Austin 
 
I will refer further to the impact of Liberal thought, via the Social Contract theory in 
the next sub-section, but chronologically it is now the time to consider John Austin, 
one of the major proponents of Legal Positivism, who firmly rejected the Natural Law 
position, whilst also adopting a particular variant of Thomas Hobbes’ Sovereign 
theory. 
 
The critical question to be answered by any Positivist is, if the law is Posited rather 
than simply discoverable from Nature, then who is it that Posits the law. Hobbes 
indicated that in his view his ‘Leviathan’ posited the law. Austin’s variation on this 
was his “Command Theory”, which essentially has a Commander positing the law: 
 
                                           
30 Locke J, (1689) ‘Two Treatises of Government’ in Cambridge Texts in the History of 
 Philosophical Thought, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1988) 
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“Every positive law, or every law so called, is a direct or circuitous command of a 
Monarch or Sovereign number in the character of a political superior: that is to say a 
direct or circuitous command of a Monarch or Sovereign number to a person or 
persons in a State of subjection to its author”31. 
 
Austin further defines a Command as different to other ‘wish’ statements by insisting 
that there are Sanctions to uphold commands: 
 
“If you express or intimate a wish that I shall do, or forbear from some act, and if you 
will visit me with an evil in case I comply not with your wish, the expression or 
intimation of your wish is a command”32  
 
Various writers paraphrased Austin as describing law as a set of ‘Orders backed by 
Threats’, and this led subsequently to considerable criticism of Austin, especially 
from Herbert Hart (see later Sub-Section). However, one of the other strong criticisms 
of Austin was that his definition of law could be extremely penal, indeed the most 
despotic Dictatorship would fit his definition of a Command based Legal System. 
Such a Legal System would meet the definition of a valid system even if it was totally 
immoral. This point was taken up by John Stuart Mill. 
 
2.8 John Stuart Mill 
John Stuart Mill brought together a number of the inter-related threads referred to in 
earlier sub-sections and combined a Positivist approach, with Utilitarianism, with 
Social Contract theory, with Liberalism, and with recognition of parts of Austin’s 
Command theory. However, Mill tempered the extreme interpretation of Austin’s legal 
theory: the so-called ‘Orders backed by Threats’, by the introduction of his 
“Prevention of Harm” principle: 
 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community against his will, is to prevent harm to others”33. 
                                           
31 Austin J (1832) ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined’, in Cambridge Texts in the 
 History of Philosophical Thought, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1995) 
32 Ibid 
33 Mill JS (1859) ‘On Liberty’, in Oxford World Classics (Oxford, Oxford Univ’ Press 1991) 
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Hence it can be seen that Mill brought a degree of a moral ‘back-drop’ to Austin’s 
Command Theory. His principle concerning Harm also impacts heavily on my line of 
enquiry regarding the Jurisprudence around Rescue, e.g. does the failure to attempt 
a straightforward rescue amount to ‘harm to others’ which the law should address?; 
and does the need to protect Rescuers from being pursued come within the definition 
of ‘preventing harm to’ such that the law should intervene? These are the key 
questions for later in this thesis. 
 
2.9 Hans Kelsen 
Hans Kelsen is the next philosopher whose work I wish to consider (albeit in outline). 
I do this because he introduced the idea that a Positive Law approach can be 
anchored by a Basis Norm, rather than via some more dictatorial form of Command.  
Kelsen described this purer form of origin in his “Pure Theory of Law”, in which he 
developed the idea of a Hierarchy of Norms (Rules) culminating in a Basic Norm (the 
“Grundnorm”). All the subsidiary Norms were stated as drawing their legitimacy from 
the Basic Norm. 
 
Kelsen used the term “Pure” in his theory to re-emphasise the Positivist approach i.e. 
that he was describing Law as it “is”, not how it “ought” to be – in other words without 
including morality in the formulation (which would detract from its objective purity): 
 
“The Pure theory of law is a theory of positive law … the theory attempts to answer 
the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to be. It is a science of law…”34   
 
Kelsen developed his theory of a hierarchy of Norms which individuals must obey, 
as the ‘price’ of belonging to any given society, but confirms that the Norms 
themselves obtain their validity from a Basic Norm: 
 
                                           
34 Kelsen H (1934) The Pure Theory of Law (New Jersey, The Law Book Exchange 2009) 
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“The Basic Norm is the presupposed starting point of a procedure, the procedure of 
positive law creation. It is itself not a norm created … by the act of a legal norm, it is 
not a positive but a presupposed norm so far as the Constitution-establishing 
authority is looked upon as the highest authority and can therefore not be regarded 
as authorised by the norm of a higher authority”35  
 
As to the character of his ‘presupposed’ basic norm, Kelsen goes on to state: 
 
“coercive acts ought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner which 
the historically first constitution, and the norms created in accordance to it, prescribe 
(in short: one ought to behave as the Constitution prescribes)”36. 
 
These are points picked up by and expanded upon by Herbert Hart 
 
2.10 Herbert Hart 
Herbert Hart published his “Concept of Law” in 1961, and for me established the most 
coherent theory of Law to date i.e. that Law is as posited, rather than arising naturally, 
and that generally there is no necessary Connection between Law (as so posited) 
and Morality (as flowing from ‘Nature’). Hart’s theory or concept of law has been 
challenged by a number of subsequent philosophers, and most notably by Ronald 
Dworkin, and by the Legal Realists, the Critical Legal Studies movement, and the 
Post-Modernists. Hart defended his Concept from Dworkin’s challenge reasonably 
successfully, and others have demonstrated that Hart’s Positivism survives the more 
modern challenges, especially when considering Law in its everyday sense, rather 
than at the theoretical margins. It is this sense that I suggest that Hart established a 
high water mark for Positivism, and the most helpful concept to guide my enquiries 
into what an analysis of Rescue can tell us about Law and Morality. 
Hart himself begins by challenging the work of John Austin, and it is he who 
categorised Austin’s work as Orders backed by Threats. Hart asks the question: 
                                           
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
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“How then do law and legal obligations differ from and how are they related to Orders 
backed by Threats”37.   
 
He asks this question because, as he asserts, Austin’s formulation does not 
distinguish from the situation of “the gunman who says to the bank clerk ‘hand over 
the money or I will shoot’”38 i.e. this is also an order backed by threats, but it is by no 
means Law.  Hart recognises that Austin attempted to overcome this issue by 
referring to his Commands (and Sanctions) as being legitimised by reference to the 
Sovereign. But this raises the next problem for Hart i.e. why does a legal system 
need a Sovereign? Hart indicates that it does not, and states further that the presence 
of a Sovereign (as an individual, or as a group of individuals habitually obeyed) 
cannot be an essential for a legal system, since this would not provide continuity of 
the system, when the Sovereign ceases to exist (in Hart’s terms the transition from 
Rex I to Rex II): 
 
“Let us now suppose that, after a successful reign Rex dies leaving a son Rex II who 
then starts to issue general orders. The mere fact that there was a general obedience to 
Rex I in his lifetime does not by itself even render possible that Rex II will be habitually 
obeyed … There is as yet no established habit of obedience to Rex II”39. 
 
What Hart suggests is that rather than a Sovereign, what is needed is a system of 
Rules in a Society, habitually obeyed by the majority of the members of that Society. 
He actually describes two different types of Rule: “Primary Rules”, which describe 
the obligations (and rights) of citizens within the legal system – which are habitually 
obeyed and followed, and “Secondary Rules” which provide for the establishment, 
maintenance, and continuity of the Primary Rules: 
 
“… Law may most illuminatingly be characterised as a Union of primary rules of 
obligation, with … secondary rules”40  
                                           
37 Op Cit Note 19 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid, Page 53 
40 Ibid, Page 94 
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The vital component of Hart’s Secondary Rules is what he calls his “Rule of 
Recognition”, being the rule which validates the Primary Rules which Society is to 
live by. In Hart’s Concept of Law this Rule of Recognition replaces the Basic Norm 
described by Kelsen in his theory of law. Hart states that a Rule of recognition will: 
 
“Specify some feature or features possession by which by a suggested rule is taken 
as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by 
the Social pressure it exerts41.  
 
Hart continues to describe the characteristics of such a Rule of Recognition and 
indicates that it can validate Primary Rules by virtue of “the fact of their having been 
enacted by a specific Body, or their long Customary practice, or their relation to 
Judicial decisions”42. 
 
2.11 Criticisms of Hart  
Before looking further at some of the more specific parts of Hart’s philosophy as it 
touches on my thesis it seems sensible to mention some of his main critics: 
 
Hart’s major critic was Ronald Dworkin, who posed a challenge which could be said 
to have a Natural Law character. He suggested that Hart’s concepts failed to explain 
how Judges reach decisions in novel cases i.e. if the law is posited by reference to a 
Rule of Recognition, then how is a solution found when a case arises (a ‘Hard Case’) 
which does not fit the posited formula. In such cases Judges tend to interpret the law 
and as such go beyond that which is posited. Dworkin suggests that this creates a 
fundamental problem for Positivism and Hart in particular, but also creates unfairness 
in that ‘certainty’ within the law is lost, and the citizen under review suffers because 
                                           
41 Ibid,  
42 Ibid, Page 95 
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he is eventually penalised by a law which did not exist at the time when he originally 
acted. 
 
Dworkin set out his criticisms of Hart in his work “Taking Rights Seriously”43. He 
ascribes three traits to Positivism: (i) The Law of a Community is a set of Rules 
“distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having to do not with their content but with 
their pedigree (Dworkin’s emphasis)”44, (ii) “The set of these valid rules is exhaustive 
of the Law”45, and (iii) “To say that someone has a legal obligation is to say that his 
case falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or forbear from doing 
something”46. 
 
The crux of Dworkin’s argument really emerges from point (ii) above, and he 
elaborates it as follows: 
“If someone’s case is not clearly covered by such a rule (because there is none that 
seems appropriate, or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for some other 
reason) then the case cannot be decided by ‘applying the law’. It must be decided by 
some official, like a Judge, ‘exercising his discretion’, which means reaching beyond 
the law for some other sort of Standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal 
rule or supplementing an old one”47.  
 
The introduction of the idea of ‘discretion’ is at the heart of Dworkin’s criticism and 
he uses this to explain that, as well as established legal rules, it has to be recognised 
that Judges (like his archetypal Judge, ‘Hercules’) have to interpret the law with the 
help of other tools such as “Principles, Policies and other sorts of Standards”48.  
 
                                           
43 Dworkin R (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, (London, Duckworth 1991) 
44 Ibid, Page 17  
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid, Page 22 
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This is expanded in Dworkin’s “Law’s Empire”49, where he applies a general 
Interpretive method to the law i.e. “First, there must be a ‘pre-interpretive stage in 
which the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice 
are identified. … Second, there must be an interpretive stage at which the interpreter 
settles on some general justification for the main elements of the practice identified 
at the pre-interpretive stage. … Finally there must be a post-interpretive or reforming 
stage, at which he adjusts his sense of what the practice “really” requires so as better 
to serve the justification he accepts at the interpretive stage”50. 
 
Dworkin explains how hard cases are dealt with in this manner and applies the idea 
of ‘Law as Integrity”51, to indicate that Judges in dealing with hard cases in the post 
interpretive stage should apply Principles of Justice and Fairness. 
 
Dworkin then uses his ‘Interpretive’ approach as the core weapon to attack Hart’s 
Positivism by stating that as Judges in Hard Cases have to use tools like Principles, 
which are not fixed, posited rules, then they sit outside Hart’s Rule of Recognition. 
 
This is a strong criticism, and it could be suggested that if these ‘tools’ are not formally 
posited in a legal system, then the only other explanation must be that these 
‘discretional’ factors must simply be pre-existent, or perhaps Natural, and to this 
extent it could be argued that Dworkin is using a Natural Law argument.  
 
Hart responded to Dworkin’s various criticisms in the second edition of his “Concept 
of Law” published (after his death) in 1991, and in the Postscript to the same he 
                                           
49 Dworkin R (1986) Law’s Empire, (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2008) 
50 Ibid, Page 65-66 
51 Ibid, Page 164 
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particularly addressed the suggestion that his theory of Law did not allow for the role 
on Interpretation as part of its ‘explanation’. 
 
Hart specifically refers to his description of the Rule of Recognition, and reminds us 
that the Rule has the “duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra [my emphasis] 
of doubt”52 which he states “imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness or open 
texture”53. He explains this further in the actual Postscript by confirming that the 
pedigree of the Rule of Recognition is not limited to rules set out in Statutes, or 
described by Precedents, but also contains Principles of various kinds e.g. Rules of 
Interpretation, or Judicial Reasoning etc. These are equally posited e.g. in 
recognised legal textbooks. These Principles are then brought into play in Hart’s Hard 
Cases, or Cases in the Penumbra. The important point being that such ‘solutions’ are 
not just plucked from the air, at a Judge’s whim (which would be contrary to 
Positivism), but are reached as a result of applying a posited toolkit for judicial use, 
and which are familiar to the judges through legal academia, or indeed through their 
legal education and training. In Hart’s words “… some basic principles … such as 
that ‘no man may profit from his own wrongdoing’ are identified as Law by the 
‘Pedigree’ test in that they have been consistently invoked by Courts in ranges of 
different cases as providing reasons for decision …”54 
 
The other main criticisms of Hart’s philosophy of Law can be considered as more 
‘avant-garde’ stemming from: the thoughts of the Scandinavian and American Legal 
Realists; the ideas of the Critical Legal Studies movement; and the Post-Modernist 
writers.  
 
                                           
52 Op Cit Note 19 Page 123 
53 Ibid  
54 Ibid, Page 265 
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The ideas behind Legal Realism were not a direct response to Hart, and the first 
proponents of Legal Realism, the Scandinavian Legal Realists began writing in the 
first half of the 20th Century. The first such writer of note was Axel Hagerstrom who 
challenged the objectivity of posited legal concepts. He argued that such concepts 
were only objective in terms of the verbal form in which they were stated. He 
considered that the words used were a device and did not reflect the reality of what 
individuals actually do55. Hagerstrom felt that a more scientific approach to defining 
law was necessary, and needed to be based on research of what people actually 
considered to be Law and why they considered themselves to be bound by law. This 
idea was taken forward by Karl Olivecrona towards the end of the Century who 
stressed that when we refer to being bound by the law it is important to recognise 
that more often than not what we mean is people’s “feeling of being bound”, rather 
than that there is an objective fact of them being bound by something56. These ideas 
therefore introduced the proposition that it was not enough to just consider law as 
that which was posited by the state but required research into behavioural science.  
 
Whilst the Scandinavian Realists were generally focused on what the general public 
actually do, the American School was focussed on what those within the legal system 
(Judges and Lawyers) actually do. Furthermore, the American legal realists wanted 
to understand what Judges etc. do in practice, not what they say they do. This 
approach is most easily considered by looking at the work of Karl Llewellyn, who 
distinguished between the “Paper Rules”57 which Judges refer to when setting out 
their reasons for their decisions (in order to remain within the fabric of the system of 
which they are part), and the “Real Rules” which actually determine why they reach 
those decisions (which involve a whole matrix of real facts not least those related to 
their education, their prejudices (innocent or otherwise), their politics or even what 
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they ate for breakfast that morning). This approach again demanded research into 
the behavioural science of what Judges and Lawyers do, not just an acceptance of 
posited Law. However and most importantly for my insistence on the overall reliability 
of Herbert Hart’s concepts, Llewellyn was quick to point out that: 
 “…I feel strongly the unwisdom, when turning the spotlight on behaviour, of throwing 
overboard emphasis on rules, concepts, ideology and ideological stereotypes and 
patterns. These last, as we have them, are by themselves confusing, misleading, 
inadequate to describe or explain. But a jurisprudence which was practically 
workable could not be built in terms of them, if they had not contained a goodly core 
of truth and sense”58.  
 
Hence I think it is fair to say that neither branch of the Legal Realism movements 
were demanding a complete displacement of Legal positivism per se, but both were 
pointing out that there are other factors at play, and that positivist philosophers must 
not take a blinkered view when trying to define Law. Interestingly Hart seems to have 
been alive to these exhortations, and notably he prefaced his work with the realisation 
that his must be an “essay in descriptive sociology”59. Having said this, it is clear in 
some instances that Hart seemed to overlook his own intentions. Nonetheless, I do 
not consider that this compels me to disregard Hart’s work as my guiding light, rather 
it cautions me to bear in mind wider behavioural aspects as I do so. 
 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLS) is widely accepted as having grown out 
of the earlier Legal Realist movements, and in particular from the American Legal 
Realists. However, whilst the Legal Realists were generally quite permissive in terms 
of expressing their views as supplemental to those of Legal positivism, the CLS 
Movement was much less accommodating. 
 
Their overall philosophy was very much Socialist in character, and they were critical 
of the manner in which law was being discussed in the late 20th Century in a way in 
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which Liberalism was virtually the philosophical default, and theories of law were 
promoting individualism. The CLS sought to demonstrate that this was a mistaken 
approach reflecting the influence and relevant affluence of the large majority of legal 
academics, legal writers, lawyers, judges and people of influence within the 
Establishment. They championed what they saw as a far more egalitarian approach 
and philosophy. 
 
“Liberalism in its various forms plays a central role in shoring up the current system, 
a system [which] is pervasively unjust.”…“The present system continuously 
oppresses and exploits people and that legal doctrine keeps them unaware of their 
true interests”60  
 
The CLS Movement expressed a number of common themes i.e. ‘Indeterminacy’, 
‘Contradiction’, and False Consciousness. These themes can perhaps be best seen 
in the works of Duncan Kennedy who in addition to claiming that these characteristics 
permeate modern legal systems also draws attention to the paradox of the State 
setting definitive legal rules, and Judges using standards to reach solutions where 
such rules prove non-definitive in practice. He suggests that this creates uncertainty, 
with those before the law suffering as a result. He would prefer an altruistic approach 
to law whereby there are standards that ensure that there is a uniform response with 
little recognition of individuality, rather than a rigid form of Rules which can be used 
to benefit, by individuals with the knowledge and/or means to do so: “... altruistic 
views on substantive private law issues would lead to a willingness to employ 
standards in administration, whilst individualism seeks to rely on an insistence of rigid 
rules rigidly applied”61. 
 
These views proposed the interesting suggestion that legal systems in Western 
democracies in the late 20th Century were the result of capitalist interests seeking to 
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oppress the general public for their own privileged benefit. However, they were very 
much of the moment, and the solution put forward that the legal systems should be 
redesigned to produce an egalitarian and altruistic uniformity (in place of rewarding 
liberal and entrepreneurial individualism) suffered the same fate as the Communist 
experiment in Eastern Europe which fell with the Berlin Wall in 1996 (i.e. that imposed 
uniformity led to reduced benefits for all, and that unbridled altruism could lead to 
anarchy again with dis-benefit to all). 
 
This said, CLS like Legal Realism encourages us, as modern thinkers about Law and 
Legal systems, to adopt a flexible and unblinkered approach to our researches.  
 
The Post Modernists were much less structured in their criticisms of Hart and by way 
of example, Costas Douzinas, Ronnie Warrington and Shaun McVeigh (hereinafter 
DWM), writing in “”Postmodern Jurisprudence”, stated: 
 
“The orthodox jurisprudence of modernity constructs theories which portray the law 
as a coherent body of rules and principles … post modern theory could not be more 
different. It distrusts all attempts to create large-scale, totalising theories in order to 
explain social phenomena”62. 
 
They summarised modernity’s position as one where “the state’s function is no longer 
to ensure that society moves inexorably along the path of virtue, but to see that 
contracts are enforced and that fundamental minima of peace and survival are 
achieved. Legality and Morality now become distinct (my emphasis). The former is a 
matter of external prescription and coercion; the latter, inward and subjective.”63 
 
Their attack on Hart was that despite asserting that he had created a ‘descriptive 
sociology’ he provided “no anthropological or historical evidence”64 to support his 
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conclusions. Their plea was to consider Judges’ decisions in Context , which was 
repeated by other writers such as Professors Martha Minnow and Elizabeth 
Spelman: “Like others concerned with the failures of abstract universal principles to 
resolve problems, we emphasize ‘context’ in order to expose how apparently neutral 
and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share the 
characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual adult men 
for whom those rules were actually written”65 
 
There is unquestionably a great deal of insight introduced by such writers into 
Jurisprudence, and it is now essential to bear these contextual themes in mind in 
interpreting any theories of Law or Legal systems. However the wider claims of 
Postmodernism have more recently been challenged themselves, largely on the 
basis of the findings of experiments conducted by behavioural scientists (whose 
results have largely nullified the criticism of Harts work as not reflecting 
anthropological research). As an example Scott Fruehwald published an article in 
2011: “When Did Ignorance Become a Point of View?: Postmodern Legal Thought 
and Behavioural Biology”66. Fruehwald is very dismissive of the influence of 
Postmodernism and commences his criticism by stating: “As this paper will show, 
Postmodernism is based on the denial of human nature – it is based on ignorance 
(lack of knowledge), and it has had a pernicious effect on the law”67. He asserted that 
the human mind has evolved in the same way as the human physique and that we 
are hard wired in terms of our outlooks on life68. Another critic who demonstrated the 
‘hard wired’ and innate nature of various of our intuitions was Matt Ridley69 who’s 
                                           
65 Minow M and Spelman E, ‘In Context’, South California Law Review 63, (1990), p 1597 
66 Fruehwald E S (2011) “When Did Ignorance Become a Point of View?: Postmodern  
Legal Thought and Behavioral Biology”, last accessed 10.03.2014 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769243 
67 Ibid, Page 1 
68 ibid 
69 Ridley M (2003) ‘The Agile Gene: How Nature turns on Nurture, 
 http://web.stanford.edu/group/hope/cgi-bin/wordpress/2013/05/the-agile-gene-how-
 nature-turns-on-nurture-by-matt-ridley/  last accessed 24/07/14    
 44 
particularly informative experiments studied the views of ‘reared-apart’ twins on 
religious fundamentalism: “the correlation between the resulting scores for identical 
twins reared apart is 62 percent; for fraternal twins reared apart just 2 percent”70. 
 
Fruehwald also negated another Postmodernist argument that there are no moral 
universals: “In addition to others [universals] universals also exist in the [moral 
content of the] law, including a concept of fairness, distinguishing right and wrong, 
inheritance rules, murder proscribed, normal distinguished from abnormal states, 
property, rape proscribed, reciprocal exchanges of labour, goods, or services 
(reciprocal altruism, redress of wrongs, and some forms of violence proscribed)”71. 
In particular he quoted from the work of Michael Guttentag, who demonstrated: “most 
individuals respond negatively to an incestuous relation. But they cannot explain why 
they reacted this way”72. Whilst suggesting: ‘this is a product of natural selection (and 
thus innate), because of the potential harm from incest”’73. 
 
The idea that there are no universal formations of thought, and no universal morality 
is fundamental to the “Deconstructuralism” at the heart of Postmodernism, and the 
demolition of these ideas by Behavioural Science leaves Postmodernism 
considerably discredited.  However, it cannot be dismissed entirely, and its value is 
to have demonstrated a need for a pluralistic approach to Jurisprudence (in much 
the same way as Legal Realism and the work of the Critical Legal Studies movement 
has required the dominance of Legal Positivism to be tempered by a recognition that 
other viewpoints cannot be ignored, both generally, but most importantly at the 
margins where in hard or novel case the posited Rules tend to run out).  
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2.12 Further Consideration of Hart  
Having briefly looked at the main criticisms of Hart I maintain that his Concept of Law 
(adjusted to reflect additional interpretative principles and certain elements of 
plurality highlighted by the Deconstuctionalists) remains sufficiently all-embracing to 
represent the best explanation of Law to date.  
Hence I now wish to move to Hart’s comments regarding ‘Justice and Morality’, ‘Laws 
and Morals’, and (with Tony Honore) his ideas on ‘Omissions’, since these are the 
most germane to my project, and my desire to use the concept of ‘Rescue’ to test 
various notions of Morality and Law which result from an acceptance of Positivism. 
 
At the very start of his Chapter on ‘Justice and Morality’, Hart expressed the 
fundamental ‘Battle-line’ between the Natural Law and the Positivist points of view 
i.e. “… the general contention that between the law and morality there is a connection 
which is in some sense necessary”74. This has been paraphrased by numerous 
writers as Hart’s objection to ‘Any Necessary Connection between Law and Morality’. 
 
Crucially however, Hart concedes that if there is an absence of Justice in the system 
then it is not a valid system. As to what ‘Justice’ means, Hart sets out the generally 
held components which include: like cases should be treated alike; no man should 
be a judge in his own cause; laws should be intelligible and within the capacity of 
most people to obey, law should not (generally) be retrospective; there should be the 
right to a fair hearing, to be heard, to have legal representation, to receive ‘reasoned’ 
judgments; and for any penalties to be proportionate etc. etc. These, and various 
other elements, are generally summarised as ’Natural Justice’. 
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Hart therefore re-emphasises that his version of Positivism does not ignore the fact 
that certain moral elements can be included within any particular legal system, but 
he rejects the notion that moral elements must be so included. He then makes a 
considerable concession in his Concept of Law, in that he acknowledges that a 
typical legal system is likely to have a “Minimum Content of Natural Law” (or 
morality)75. He then explores what the nature of this ‘minimum content’ might be and 
lists: ‘protection of the individual from Serious Harm’76; ‘reinforcement of Mutual 
Forbearance’ (restraint of the strong/ support of the weak)77; ‘recognition of certain 
Property Rights’ (e.g. shelter/food/water)78; and provisions for Enforcing all these’79. 
 
Hart also includes the earlier-mentioned ‘Administrative’ elements of Natural Justice 
in his description of the Minimum Content of Natural Law.  
 
He then concludes the major part of his Concept of Law by stating that he prefers a 
form of Positivism which can include this Minimum Content of Natural Law (or 
Morality), and describes this as the “Wider Concept” [of Positivism], rather than the 
“Narrower Concept”80.      
 
However, in proposing this concession (referred in his Postscript as “Soft 
Positivism”81), Hart makes it quite clear that this is as far as he is willing to go, and 
that, beyond this minimum content, there cannot be any further necessary connection 
between Morality and Law. He demonstrates that if we ignore this axiom, and 
accept a complete and indiscriminate mixing of Law and Morality as forming a legal 
system, then we inadvertently accept the confusion of two very different concepts 
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i.e. ‘law as it is’, and ‘law as it ought to be’. If we do this, we would then be forced 
to accept any specific legal system without criticism i.e. ‘warts and all’. However, 
by maintaining the essential ‘SEPARATION’ we can continue to subject any 
particular legal system to INDEPENDENT moral scrutiny, and thereby decide 
whether it is a system which should, or should not be accepted.  
 
This approach enables us to denounce the most outrageous legal systems (such 
as that in force in Nazi Germany, in the middle of the 20th Century) as moral 
abominations 
 
Hart also wrote widely on aspects of Causation, particularly in collaboration with Tony 
Honore, and in 1959 (just before Hart’s publication of the Concept of Law) they jointly 
published “Causation in the Law”82. This work looks at Causation in its various guises, 
and in particular for my work, there is an insightful consideration of the different 
character of Acts and Omissions (summarised as the “Acts and Omissions 
Doctrine”). I am especially interested in the Failure to Rescue as a class of Omission, 
and so Hart and Honore’s views on Omissions (covered further in the second edition 
of their book83, and in Honore’s individual work “Responsibility and Fault”84) provide 
further framing for my thesis. 
 
I would therefore reiterate that it is Hart’s philosophy of law which forms the main 
theoretical framework for my thesis. In particular, it is his contention that Law and 
Morality should generally be kept separate which forms my theoretical blueprint. I 
include a detailed analysis of Moral Luck as part of my project, and indicate how this 
supports that contention. I also look at the nature of the Acts and Omissions Doctrine 
as it applies to Rescues and introduce a wider characterisation of human conduct to 
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enable me to demonstrate that the inclusion of aspects of Luck leads to more 
structured conclusions regarding the separation of Law and Morality in defining the 
‘Jurisprudence of Rescue’. 
 
 
       Part 2 How this Thesis touches on the Debate about Law and Morality 
 
2.13 General Approach 
I believe that the importance of maintaining a sufficient separation of Morality and 
Law cannot be overstated and this is reinforced by consideration of the famous Hart-
Devlin Debate which took place in the middle of the 20th Century (and which no doubt 
led to Hart reiterating the necessity of this separation in his “Concept of Law”85 
published in 1961, and in his succeeding work: “Law, Liberty and Morality”86). Hart 
stressed the vital importance of maintaining a separation between Law and Morality 
during what was probably the most notorious clash of views on the subject which 
broke out in 1959 when Lord Devlin published his lecture “The Enforcement of 
Morals”87.  
  
Devlin’s lecture triggered the monumental Debate between himself and Herbert Hart, 
which centred around whether the law of the State should be used to compel 
individuals to comply with the prevailing moral code of the citizens of that State. The 
focus of the debate was whether the Law in England & Wales should prohibit 
homosexual practices between consenting adults in private. Devlin felt that it should, 
as it would reinforce Society’s natural predisposition that such activity (even in 
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private) was immoral. Hart, by contrast, felt that it should not, and that the State/Law 
should not involve itself in the sphere of private morality. 
 
This is not the place to track this difference of opinion in great detail, but Hart pursued 
his argument based on John Stuart Mill’s ‘Liberal’ principle that: “the only purposes 
for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised Society 
against his will is to prevent harm to others”88. Hart considered that what consenting 
adults did in private did not harm others whereas Devlin held a contrary view based 
on two particular points i.e. that simply knowing that two people were acting in an (to 
Devlin) immoral manner in private was enough to harm Society’s Sensibilities, and 
secondly, that sometimes consent was uninformed, and the participants in (to Devlin) 
immoral acts in private needed to be protected from harming themselves. 
 
Significantly, the more liberal approach won through, with Hart’s views being 
supported by the thrust of the Wolfenden Report published in 1957, which 
recommended that homosexual practices between consenting adults in private 
should no longer be a crime, stating that: “… there must remain a realm of private 
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business”89. 
 
However, whilst relaxation of certain offences related to Prostitution (generally) did 
emerge as a result of the Wolfenden Report, no immediate changes took place 
relating to Homosexuality. Nonetheless the Report, and Hart’s views (rather than 
Devlin’s) were vindicated in 1967 when Homosexual Practices by Consenting Adults 
in Private, were decriminalised by the Sexual Offences Act of that year90. 
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Returning to Hart’s “Law, Liberty and Morality” he described four fundamental 
questions arising from the relation between Law and Morality: (1) Has the 
development of the Law been influenced by Morals? (2) Must some reference to 
Morality enter into an adequate definition of Law? (3) Is Law open to Moral criticism? 
(4) Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards Immoral, sufficient to 
justify making that conduct punishable by Law?91 
 
Hart answers the first three questions very clearly in his “Concept of Law” i.e. (1) the 
Development of Law has definitely been influenced by Morals; (2) the inclusion of a 
Minimum Content of Natural Law is accepted by Hart as part of his definition of Law; 
and (3) by otherwise maintaining the separation of Law and Morality, Hart ensures 
that the Law can remain open to moral criticism. 
 
It is Hart’s fourth question which is the most germane to my thesis, and is therefore 
repeated again in full: “Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards 
Immoral, sufficient to justify making that conduct punishable by Law”? 
 
In “Law, Liberty and Morality” Hart provides various examples of conduct which have 
at some time been (and in at least one case still is) penalised by the Law i.e. Suicide, 
Abortion, Homosexuality, Euthanasia92. It is the principle: that certain conduct (acts 
or omissions), whilst being viewed by many as immoral, should be separate from law, 
which is at the crux of my thesis. 
 
By way of a modest contribution to the Law and Morality debate, I will posit that whilst 
attempting the rescue of a person in peril would be seen by most people as a Moral 
Duty, complications in the jurisprudence of Omissions, and especially the omission 
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to rescue (being particularly susceptible to the impact of Moral Luck) point to 
confirming that Moral obligations should not necessarily translate to Legal obligations 
and that generally (Easy Rescues aside) there should not be any legally enforceable 
Duty to Rescue in England and Wales. This viewpoint is expanded in the following 
Chapters of this work, as is my plea that the Protection of Rescuers should be Legal 
(rather than Moral) in nature.  
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3)  Moral Luck and Rescuers/Good Samaritans 
Up until now I have only provided an outline explanation of the phenomenon of Moral 
Luck, but it is now essential that I spend a significant part of this work considering 
the controversial subject. I do this for two main reasons: in the first case I want to 
fully investigate the impact of Luck on Moral and Legal responsibility, and in the 
second case I want to review the manner in which Bad Luck (in particular) applies in 
the case of Rescues. It is unquestionable that a rescue only becomes necessary due 
to the fact that bad luck of some sort has created an emergency situation from which 
someone requires to be rescued.  By its nature a rescue is not a planned event, and 
rescue is probably one of the more extreme scenarios where issues of luck affect 
obligations and responsibilities (i.e. it being unlucky that an emergency arises; 
unlucky that an agent finds themselves at the scene; unlucky if they find themselves 
under an obligation/ responsibility for attempting a rescue, and unlucky if the rescue 
goes wrong). 
 
3.1 The paradox of Moral Luck 
The modern analysis of what has come to be called “Moral Luck” effectively began 
with Bernard Williams’ work of the same name93.  
 
Williams begins this work with a discussion about “Persons, Character and Morality”. 
He generally establishes a view that for human life to have value, the human being 
must have a unique character, and should have control over his or her life, if that life 
is to be considered a life worth living. This idea echoes the philosophy of earlier 
writers and in particular John Locke and his “Of the State of Nature”94, and John 
Stuart Mill and his “On Liberty”95 . 
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However, Williams did not ignore the long history of the theory of Determinism 
(succinctly defined by Peter Van Inwagen as “every event, including human cognition 
and behaviour, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of 
prior occurrences”96). Williams also kept firmly in mind the Utilitarian principle that the 
morally preferable outcome is the one which achieves the greatest overall good. This 
includes the related theory of Consequentialism (which term was coined by Gertrude 
Anscombe97 i.e. that the goodness of an action depends upon the consequences 
(good or bad) that it produces). 
 
It was the tension between the concept of the importance of personal autonomy and 
the idea that human beings might just be pawns in a cosmic game of chess that led 
Williams to articulate the paradox of Moral Luck. He recognised that agents could not 
fully control the world around them and that the influences of Determinism and 
Consequentialism will always dictate that matters beyond their control, and especially 
Luck, will intervene. Hence if it is accepted that an agent should only be held 
responsible for what he or she can personally control, and the fact that Luck seems 
to play such an integral part in everything that happens in the world, then 
paradoxically the agent could be said to have little or no responsibility for anything. If 
this were true it would be very concerning and would strike at the heart of the 
fundamental importance of pursuing a life worth living. 
 
The interaction of these two ideas deserves a little further investigation, and it seems 
appropriate to begin with a consideration of the prospect that our lives might be 
completely predetermined and beyond our personal control (i.e. dictated by Luck or, 
as the ancients believed, by the Gods). This presumption has a long pedigree and 
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was one of the themes which was explored by Martha Nussbaum in her major work 
“The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy”98. 
 
Nussbaum demonstrates that the Ancient Greeks, including Aristotle were convinced 
that the lives of men and women were unavoidably subject to the overriding influence 
of Fate/the Gods.  This approach accepted that the question of whether an agent’s 
actions were morally praiseworthy was not determined by his/her own direct 
intentions, but by the fickle decisions of the Gods (a device used to explain what 
would otherwise appear to be purely matters of luck). For an example of Aristotle’s 
views on the subject Nussbaum provides the following quote: 
 “For many reversals and all sorts of luck come about in the course of a life; and 
 for the person who was most especially going well to encounter great calamities 
 in old age, as in the stories told about Priam in the Trojan War. But when a 
 person has such misfortunes and ends in a wretched condition, nobody says that 
 he is living well”.99  
   
This dominant idea that human lives were in the lap of the Gods (or perhaps a single 
God) persevered for many centuries. However much more recently, 18th and 19th 
Century writers began to prefer an explanation of human agency which put much 
more store in the principle of personal autonomy. They deplored the idea that human 
beings were not masters of their own destiny. 
 
On the other hand, and as mentioned earlier in this work, John Stuart Mill was 
particularly adamant that, whereas much in the world might be predetermined (e.g. 
that a storm will break in the seas around Cape Horn on a given date at a given time), 
the manner in which human beings might react to such circumstances (i.e. whether 
or not to attempt to rescue a shipwrecked sailor) will be solely a matter of that 
person’s character, and particularly their characteristic goodness, courage, and 
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bravery. Furthermore, if a rescue could be attempted without any significant risk of 
personal injury (an ‘Easy’ rescue), then the moral character of the individual will 
determine whether they will actually help, and become a ‘Good Samaritan’. This idea 
that human autonomy should be paramount was emphasised by Mill over and over 
again, and is reflected in one of his most well known statements: “The only Freedom 
which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way …”100.  
 
One of the most regularly quoted philosophers who placed individual goodness at 
the pinnacle of the human condition, and the one who gave us his famous, and 
hugely influential concept of the Categorical Imperative: the (universal) ‘Good Will’ 
was Immanuel Kant. He proposed the pre-eminence of the Good Will in the following 
way: 
“A Good Will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for 
the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition: that is, it is 
good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that 
can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of 
all inclinations”101 
 
However, Kant went much further, and his specific argument was that whereas 
much of the human condition may be predetermined, there must be an essential 
or fundamental core concept that transcends the pre-determined factors, and 
which is immune to the vagaries of fate, or in terms more pertinent to this thesis: 
Immune to Luck!  Kant continued in the quotation referred to above as follows: 
 
“Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the niggardly 
provision of a stepmotherly nature, this [Good] Will should be wholly lacking in 
power to accomplish its purpose … [then] …if there remained only the goodwill … 
it would sparkle like a jewel in its own right … usefulness or fruitlessness can 
neither diminish nor augment its worth”102   
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Re-stating Kant’s idea, he was firmly emphasising that no matter what hand of 
cards fate deals to each of us, there is one characteristic which regardless of the 
‘slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’ (borrowing from Shakespeare), and 
regardless of our physical resources, or physical health, remains entirely in our 
control, and this is our basic Good Will (or put another way, our Morality). 
 
The competing principles of Determinism, and Personal Autonomy (as briefly 
summarised above) were fully considered by Bernard Williams and he placed them 
in careful juxtaposition i.e. on the one hand our lives are, to a considerable degree, 
subject to fate or luck; whilst on the other hand, if we are to consider ourselves as 
free-thinking, and free-acting autonomous entities, then we must cling to the idea 
that we are to a significant extent masters of our own destiny, and that luck should 
neither dictate nor impact on our moral responsibility for our actions. In other words, 
if on occasion we accept that we just have to “Trust to Luck”, then those occasions 
should be very very rare (otherwise we completely surrender our individuality and 
simply become automatons). 
 
It was the tension between these two conflicting ideas of Personal Autonomy and 
the Intervention of Fate, that Bernard Williams described as the Paradox of Moral 
Luck i.e. we should only be held responsible for those events over which we have 
personal control, but we must also recognise that the impact of fate in our lives 
means that almost everything that we do is in some way subject to luck (and hence 
beyond our control). 
 
 
3.2 Bernard Williams’ Theory of Moral Luck 
Bernard Williams commences his description of Moral Luck by referring to an 
example based on a hypothetical artist who, in order to fully realise his potential, 
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decides to abandon his wife and children, and leave for the South Seas103 . At the 
point of leaving his family, this decision would be likely to be considered morally 
reprehensible by most right-minded individuals. However, if as a result of his 
decision the individual becomes an extremely successful artist, and produces 
sublime works of art (which produce untold pleasures for civilisation generally), 
then at that point, his decision to sacrifice everything for his art may be considered, 
on balance, to have been morally justified. This is a form of Consequentialism and 
the claim would be that the eventual end justified the original means (relying on the 
felicific calculus of Bentham’s Utilitarianism i.e. that the calculation of the 
happiness of civilisation generally created by the artist’s wonderful works, far 
outweighs the pain caused to the artist’s family when he deserted them).  
 
Loathe as he is to ascribe this set of circumstances to a real life artist, Williams 
nonetheless provides his artist with the illustrative name ‘Gauguin’. What becomes 
immediately apparent is that the question of whether ‘Gauguin’ has acted morally, 
or not, depends upon when his actions are evaluated: either at the outset, or at the 
conclusion. If judged at the outset (on abandoning his wife and family) ‘Gauguin’ 
would generally be considered blameworthy. However, if judged at the conclusion 
(having given the world great art), he would generally be considered praiseworthy. 
The difficulty with this situation is that, whether the act under evaluation can be 
considered morally justified, can only be decided once its consequences are 
known. 
 
Furthermore, the question of whether the consequences will be positive or negative 
cannot be predicted at the outset, and will very much depend upon luck. If 
‘Gauguin’ had departed for the South Seas but had been shipwrecked and died on 
route, then he would never had gone on to produce the wonderful works of art, and 
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the felicific calculus would have had a fundamentally negative outcome (the pain 
that would have been caused to ‘Gauguin’s’ family would have considerably 
outweighed any happiness resulting from the abortive emigration). In a similar way 
if ‘Gauguin’ had reached the South Seas but signally failed to produce noteworthy 
artworks, then again the calculation would have led to a negative result. 
 
The question of whether the calculation turns out positive or negative is therefore 
entirely subject to the vagaries of luck: luck in the way things turn out. This is the 
archetypal situation to which Bernard Williams gives the description: Moral Luck 
i.e. the situation where the moral characteristics of a human agent’s acts or 
omissions are solely, or predominantly, down to luck. 
 
Just to underline the implications of luck on the moral dilemma created by the story 
of ‘Gauguin’, I would like to put forward another luck-based outcome which would 
change the moral character of the situation in a different way. If ‘Gauguin’ had 
thought that he would be dragging his family down by staying, and if on leaving his 
wife he was confident that she would be looked after by a wealthy suitor, who 
subsequently married her and adopted their children, - giving them all a life of 
luxury which they could never have enjoyed with him - then again the 
consequences of ‘Gauguin’s’ actions would have had a net positive outcome. This 
outcome is not hypothesised by Williams, but it again underscores the concept of 
moral luck (i.e. luck in the probability of Mrs ‘Gauguin’ meeting a wealthy 
benefactor). 
 
Having thus established the Paradox of Moral Luck, Bernard Williams attempts to 
deal with the problem that he has created, and suggests a number of ways in which 
the need to re-assert personal autonomy might be achieved despite the pervasive 
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intervention of Luck in a person’s life and actions. The most interesting solution 
that he proposed involves the idea of Agentic Regret104.   
 
Williams recognises that the impact of Moral Luck may mean that Society itself will 
not hold an agent responsible for matters caused by them (where those matters 
have largely come about due to bad luck, and hence due to factors beyond the 
agent’s control).  However regardless of this, the circumstances might be such that 
the agent will personally hold themselves responsible, despite the fact that s/he 
could not have done anything about it, AND where Society completely absolves 
her/him of responsibility. This idea of self-reproachment was what Williams termed 
Agentic Regret, and it is this self-criticism which he suggests may be sufficient to 
re-establish the fundamental characteristic of personal autonomy. 
 
In order to analyse this further, Williams provides the example of a lorry driver who 
through no fault of his own, runs over a child that has dashed out into the road right 
in front of the lorry, with the consequence that the child is killed.105 
 
The lorry driver has clearly caused the death of the child, but society does not hold 
him responsible, as he had no control over the event (i.e. he would not have had 
any chance to brake, even if he had been able see the child in time). Society puts 
the matter down to the bad luck of the lorry driver, in that a boy rushed out in front 
of the vehicle without looking. However, the lorry driver himself may not be so 
dismissive, he will still feel that he was instrumental in the boy’s death. He is 
therefore likely to feel guilt or remorse even if there was nothing he could have 
done to prevent the death. It is this internal feeling of regret which Williams 
identified as Agentic Regret. It tends to ‘square the circle’ such that whilst bad luck 
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appears to have absolved the lorry driver of blameworthiness, this is not the end 
of the matter, and the lorry driver himself still feels blameworthy to some internal 
extent. Hence luck has not completely ’neutralised’ personal feelings of 
responsibility (autonomy?). 
 
If building on this type of scenario (as described by Williams), a different variant is 
constructed, then interesting issues arise. In the new example another lorry driver 
could be placed in a similar situation but this time he is using a mobile phone at 
the critical time. Again a young boy runs out into the road, and again the driver has 
absolutely no chance to brake. In this example however the boy is running 
considerably faster and instead of being killed he is just deflected onto the opposite 
pavement albeit badly bruised. 
 
Unlike the first situation, the lorry driver will come under considerable criticism from 
society due to the fact that he was using his mobile phone whilst driving. However, 
from a causation point of view, the lorry driver will not have been instrumental 
(unlike in the previous case) in the death of a child. It will again be a fact that in the 
case of the second lorry driver, he would not have had any time to apply the lorry’s 
brakes (whether he was on his mobile phone or not). The collision with the child is 
still a matter of bad luck for the lorry driver, but because he was using his mobile 
phone Society will now quite clearly blame him for some wrongdoing. This public 
sanction and indeed the legal (criminal) sanction that follows, will make the lorry 
driver feel much guiltier than the lorry driver in the first example. His feelings of 
Agentic Regret will be much higher. 
 
The interesting feature between the two examples is that causally speaking there 
is absolutely no difference between the actual responsibilities of the lorry drivers 
for the collisions. Both lorry drivers were driving along a road, and in both cases a 
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boy has run out in front of them without looking, and both had no opportunity to 
brake. However, luck has played a very different part in the two outcomes. In the 
first case luck has determined that a child has died. In the second case luck has 
determined that a child has only been badly bruised. 
 
Neither of the outcomes was within the control of the individual lorry drivers. In the 
first example the lorry driver was at no fault at all, but a child died. Whilst Society 
will not apportion blame, the lorry driver, will personally feel considerable Agentic 
Regret. In the second example, the lorry driver was at some fault (because he was 
driving whist using his mobile phone), but fortunately a child has not died. This time 
Society will penalise the lorry driver, but he is unlikely to experience anywhere near 
the same degree of Agentic Regret (as the lorry driver who was involved in a 
death).  
 
It can therefore be seen that whilst the causal responsibility, and the degree of 
control over the situation, of both drivers is identical (neither would have had any 
chance to apply the brakes of their vehicle under any circumstances), Luck very 
materially affects the outcome (both in terms of the degree of injury to the child, 
but also in terms of the impact upon the lorry driver (in terms of both the way in 
which Society treats them, and the way in which they will treat themselves)). 
 
Bernard Williams recognised the enormous potential for luck to interfere with the 
moral outcome of a particular event, and was concerned that this had fundamental 
repercussions for our basic need to be and feel masters of our own destiny (to 
possess the necessary personal autonomy to make our lives worth living, and not 
to simply proceed through life as fate’s puppets).  
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However, Williams did not claim to have a comprehensive solution to the problem 
which he had identified. Nonetheless he clearly articulated that neither of the 
previously held views (i.e. that a human agent should only be held responsible for 
matters which s/he actually has control over; and that if it is recognised that luck 
plays a significant part in events, then an agent should not be held responsible for 
the same) can survive unscathed. However, the introduction of the idea of Agentic 
Regret does alleviate some of the difficulty. 
 
In terms of the theoretical framework of my thesis Agentic Regret is interesting in 
that even if Society decides not to apply a legal Duty to Rescue (even in the case 
of an Easy Rescue), then this does not mean that the individual will not sanction 
him/herself (by feeling regret). Hence the legal and moral consequences remain 
separate but the agent is not immune to feelings of responsibility. 
 
The next modern writer to contribute materially to the Moral Luck debate was 
Thomas Nagel in his highly influential work entitled “Mortal Questions”, written in 
1979106.  This work is examined in the following sub-section. 
 
3.3 Thomas Nagel’s Theory of Moral Luck 
Thomas Nagel also begun his work by considering the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant i.e. that the Sovereignty of the human ‘Good Will’ displaced all pretenders as 
the “Categorical Imperative”107. This one concept transcends all others and is 
immune to all other worldly influences, and remains inviolate to such, including 
luck. Whatever degree of good luck, or bad luck that fate imposes on a human 
agent, that person can rise above (transcend) such influences and maintain a 
morally sound position i.e. that of having and exhibiting a good will. 
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This idea of Morality’s immunity to luck was previously considered to hold great 
promise for humanity, and suggested that whatever a person’s station in life, and 
whatever misfortunes may befall them, it is possible to rise above it all and maintain 
an all-conquering good will. Another way of looking at this would be to view the 
good will as performing the role of a Universal Currency which values everyone on 
the basis of a totally level playing field: a value criterion that we can all aspire to, 
whatever disadvantages life chooses to imposes upon us. 
 
However, Nagel does not accept this promise, and shares Bernard Williams’ view 
that luck can very substantially influence the moral value of a person’s character 
and actions.  
 
Williams provided the example of the ‘Gauguin’-type character, and demonstrated 
that the moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of that character was entirely 
determined by the consequences (outcome) of his actions. Such consequences 
being heavily subject to the vagaries of luck. 
 
Nagel provides his own example: “However jewel-like the goodwill may be, there 
is a morally significant difference [or outcome] from rescuing someone from a 
burning building, and dropping him from a 12th storey window while trying to rescue 
him”108         
 
He also suggests that “someone who was a guard in a Concentration Camp [in 
WWII] might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to 
power in Germany”109   
                                           
108  Op Cit Note 106 
109  Ibid  
 64 
 
Nagel then takes a somewhat more analytical approach than Williams and sets out 
to describe four types of luck which can affect the moral status of an agent’s actions 
(or omissions): 
 
 Luck in the eventual Consequences (in the way things turn out)  
 Luck in the way one is Constituted (Constitutive Luck) 
 Luck in individual Circumstances  
          Luck in Causation (Antecedent situation) 
 
3.3.1 Luck in the Eventual Consequences 
Nagel actually described this as the Luck in the way things turn out, and hence it 
is the specific category of Luck in which he follows the method of Bernard Williams. 
Nagel provides numerous examples, but one will suffice:  
 
A gunman may decide to shoot and murder a man, and clearly (all other things 
being equal) he would seem to be someone who should be looked upon as a 
morally reprehensible person. However, on another occasion the gunman may 
decide to shoot another man, but in the split second of firing the gun, a bird flies in 
the path of the bullet thereby deflecting it so that it no longer hits its target but sails 
harmlessly by. The target is not harmed and the gunman in that case is not a 
murderer. In the second set of circumstances the gunman may remain undetected 
and Society no longer has the opportunity to consider the gunman in such a bad 
light, and hence his moral standing becomes substantially different. On the face of 
it, Luck in the way things have turned out (due to the appearance of the bird) has 
undoubtedly influenced his moral standing. 
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This is the archetypal problem, or moral dilemma between unsuccessful attempts 
and successful attempts. Many people (and Kant probably amongst them) would 
suggest that there is morally no difference in the two attempts. However, the large 
majority of Society would reject this and hold that someone who completes their 
attempt and succeeds in murdering someone, is more blameworthy than someone 
who fails to do so. 
 
There is in reality one and only one thing different in the cases of the successful 
and unsuccessful attempt: in the first case someone dies, in the other they do not. 
In other words there is a difference in the way things turn out. However, it is 
undeniable that the reason that things turn out differently is entirely down to luck 
(e.g. the intervention of a bird). The conclusion must be that luck in the way things 
turn out does influence the degree to which people’s actions, and thereby their 
moral standings, are judged. 
 
3.3.2 Luck in the way someone is Constituted (Constitutive Luck) 
 
By Constitutive Luck Nagel refers to the manner in which a person’s character is 
made up. I would also add to this, the manner in which a person is constituted by 
nature (i.e. I include both Nurture and Nature).  
 
In terms of character a person may be brave or timid; they may be optimistic or 
pessimistic; they may be selfless or selfish; they may be honest or dishonest etc. 
etc. There may be many reasons why someone has their particular character, and 
much will depend upon their upbringing, or their education, or their experiences. 
 
However, this review of the impact of luck is not concerned as to how a person has 
come to possess certain characteristics, but simply with the fact that their particular 
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character governs the manner in which they will respond to various circumstances.  
For example, a timid person may be scared to confront anything 
 
unusual, whereas a brave person is likely to have no such reservations. 
Consequently, the timid man may decide to turn a blind eye if they see someone 
vandalising a building, but the brave man might raise the alarm and warn the 
vandals off and hence prevent the damage occurring. Society’s view of the moral 
status of the two people will be more positive in relation to the braver person than 
it will be in relation to the timid person. However, the question of why someone has 
a timid character or a brave character, will to a large extent be a matter of complete 
luck e.g. luck as to whether they were raised in a family which was risk averse, or 
one which recognised risks and confronted them. 
 
A similar point can be made about the physical attributes that nature has provided 
to a person. One person may be a physically strong person, whereas another may 
be much weaker. These attributes will dictate how the two people can respond to 
various circumstances. The strong person would probably have no hesitation in 
starting to try to move a large number of rocks which have fallen from a collapsed 
wall adjoining the pavement and which are forcing children into the road. However, 
the weak person might consider that they do not have the strength to compete such 
a task and so may not even attempt to do so. The point is again that Society is 
likely to look at the strong person (who attempts the task) as more morally 
praiseworthy than the weak person (who does not make such an attempt), even if 
neither is actually capable of removing the whole of the blockage. The evaluation 
of the two agents is very different, but the reason for the two different responses is 
purely a matter of luck: luck in the first person being born strong and the second 
being born weak.                
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3.3.3. Luck in Individual Circumstances 
Nagel returned to the example of the Concentration Camp Guard to describe this 
type of luck. He explained that unless someone is in a particular place at a 
particular time they may never confront a specific set of circumstances which will 
test their moral character in a specific way. If the hypothetical concentration camp 
guard, had been born, say, in Australia then he would never have found himself in 
the German Army, never in that Army in 1943, never stationed in a concentration 
camp, and never turning a blind eye to the gassing of thousands of men, women, 
and children. 
 
Society would have no difficulty in judging the concentration camp guard as morally 
repugnant, but it is completely a matter of luck that the individual was born in 
Germany in, say, 1910, rather than in Australia in 1980!  
 
If the German guard had never been in Auschwitz, Dachau or Belsen (or any of 
the other camps) his moral character would never have come under such a terrible 
test. The fact that he was there, and in the peculiar circumstances of that time, was 
completely a matter of luck (bad luck). Once again luck has substantially intervened 
in defining a person’s moral status. 
 
3.3.4. Luck in Causation (i.e. prior Antecedent situation) 
Nagel lists this as his fourth category of Luck which can affect a person’s moral 
status, but he does not provide any specific examples in this case. However, he 
alludes to the chain of circumstances that led up to that particular situation which 
a person faces when he confronts a specific moral test.  
 
In effect it seems that Nagel was referring to the principle of a chain of causation 
being responsible for every event which occurs. If any one link in this chain of 
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causation changes, it is likely that the event anticipated will no longer occur. 
Whether each sequential link in the chain occurs, and occurs in the right order will, 
fundamentally, be down to luck. Hence it will again be largely a matter of luck 
whether someone is in the right place at the right time (or in the wrong place at the 
wrong time). In any event if an agent finds himself in a specific situation and  
their moral character comes under test, then the fact that they become a link in that 
chain of causation will again be predominantly a matter of luck.      
 
3.3.5. Nagel’s Conclusions 
Thomas Nagel has in my opinion succinctly demonstrated that a wide variety of 
luck based factors impact upon a person’s moral status at any particular time, and 
he makes it clear that luck plays a much larger part in everyone’s lives than 
appears on the surface. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the moral character of 
an agent is influenced far more by luck than is generally accepted (and certainly to 
a much greater degree than was accepted by Immanuel Kant et al).  
 
Unfortunately, this result has somewhat unwelcome repercussions for our 
fundamental desire that as human beings we should have full personal autonomy 
(and gives weight to the Determinists who believe that all our lives and actions are 
pre-determined). Indeed, Nagel recognises this as the inevitable conclusion 
flowing from his work. He states in his final two pages, the following lines:  
 “I believe that in a sense the problem has no solution, because something 
 in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions being events, or people 
 being things … Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed to the 
 personal self”.110        
 
As he further puts it: 
 
 “We cannot simply take an external evaluative view of ourselves – of what 
 we most essentially are and what we do. And this remains true even when 
 we have seen that we are not responsible for our existence, or our nature, 
 or the choices we have to make, or the circumstances that give our acts 
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 the consequences they have. Those acts remain ours and we remain 
 ourselves, despite the persuasiveness of the reasons that seem to argue 
 us out of existence”.111  
 
He concludes: 
 “The problem of Moral Luck cannot be understood without an account of 
 the internal conception of agency and its special connection with the 
 moral attitudes, as opposed to other types of value”.112 
 
   “I do not have such an account”. 113 
 
In concluding his account of Moral Luck at this point, Nagel leaves its further 
development and analysis (and possible solution) to subsequent writers. Many 
such individuals have contributed views on the subject, and the most interesting of 
these opinions are considered in the following sub-sections.  
 
What can be recognised at this point is a desirability of generally keeping Moral 
and Legal repercussions separate. If Luck plays such a pervasive role in our lives 
then it is better to leave most of the consequences in the Moral sphere, rather than 
the Legal one, and this reinforces the fundamental theoretical framework of my 
thesis  
 
3.4     Subsequent Views on Moral Luck 
Following the pivotal works of Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, a considerable 
number of writers have contributed views on the paradox of Moral Luck, some in 
support, but most in opposition. The writers that I have considered in this respect 
are: 
 Martha Nussbaum.   Judith Andre 
 Nicholas Rescher   Norvin Richards 
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 Brian Rosebury   Susan Mendus  
 Judith Jarvis Thomson  Margaret Urban Walker 
 Donna Dickenson 
 
I have not however reviewed all their works in great detail, but I have paid more 
attention to the writings of Martha Nussbaum, Susan Mendes, Margaret Urban 
Walker, and Donna Dickenson given that they are strong proponents of Moral Luck, 
but also because they concentrate on practical implications, and my thesis is 
concerned with the practicalities faced by Rescuers. 
 
3.4.1. Martha Nussbaum 
It seems logical to begin this review of the various writers on Moral Luck by 
returning to Martha Nussbaum’s work where, writing at the turn of the 21st Century, 
she traces the debate on Moral Luck to Ancient Greek Philosophy. She addresses 
this in the opening “Luck and Ethics” section of her major work “The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy”114. 
 
She begins by contrasting the position of human beings with that of other living 
organisms. The latter are stated to be unthinking, and therefore entirely subject to 
the whims of luck. Human beings by contrast possess ‘reason’, and as sentient, 
thinking, beings they can save themselves “from living at the mercy of luck”115.  
 
However, in recognising that a totally predictable life would be mundane, 
Nussbaum refers to ancient Greek philosophy and the underlying principle that for 
a life to be worth living it must be a good life. Furthermore, for a life to be a good 
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life it must be one over which the individual maintains a sufficient degree of control 
– rather than being a simple automaton (with no real or effective choices). 
 
Having stated this she acknowledges that it is impossible to completely rule out the 
influence of chance, or luck and poses the question: ”How much Luck … can we 
humanly deal with”116.  
 
She therefore proceeds to make reference (once again) to the more modern 
thinking of Immanuel Kant, and his view that there was one area of the human 
condition which was totally immune from the influence of luck i.e. the individual’s 
morality. If this principle was proven to be true, it would solve the question which 
she had identified from Ancient Greek thought, and would provide the answer that: 
in the realm of morality, no amount of luck would be too much to live with! 
 
Nussbaum then considers the various ways in which the influential writers, Bernard 
Williams and Thomas Nagel have suggested that a person’s moral condition is 
unavoidably subject to luck. She refers to the impact of both external contingency 
(i.e. the combination of worldly events which present challenges to our moral 
decision making), and internal contingency (i.e. the influence of our internal 
characters and constitutions which also shape our moral decisions). 
 
In particular, Nussbaum quotes Aristotle’s demonstration of a general transition 
from the optimism of youth, to the pessimism of old age, whereby the debilitating 
effect of years and years of adverse circumstances (bad luck) will eventually sour 
an individual’s good disposition. It might be said that it is this inexorable descent 
(in other words, the slow extinguishing of the flame of virtue), which Nussbaum 
may in essence be describing in her core concept: the “Fragility of Goodness”. 
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In summarising this comparatively short review of Martha Nussbaum’s main 
theme, there is little doubt that she accepts the fundamental validity of the concept 
of Moral Luck (anchored as it is in Ancient Greek philosophy). Hence she can be 
included in that group of writers who recognise that luck inevitably impacts upon 
human morality. She does not therefore seek to argue away the idea of Moral Luck, 
but accepts it, by way of acknowledging that it is inevitable that a certain degree of 
luck intervenes in the pursuit of a virtuous human life.  
 
The alternative of living a life totally immune from luck would be to live a totally 
predictable life in an unavoidably sterile environment. In fact, it would be akin to 
living in a permanent sleep, happily insulated from the effects of luck, but passing 
our days in (what to most) would be an unacceptable realm of shadow. She hence 
promotes the need to fully recognise the vagaries of Luck, rise above them, and 
thereby live fulfilling lives as virtuous individuals. 
 
3.4.2. Judith Andre 
To provide some balance at this point it is appropriate to consider the views of a 
number of writers who reject the idea of Moral Luck, and I start with Judith Andre. 
 
Judith Andre analyses the theories of Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in her 
work: “Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck”117, and concludes that they both accept 
that luck ultimately interferes with our moral condition: “Each writer finds 
destructive inconsistency - possibly incoherence - within our concept of 
morality”118.  
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In particular she looks at the Character of individual actors and refers to a common 
example through which Moral Luck is often analysed: the attempted gunman (e.g. 
where two gunmen each fire a shot at an individual, but the first succeeds in killing 
the victim, whereas the second fails, but only because, by luck, a bird flies in the 
path of his bullet). 
 
Andre makes it clear that in cases like this the intent of the two gunmen is the same 
i.e. they both intended to kill a person (and thereby they both committed the same 
moral wrong). She therefore suggests that instead of evaluating the different 
outcomes, Society should evaluate the Constitutive morality of the relevant actors, 
or to use her specific words: “Society should concentrate on evaluating their moral 
Character”119. 
 
The character of an actor will depend on a whole myriad of factors: when were they 
born, who were they born to, how were they raised, how were they educated etc. 
etc. However, if at the point of pulling the triggers, the gunmen had exactly the 
same motive in mind, then Andre suggests that they should both be equally 
deserving of Society’s condemnation. Nagel by contrast would more readily 
condemn the gunman who was raised with the benefit of all life’s advantages, and 
who should know better; and would to some degree excuse the gunman who had 
suffered a number of life’s disadvantages, lived in a violent environment, and who 
has never fully appreciated the sanctity of human life.  
 
However, and as referred to in the earlier section, Nagel placed great emphasis on 
the fact that Luck influences the way in which the Character of different individuals 
develops. This is quite fatal to Andre’s argument and in effect she has only 
replaced ‘Moral Luck’ with ‘Character Luck’. It remains the case that luck inevitably 
intervenes in the scenarios that an actor has to face and the moral dilemma 
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therefore remains unchanged: the agent continues to be held responsible by 
reference to factors which are beyond their control.   
        
 
3.4.3. Nicholas Rescher 
Nicholas Rescher also argues that the idea of Moral Luck can be too readily 
accepted120, and begins his article by referring to the philosophy of St Augustine, 
who attempted to re-interpret the role of luck as simply being a fully integral part of 
“God’s all-encompassing plan”121. He then quotes from Pascal (1670), who stated 
“We find ourselves in this world only through an infinity of accidents”122.  
 
More colourfully, Rescher cites the work of Pascal’s predecessor, Balthasar de 
Gracian y Morales, who contrasted life with a game of cards: “In this life fate mixes 
the cards as she lists, with no consultation of our wishes … we have no choice but 
to play the cards she deals to us”123.  
 
He further establishes the long philosophical pedigree of Luck as an integral part 
of our lives by referring to the well-known quotation from Shakespeare relating to 
the “Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune”124.  
 
Rescher then poses a fundamental question: “What is Luck?”, and sets out two 
concepts: a) that often an outcome occurs by accident (i.e. outside our control), 
and b) that such an accidental outcome usually has either a positive or negative 
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effect (i.e. that it makes a material difference)125. Having made these points he 
continues by demonstrating that this unpredictability in our lives (caused by Luck) 
has entered our everyday vocabulary, and quotes the examples of “Your Lucky 
Star”; “A Lucky Rabbit’s Foot” [which, as an aside, reminds one of the old joke that 
this was not very lucky for the Rabbit!]; “Lady Luck”; “Trust to Luck” etc. etc.  
 
However, in doing this, Rescher is not denying that Luck plays a fundamental role 
in our lives, but he seeks to demonstrate that its consequences are far less 
challenging than Williams and Nagel would have us believe, and points to tools 
such as Insurance to insulate individuals from the impacts of Luck, and the welfare 
state to look after those who are ‘injured’ as a consequence.  
 
Whilst this is initially encouraging, it tends to suggest that we should not worry 
about the unpredictability of life, and should be prepared to ignore how individuals 
respond to bad luck; that our lives are predetermined; and that we can never be in 
charge of our own destinies. 
 
I find this disturbing and would prefer to reject such a conclusion, and recognise 
that we are put to various tests on a regular basis and that how we respond to them 
is a measure of our moral character. The acceptance of Moral Luck, which makes 
us more conscientious individuals, is to me to be preferred to Rescher’s reduction 
of our lives to that of being mere automatons (albeit insured), in some great plan. 
 
3.4.4      Norvin Richards 
Norvin Richards has also attempted to discount the concept of Moral Luck and took 
a different stance in his work:” Luck and Desert”126, written in 1986. The approach 
adopted by Richards was to begin by restating the ingredients of Moral Luck which 
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he expressed as the contradiction between two fundamental and long held beliefs 
i.e. that an agent should not be punished for something beyond their personal 
control, but that an agent should be punished according to the consequences of 
their actions.  
 
In developing this now familiar theme, he once again drew upon Thomas Nagel’s 
example of the two inattentive drivers (one of whom is lucky and does not come 
across a young child in his path), and the other who is unlucky and who not only 
comes across such a child but who also causes the child’s death. 
 
Richards recognised the difficulties that these types of example pose, and 
therefore sought to put forward an alternative explanation, and one based on 
‘Desert’ rather than Luck i.e. that the moral luck paradox can be avoided if, instead 
of evaluating someone by reference to the outcome that their actions lead to, we 
take a more equitable approach and evaluate the person by reference to what they 
deserve. 
 
However, this creates an immediate problem for Richards in that that the desert 
that someone receives will, itself, often be determined by Luck. As referred to 
earlier, Nagel looked at this under his ‘Circumstantial Luck’ and used the example 
of a Nazi officer in a concentration camp during the second world war. If 
 
When such a camp was liberated by Allied soldiers, they would discover the crimes 
committed by the officer who had been stationed there, and that officer would 
eventually receive his just deserts for being such a cruel individual. However, it is 
a matter of Luck that the officer is an individual born in Germany in the 20th century, 
and if say, he had been born in Australia much later, then even if he still had the 
same tendency to be cruel, this would never have been put to the same terrible 
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test. This second individual would never receive the just deserts his cruel character 
warranted, because of Luck in where and when he was born. 
 
Hence, even when we concentrate on Desert, it is still impossible to isolate the way 
in which a person is evaluated, from the effects of Luck, and Richards has taken 
us no further than to replace the idea of ’Moral Luck;’ with ‘Desert Luck’. 
 
3.4.5   Brian Rosebury 
Brian Rosebury’s article in October 1995 called “Moral Responsibility and Moral 
Luck”127 suggested that the problem described as Moral Luck was actually one of 
a lack of knowledge. He felt that limited the knowledge of a situation impeded its 
proper interpretation and he preferred decisions based on “fully comprehensive 
knowledge”128. However, he recognised that it is very rare, if ever, that the actor 
will have perfect knowledge, since to delay action until absolutely everything is 
known (and every unexpected possibility is assessed) would subject us to a 
“disabling perfectionism129. 
 
Nonetheless he continues by stating:  
“I maintain that Moral Luck … is a chimera, and that a recognition of the role of epistemic 
fallibility, as a variable in moral decision making will help us dispose of it”130. 
 
He then explores a number of examples in order to demonstrate that when Bernard 
Williams, and Thomas Nagel were defining “Moral Luck”, what they were actually 
describing was really “Epistemic Luck”, By the use of this term he meant Luck in 
terms of the actor not knowing enough information about the matrix of factors which 
were at play in the event, and thereby leaving him/herself open to the impact of 
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chance. If the actor had known all the information, then s/he would have been able 
to avoid the (for example) bad luck waiting around the corner. 
 
Hence in Nagel’s Careless Driver example s/he would have foreseen that the child 
was about to walk out into the road. On this basis it is not the actor’s moral status 
which is determined by luck, but the actor’s level of knowledge. Rosebury believes 
that this approach leaves the actor’s moral status immune to luck (which only 
affects their level of knowledge, not their culpability). In his words: “Morality retains 
its Sovereignty”131. 
 
However, there is a contradiction here because it will always be a matter of luck 
whether an actor is able to amass a complete knowledge of the circumstances they 
face, before they are required to act. In this sense Rosebury has simply replaced 
‘Moral Luck’ with ‘Epistemic Luck’ 
 
He seems to acknowledge this issue himself when he makes the following 
statement near the end of his article: “Clearly judgements in law are not, or not 
wholly, regulated according to a luck-free conception of moral responsibility …”132   
 
3.4.6      Judith Jarvis Thomson                
Judith Jarvis Thomson approached Moral Luck as one of the “cluster of problems 
about morality that are generated by Determinism”133. She proceeded by reciting 
the Determinist principle that: “Whatever we do, we have to do, and cannot refrain 
from doing”134.  
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She then re-stated the moral principle that whatever we do is only to our discredit 
if we could have refrained from doing it. She therefore reached the conclusion (by 
conjoining the two principles) that we are forced to accept: “that nothing a person 
does is to his or her discredit”135. 
 
However, Thomson immediately sought to avoid the implication of Moral Luck by 
introducing her own approach to discounting the paradox, by concentrating on the 
idea of “Blame”, and in order to develop this theme she once again used an 
inadvertent driver example and contrasted the actions of three drivers backing out 
of their drive.  The first (“Alfred”) backs out with full attention but runs over (and 
kills) a very young child, from the neighbouring property who has fallen asleep 
under some leaves at the bottom of the drive. The second (“Bert”) backs out of the 
drive but is not concentrating (because he is distracted by adjusting his car radio) 
and also runs over and kills a sleeping child. The third driver (“Carol”) does exactly 
the same as the second driver Bert, and reverses out without paying attention BUT 
fortunately for her the child had woken up just five minutes earlier, and toddled 
back home. 
 
Thomson then seeks to allocate Blame to the three drivers, finding that Alfred 
should incur no blame (albeit a child died), Bert should incur blame (a child died 
and he was careless), but also Carol should incur blame (given whilst no-one died, 
she was equally as careless as Bert). 
 
However, this analysis does not accord with how individuals are blamed in practice: 
Alfred will be blamed to some extent (and especially by himself), Bert will definitely 
be blamed, but of most interest, Carol will not be blamed - given no adverse 
incident ever took place. 
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It seems very much, that in using this example Thomson has failed to appreciate 
that Luck has dictated how Blame is apportioned, and hence her argument again 
takes us little if any way forward.  Put differently, even if Thomson introduces a 
new concept of ‘Blame Luck’ into the debate, the crux remains that Luck has again 
intervened in individual lives, and it is Luck that has made the difference in the 
extent to which each individual suffers blame. She has simply substituted ‘Blame 
Luck’ for ‘Moral Luck’ 
 
3.4.7      Susan Mendus                
Having looked at some of the arguments put forward against Moral luck, I now 
return to writers who not only recognise, but champion the idea (and as a result I 
do this in much more detail). 
 
Susan Mendus’ article “The Serpent and the Dove”136, has an unusual title, based 
on Immanuel Kant’s words when he commented on the need to reconcile Politics 
and Morality: “If politics was to say “be thee wise as Serpents”, morality might add, 
by way of qualification, “and harmless as Doves”137 
 
Mendus initially identifies with Kant and points to his philosophy that if there is a 
conflict between politics (the serpent) and morality (the dove), then the former must 
yield to the latter. This is because, whereas politics can be subject to luck, morality 
should not be so. Put another way, she comments that politics is only concerned 
with consequences (which can be subject to luck), whereas morality is only 
concerned with the Good Will, and is therefore “immune to luck”138   
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In contrasting the supremacy of the dove in relation to the serpent, Mendus 
recognises that there are a number of very strong views against the idea that 
morality is immune to luck, and analyses some of the arguments put forward under 
the description of Moral Luck. 
 
She concentrates on consequential, or external luck (acknowledging that aspects 
of Constitutional, or internal luck were to a large extent ignored by Kant). In 
particular, Mendus re-traces Bernard Williams’ example of the ‘Gauguin’-like figure 
and seeks to demonstrate that factors other than moral value are of importance in 
these outcome based scenarios, and she quotes political or artistic values. In the 
‘Gauguin’ example she accepts that the Artistic Value of the artist’s eventual works 
created in the South Pacific, provided great benefit to humanity and justified his 
decision to desert his wife and family in Paris (a decision which other than for the 
success of his art would clearly have been considered immoral). Mendus has no 
hesitation in labelling the ‘Gauguin’ figure as a “Serpent”, and the deserted wife 
(and children) a “Dove”.  However, she quickly reaches the conclusion that 
examples of this kind demonstrate that Kant’s approach was too simplistic and that 
sometimes Morality must take second place. 
 
Hence Mendus’ conclusion is that we have no choice but to accept that it is not a 
case that the Dove should always have precedence over the Serpent, with morality 
always being supreme. Having suggested this however, she nevertheless stresses 
that, in her view, some of the competing values that are important to us are all 
sometimes susceptible to luck, and sometimes they are not. She encapsulates this 
in the idea that certain things we do can in one sense be disagreeable, but they 
will nonetheless be right. More specifically she states that: “There is some sense 
in the thought [that something can be] morally disagreeable, but morally 
 82 
justifiable”139. She therefore seems to be saying that it may be disagreeable to 
accept that luck sometimes plays a part in assessing moral value, but this can 
sometimes otherwise be acceptable if the outcome produced is morally right. 
Indeed, she reinforces the point by adding: “In just the same way as we have 
reason to be grateful that ‘Gauguin’ chose art rather than morality, so we have (or 
may have) reason to be grateful that people [sometimes] choose politics rather 
than morality”140.  
 
Susan Mendus therefore seems to accept the idea of Moral Luck to a significant 
degree, and makes the further important suggestion that “we must make a 
distinction between what would be appropriate in an ideal world, and what is 
required in this world”141. The inevitable consequence being that we have to accept 
that sometimes luck intervenes in our lives, and moral experiences. If we do not 
accept this then the only way to totally avoid the impact of luck would be to live in 
a clinically sterile environment, where luck is prevented from entering our lives at 
all. This would not however be a quality life, and going back towards the start of 
her article (and echoing a number of other writers), Mendus warns that this is not 
a desirable position and cautions that: “the price of [complete] moral goodness 
[would be] eternal impotence142                
 
3.4.8      Margaret Urban Walker 
Margaret Urban Walker is one of the more compelling group of philosophers who 
accepts, and in fact welcomes the concept of Moral Luck. She states this very early 
in her article “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency”143, where she suggests 
there are three positions in relation to Moral Luck: “Moral Luck is real, but 
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constitutes a paradox” … “Moral Luck is illusory” … “Moral Luck is real and not 
paradoxical”144. She also states: “In what follows I argue for the reality and deep 
importance of (resultant and circumstantial) moral luck in human life”145. It is 
particularly noteworthy that Walker restricts her comment to Resultant and 
Circumstantial luck i.e. Luck in the way things turn out, and Luck in the situations 
in which we find ourselves. 
 
Walker then sets out the general anatomy of Moral Luck and like many other writers 
she credits Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel with having introduced it 
(“baptised it” in her words) into contemporary literature. She confirms that the two 
quoted writers were fully of the opinion that Moral Luck is real, but that they also 
saw it as paradoxical, without persuasive solutions. In contrast to this she cites 
other writers who have sought to avoid the whole idea of it being a paradox by 
establishing possible lines of argument which can be used to deny its existence, 
or which might lead us to re-evaluate the basic premises which cause it to emerge. 
She includes Norvin Richards in the first category (Richards relying on an argument 
based on “Desert”) and she includes Nussbaum in the second category (given the 
latter’s wish to demonstrate that problems with Luck can be traced back to ancient 
Greece, and hence may only be a faulty modern construct of basic assumptions). 
 
In order to dispel these approaches Walker takes the standpoint that we should 
openly embrace the fact that we can never be in perfect control of what happens 
in our lives. She states: “The truth of moral luck that the rational, responsive moral 
agent is expected to grasp is that Responsibility outruns Control”146. It is this 
commitment to personal integrity (to deal with whatever life throws at us), which is 
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behind the ‘subtitle’ of her work: “The Virtues of Impure Agency”147. Walker actually 
defines Integrity in terms of “expecting ourselves and others to muster certain 
resources of character to meet the synergy of choice and fortune”148. She also 
defines Virtue in this context as “acceptable or even meritorious behaviour which 
contributes to our living well in concert with others, a distinctly human life”149   
 
Walker then moves on to describe possible human reactions to ill luck, and makes 
the point that to be a virtuous human being we often have to accept situations of 
bad luck as simply that, and respond in such cases with a dignified grace. She 
suggests that it is being able to do this, even if circumstances are beyond our 
control, and life is unfair to us, which separates us as human beings from the rest 
of the animate world. Further she states that if moral luck did not exist it would 
remove an important means by which human beings can demonstrate their virtue 
(and the quality of our lives would be considerably poorer as a result).   
 
Walker proceeds next to make the very insightful comment that “The view against 
which moral luck offends is that of pure agency”150. She indicates that this is why 
Kantian’s have particular problems with moral luck, and why if we were to consider 
the reality that agency can never be entirely pure in practice (and will always be 
impure to a varying degree), then moral luck will cease to be such a problem. She 
also explains that this is what human beings actually do, they accept that luck (and 
especially bad luck) exists; they take the rough with the smooth; they apply 
probabilities to their lives and actions, and trust that they get things right more often 
than they get things wrong. 
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This view echoes the response of a number of other major writers who have 
touched on moral luck in their works on Responsibility, including Tony Honore, and 
Michael Zimmerman.  
 
Tony Honore has stated: “Human action invites assessment, and the credit we 
receive for what turns out well, balances out the discredit we incur from what turns 
out badly” … “If [human beings] possess normal capacities they succeed and take 
the credit for their successes, more often than they fail and incur discredit from 
their failures. They bet as it were on the outcome of their actions, and they win 
more than they lose“151.         
 
Michael Zimmerman did not explicitly accept that Moral Luck exists but he did put 
forward a similar idea in relation to the need to balance the successes and failures 
we confront. He did this via his concept that we all have a “Ledger of Life” in which 
both our positive experiences, and our negative experiences are entered, and that 
over time there is a balancing operation, which we would all hope results in a 
situation where (as intrinsically good people) we amass more positive than 
negative experiences over the longer term152. 
 
All three of these examples of a inherent balancing of our experiences, and a hope 
that the good should prevail, tend to chime with how human beings, in general, 
approach their lives, and the way in which the impact of luck is simply considered 
as one of the factors which we all just have to ‘live with’. Indeed, we have 
incorporated numerous references to this state of affairs in our everyday 
vocabularies, and phrases connected with Luck (such as the following) are 
commonplace: “Trust to Luck”, “As Luck would have it”, Don’t Push your Luck”, 
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“Third time Lucky” etc. etc. This incorporation of the principle that we are all 
susceptible to the vagaries of Luck, into our everyday language, resonates with the 
linguistic approach of Herbert Hart, who, when confronted with difficult legal 
problems (his so-called Hard Cases), reverted to solutions which suggested 
themselves by reference to the way in which everyday people use everyday 
language to describe everyday events in their lives153. 
 
Returning to the work of Margaret Urban Walker, she starts to conclude her article 
by contrasting the quality of life in being a ‘pure agent’ and of being an agent who 
lives their life under the influence of Luck (an ‘impure agent’). She indicates that 
the pure agent is not prone to luck, and therefore he/she will only be responsible 
for what is within his/her control. Walker therefore suggests that the pure agent will 
tend to be self-orientated, and impervious to the calamities which confront other 
people. He/she will only believe in the survival of the fittest (and lead a life which 
in my words, borrowing from Hobbes, is Nasty and Brutish, and possibly Short).  
 
On the other hand, Walker suggests that an agent who accepts that we can only 
be impure agents, and susceptible to luck, will tend to be generous and 
compassionate. S/he will recognise that some people will suffer unfairly from bad 
luck, and s/he will seek to help those who are unlucky (either directly, perhaps by 
giving to charity, or indirectly, by perhaps paying insurance premiums to help 
create a fund from which others can seek to be assisted). 
      
Walker specifically states: 
“In particular, pure agents may not be depended on, much less morally required, 
to assume a share of the ongoing and massive human work of caring, healing, 
restoring, and cleaning-up, on which each separate life, and the collective one 
depend. That the very young and old, the weak, the sick, and the otherwise 
helpless – that is, all of us at some times – depend on the sense of moral 
responsibility of others unlucky enough to be stuck with the circumstance of their 
need, will not be the pure agent’s problem. It is alarming to anticipate life in a world 
                                           
153  Op Cit Note 19  
 87 
where people routinely and with justification walk away from the harmful, cruel, and 
even disastrous results, that their actions [or omissions] were critical, even if not 
sufficient, in bringing about …All these prospects are real ones in a world from 
which moral luck has been banished, and agency is purified”154    
 
In contrast she then makes the far more reassuring statement: 
 
“Impure Agents are saddled with weighty responsibilities, and the open-ended 
possibility of acquiring more due to circumstances beyond their control … These 
are agents on whom we can depend, or at least to whom the presumption of 
dependability applies … To the extent that these agents are people of integrity, 
they will not fail us, even under the blows of bad fortune, or odd turns of fate that 
might otherwise prompt denial or opportunism”155. 
 
I find Walker’s approach to be most compelling and uplifting, and have chosen her 
article as the penultimate work of reference within my review of Moral Luck. The 
article resonates very strongly with my aim of investigating the inter-relationship 
between Moral Luck and the Good Samaritan (which without coincidence, is the 
title of my thesis). Her descriptions tally entirely, and the category of persons 
subject to impure agency undeniably include the Good Samaritans, who go out of 
their way (and usually at significant personal disadvantage) to go to the rescue, or 
aid of others in distress. The pure agents are definitely like the Levites, and the 
Priest who in the parable of the Good Samaritan, simply crossed to the other side 
of the road. 
 
The final work that I want to consider in my analysis of Moral Luck is that of Donna 
Dickenson, who fully accepts that Moral Luck exists, and like Walker she seeks to 
demonstrate how this can be used in a positive manner, although in her case she 
concentrates on the difficult moral problems which arise in the medical world. 
However, before turning to the latter’s work I will close this sub-section on Margaret 
Urban Walker by quoting the closing words in her article: “Anyone may fail morally 
in the particular dimension of facing bad moral luck. There are also cases so trying 
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as to be beyond human endurance, circumstances so shattering that maintaining 
integrity would be supererogation. They are the stuff of tragedy. But the association 
of moral luck with tragedy should not obscure the fact that the tragic case is a rare 
one, whereas more pedestrian instances of moral luck are ubiquitous, and its 
common challenges are everyday matters. In a world where we need so much from 
each other, so often, acceptance of our impurity [and the reality of Moral Luck] is 
not the worst we can do”156.   
 
3.4.9.      Donna Dickenson 
If, to me, Margaret Urban Walker was the most compelling author to write in favour 
of the Moral Luck phenomenon in the late 20th Century, then Donna Dickenson is 
the author who, I think, in the current century, has shown most comprehensively 
the value of accepting it head on, and who has demonstrated how such an 
acceptance can assist in resolving difficult moral problems (in her case, particularly 
in the medical arena). She provided these insights in her work: “Risk and Luck in 
Medical Ethics”157, and (in comparison to the other writers) I have reviewed her 
work in by far the most detail 
 
This book is also of particular interest in connection with my thesis, given that 
Donna Dickenson writes in the Medical sphere, and my specific interest is in the 
inter-relationship between Moral Luck and First Aid Volunteering, which is another 
category within this sphere. 
 
Dickenson begins her work by carrying out her own review of the Moral Luck 
paradox and asks a very important question as to whether the impact of luck is 
simply limited to the realm of morality, or does it extend much further into the wider 
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realm of “Ethics” (of which morality is only one element). If we can confine the 
effects of luck just to questions of morality then this would enable us to retreat into 
the ‘protection’ of the world of Ethics and we could comfort ourselves with the 
thought that if we cannot rely on our moral decisions as being impervious to luck, 
we can rely on the fact that if we always seek to be good (or in other words, seek 
to be virtuous/ ethical), then even if luck does interfere in our lives and actions, 
then we can insulate ourselves from criticism or censure. 
 
Dickenson immediately takes us back to Kant and his championing of the ‘Good 
Will’, and poses a devastating question: “What if having a Good Will is itself 
partially determined by Luck”158. She then provides an example from psychiatric 
ethics, whereby we have to face the fact that the formative years of some people 
are so disturbed that they emerge (through no fault of their own – and from the bad 
luck of being born to abusive parents) with a perverted concept of what it is to be 
good in the first place. 
 
She quickly proceeds to review Margaret Nussbaum’s work on Virtue Ethics, “The 
Fragility of Goodness”159, and reinforces Nussbaum’s view that Goodness itself is 
fragile, in terms of its vulnerability to Luck. However, whereas Nussbaum maintains 
that the resort to Goodness and Virtue can on most occasions circumvent the 
paradox of Moral Luck, Dickenson is less accommodating and openly 
acknowledges that luck pervades the totality of Ethics. She therefore proceeds in 
later chapters of her book to investigate how the Medical Profession has risen to 
this challenge and employed Risk Allocation, and greater reliance on Patient 
Consent to solve the various problems which confront the medical community due 
to the vagaries of luck (and Moral Luck in particular). 
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Dickenson then considers the various ways in which luck intervenes in human 
activity, and accepts Thomas Nagel’s analysis that luck impacts on our actions 
(and omissions) in four distinct ways: Consequential Luck; Circumstantial Luck; 
Causative Luck; and Constitutive Luck. In terms of her interest in the effect of luck 
in the medical arena she focuses her attention on the two aspects of Consequential 
Luck (i.e. in the way things turn out), and Constitutive Luck. She clarifies her choice 
by confirming that she is interested in Luck in the way things turn out as having 
particular relevance in the area of surgery, where there is always a risk that things 
will not turn out as expected, and Constitutive Luck as having particular relevance 
to issues such as why certain patients suffer cancer, kidney failure, liver failure etc. 
 
Dickenson accepts the Moral Luck paradox as actually being helpful to the medical 
community, because it focuses on the need to recognise risk/luck in the practice of 
medicine and the development of strategies to deal with the repercussions.  In 
terms of outcome luck, she suggests that it is possible to minimise the adverse 
impact of luck upon an individual actor, by minimising the matters that s/he is held 
responsible for, by recognising that there are a relatively limited set of 
circumstances in which (and over which) the actor has control.  
 
This leads her to concentrate further on Virtue Ethics, and the idea that we should 
accept that Moral Luck does exist, but then we should focus on how we respond 
to the challenges that this inevitably creates, and to ensure that in formulating such 
responses, we strive to ensure that we act in a virtuous and good manner in dealing 
with the situations that bad luck places us in. She begins this part of her work with 
the statement: 
 
“Any particular community may choose to honour certain ways of behaving, and to 
blame others [allowing that luck will play a part in both]: indeed it will need to do so 
in order to avoid anarchy. But we should not pretend that these purely relative, 
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society-specific sets of values are anything like Kant’s moral Universals. The 
possibility of moral absolutes that transcend cultures or societies is thus obliterated 
by this [virtue centred] interpretation of the moral luck paradox”160. 
 
She also makes the point that is up to each community or society to decide what it 
is prepared to consider praiseworthy or blameworthy in its small part of the World 
i.e. in its ‘system’. Other communities or societies may hold alternative views, and 
the differences of approach between societies will to a large extent depend upon 
the degree to which they are prepared to factor luck into their ‘system’. 
 
Dickenson then outlines some of the attributes which, whilst they are not 
universals, are ways of living our lives in a manner that our society deems 
praiseworthy. She gives the examples of ‘Grace’ and ‘Integrity’ and indicates that 
even when we are not fully in control of an outcome, we can still decide to accept 
responsibility for that outcome i.e. even if luck turns our best laid plans into harmful 
outcomes, we can still say to ourselves “That’s Life” and as a person of good grace 
I will accept the responsibility for what results. 
 
Dickenson echoes Nussbaum in this respect, and comments that it is the “Fragility 
of Goodness [the fact that goodness is susceptible to luck] which lends an 
admirable and touching quality to human endeavour”161.  
 
However even applying qualities such as Grace or Integrity does not wholly rescue 
us from moral luck, since luck acts in many ways and Constitutive Luck (i.e. luck 
in the type of people that we are) will determine if and to what extent we are capable 
of being virtuous people. Put another way, it will depend to a significant degree on 
where we are born and how we grow up and how we are nurtured as to whether 
we will approach our lives in a graceful manner, and with integrity. 
                                           
160 Op Cit, Note 157, Page 24 
161 Ibid 
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Nonetheless, this is not the end of the matter, and Dickenson saves us from losing 
ourselves in yet another moral luck maze by introducing the idea of human reason 
into the debate. What she demonstrates is that if we accept that luck plays a major 
role in everyday life, then in order to try to live our lives in a good and virtuous 
manner, then we can exercise our human reason to bring varying levels of control 
to the challenges that we face. For example, we can seek to remove bad luck from 
many of the physical things we do by applying our minds to a risk analysis before 
we proceed, we can also apply probability analysis before deciding the best place 
to site the most effective flood defences; we can also put society-wide insurance 
arrangements in place to protect the unlucky amongst us: National insurance and 
a National Health Service are the obvious examples in the United Kingdom. 
 
In raising the question of control, and the application of reason to try to maximise 
the level of control which is within our influence, Dickenson is in effect taking us 
further into the question of ‘Luck in the way things turn out’ i.e. Consequentialism. 
She recognises this and the third main section of her work considers the most 
popular form of consequentialist theory: Utilitarianism. 
 
Dickenson proceeds to analyse Utilitarianism based on Bentham's original Felicific 
Calculus, and the idea of trying to assign values to all the various positive and 
negative elements that will apply to a given act or omission. However, this 
challenge is one of the common criticisms of Utilitarianism i.e. that it is not possible 
to assign specific values to each element, and that there is a major difficulty in 
trying to settle on a common currency. In response, she specifically emphasises 
the value of probability theory as a key means of weighing up the various pro’s and 
con’s of each of the actions we might propose to take 
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This is not surprising given that Dickenson's work is specifically directed to the 
medical arena, where the use of probability theory has been, and continues to be 
at the very heart (no pun intended) of medical decision making, and the need in 
such cases - probably more so than in any other sector - to achieve Maximum 
Benefit from particular courses of action. She also explains that in the medical 
sphere there needs to be a vital extension to the basic Utilitarianism mantra, and 
hence she adds the caveat: ‘consistent with minimum harm’. This is 
understandable because in the medical field it is human lives that are at stake. 
 
Hence by using ‘Maximum Benefit, consistent with Minimal Harm’ she proceeds to 
demonstrate how, in medicine (and therefore how, in possibly other walks of life) it 
is possible to utilise probability theory, and ‘Control’ to deal with the impact of luck 
on moral/ethical decision making. Two particular examples will suffice at this stage 
to demonstrate the practicality of this approach, and these can be taken from the 
five scenarios put forward by Dickenson: it being most helpful to pick out: 
‘performing surgery when outcomes are uncertain’; and ‘allocating scarce 
resources in the challenging case of organ transplantation’. 
 
Taking surgery first, it is well-known that with all types of operation there is the risk 
of complication, or put another way, the risk of bad luck.  This might be in terms of 
failure to recover from being anesthetised; unexpected damage from a scalpel 
having to be applied very close to a vital organ; or from the possible implications 
of post-surgery infection etc. etc. From the surgeon’s point of view there may be a 
difficult moral decision to take when the probability of there being a negative 
outcome from a certain operation reaches pivotal proportions. Put simply, if in 
relation to a particular operation the probability of a patient surviving the surgery is 
only 1 in 3, then the surgeon may prefer not to operate, because he/she will 
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personally have insufficient control of the situation (due to the unknown impact of 
luck).    
 
The surgeon appears at first to be in a no-win situation. If she does not operate 
and the patient dies within, say, two years, she may well be criticised for her 
omission. On the other hand, if she does operate, but the patient dies on the 
operating table, she will be likely to be held responsible (not least by herself), and 
again open to criticism. The outcome resulting from either her action or omission 
will be outside her control whatever the moral basis on which she reached her 
decision - this is the paradox of Moral Luck arising in one of its starkest forms.  
 
However, Dickinson demonstrates a way out of the paradox, by introducing the 
idea of ‘patient consent’. If a surgeon is faced with a case where there is the 
likelihood that one in three patients would not survive this particular operation, but 
in response the surgeon is able to alert the patient to that probability of risk, and 
the patient who (with the full facts) gives informed consent, then the risk in the 
operation is thereby transferred to the patient. The surgeon can then proceed 
without moral responsibility for the outcome, and if due to bad luck the patient dies, 
then the doctor is most unlikely to be subject to public criticism (interestingly 
Dickinson makes the additional point, that the surgeon will no doubt feel regret at 
the outcome, but she will be unlikely to feel remorse, as she had not assumed 
responsibility for the risk in the operation - this had been assumed by the patient). 
By exercising this degree of control over the situation, and transferring the risk to 
the patient, the surgeon ‘escapes’ the dilemma that Moral Luck created for her. 
 
Turning to Dickinson’s second example, she outlines various problems in relation 
to organ transplantation where luck plays its role in various ways: the patient who 
had bad constitutive luck in being a person who suffers from a defective liver; the 
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donor who has bad luck in the chain of causation that led to him dying in a fatal 
accident; the doctors who confront bad luck in circumstances (having more 
patients on their transplant lists, then there are donors); and who also have bad 
luck in outcomes as to whether when the donor liver is transplanted, the recipient 
patient rejects the organ (or rather, their body does). 
 
Although Dickinson specifies a number of difficulties in this area, the particular 
problem I wish to consider at this point, is the luck in circumstances as to who 
receives a transplant. A doctor may be in a moral dilemma, in that he might have, 
say, two patients who need a liver transplant, but he can only give a donor liver to 
one of them. At a basic level if patient A receives the liver, then patient B might die 
and although he has no real control over which patient should live and which should 
die, the doctor will nonetheless have some responsibility for the patient who 
actually dies (despite the fact that it is luck which determines that just one patient 
lives) 
 
However, the doctor could possibly escape this dilemma by assessing the relative 
merits of each patient who might receive the liver compared to the other. For 
example, patient A might be a 65-year-old man, who has lived a life of excess as 
an alcoholic, and who has contributed little of value to society. By contrast, patient 
B might be a younger man in his 40s, who has lived his life in moderation, and who 
is, say, a brilliant teacher, who has brought a high quality education to thousands 
of pupils in his career to date, and who could teach thousands more if his tragic 
liver disease could be overcome by the transplant. 
 
If in this case the doctor decides to give the transplant to patient B, and regretfully 
patient A dies, it is unlikely that the doctor will be blamed for how he approached 
such a scenario. The doctor has therefore dealt with the Moral Luck dilemma that 
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faced him and did this by exercising a certain degree of control over the situation. 
He applied reason to the dilemma, carried out a utilitarian comparison, and chose 
to provide the transplant to the patient: who had longer to live; who had not 
contributed to his own illness; and who had (and would continue to have) made a 
more meaningful contribution to society. 
 
Having provided the above example myself, it should be noted that Dickinson in 
her work demonstrates that not all Countries would apply the same approach to 
these types of question. She indicates that in the UK, doctors will often evaluate 
which patient should receive a donor organ, ahead of another. By contrast she 
indicates that in Italy, no such evaluation-based approach is operated, and there 
is a simple reliance on the ‘first come - first served’ system. Each of these examples 
acknowledges that Luck is intervening in the scenario, and the Italian approach 
simply accepts the position and makes no attempt to mitigate the effects of luck 
and applies the first come first served approach regardless of the ‘merit’ of 
competing cases. By contrast, In the UK there is often an evaluation of comparative 
merits (however if cases are similar in merit, then the eventual outcome will once 
again be resolved on a first-come first-served basis).  
 
These are not the only methods that can be employed to decide how donated 
organs might be allocated when there is a shortage, and - in passing- it is 
instructive to briefly consider the views of Neil Duxbury, who writing before Donna 
Dickenson in 1999162, confirmed that he fully accepts that luck pervades our lives, 
and proposed that we build the impact of luck into our decision making – in his 
case by reference to Lotteries. i.e. by ‘tossing a coin’ to decide the allocation of 
scarce resources. Duxbury actually proposed a more sophisticated system of 
lottery allocation, and rather than rely on a simple lottery, indicated that weighted 
                                           
162 Duxbury, N, Random Justice’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 
 97 
lotteries can be of more utility. Put simply his idea is that if there are ten individuals 
each waiting for a transplant, and only one organ is available, then each individual 
can be given a weighted number of ‘chances’ in the lottery (e.g. the 65 year old 
persistent alcoholic, that I referred to above might only get one chance, whereas 
the brilliant 40 year old teacher might get seven chances – other individuals would 
also receive ‘chances’ based on the merit of their case). All the chances are then 
put in the pot and a random one selected, which could quite genuinely turn out to 
be the one related to the Alcoholic! In this scenario the Doctors are spared the 
angst of the Moral/Ethical dilemma, and disappointed patients may take some 
comfort from the fact they all had a fair chance, and Luck alone determined the 
outcome. This is a very strong example of Moral luck being both a real, and very 
helpful concept. 
 
I have only concentrated on two of Donna Dickinson's examples of how Moral Luck 
comes into play in the medical profession, and how by overtly recognising this, 
practical solutions can be found e.g. via using consent, or by applying reason to 
the problem. However it should be noted that Dickenson actually provides 
numerous other examples of the difficult circumstances (most of which involve 
aspects of luck) which medical professionals have to deal with: a) the “withdrawal 
of life sustaining treatment/ assisted suicide” - where a brain-dead patient cannot 
provide consent to what a doctor might propose163, (b) the “allocation of healthcare 
resources [e.g. scarce medicines]” - i.e. the so-called postcode lottery where a 
patient’s access to new and expensive drugs varies depending upon where a 
person lives164, (c) “Surrogacy” situations where either of the parties involved in 
such a ‘transaction’  might subsequently change their minds if, say, the child is 
born severely disabled165, (d) “human cloning” and issues such as parents 
                                           
163 Op Cit Note 157, Page 87,  
164 Ibid, Page 104 
165 Ibid, Page 124 
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conceiving a child in order to provide a possible donor, for an existing sibling who, 
might have progressive kidney disease166, (e) “Psychiatric patients and the 
possible release of someone back into society” who might then re-offend/kill 
again167. 
 
Dickenson’s approach which recognises that Luck is unavoidable in these 
complicated scenarios is very refreshing, and she actually uses the fact that luck 
prevents medical professionals from exercising full control, to develop solutions 
which can provide workable solutions to very difficult dilemmas. Her work is 
perhaps the most convincing example of aspects of Moral Luck being used in 
practice to assist decision makers to find optimal answers to some of the most 
testing challenges that anyone might have to face.  
 
3.5  Conclusions on Moral Luck and the Impact on the Law and Morality Debate  
Having reviewed the opinions of a number of the most respected writers on the 
subject, I am personally convinced that Moral Luck is a real phenomenon. The 
initial proponents: Bernard Williams, and Thomas Nagel made a very strong case, 
and whilst many subsequent writers have sought to deny its existence, I feel the 
strength of opinion is that Luck cannot be ignored when the moral content of 
decision-making is considered. 
 
The work of Margaret Urban Walker is very persuasive in this respect. However, 
the most compelling writer from my point of view is Donna Dickinson, who not only 
concludes that Moral Luck is a very real phenomenon, but demonstrates how its 
very existence is actually helpful in enabling practitioners in her profession (e.g. 
doctors) to deal with complicated problems which would otherwise prove almost 
                                           
166 Ibid, Page 137 
167 Ibid, Page 144 
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beyond resolution, without exposing such doctors to unacceptable moral 
dilemmas. 
 
It is therefore pertinent to ask the question as to how the outcomes of my 
investigations into Moral Luck interrelate with my overall intuition that the English 
Legal system prefers to maintain a separation between Law and Morality (and is 
thereby reluctant to incorporate a Good Samaritan Act into our Law). 
 
If, as I have demonstrated, it must be accepted that Luck plays a much more 
substantial role in our lives, than most people would initially accept, then it would 
seem appropriate to try to ensure that we do not allow the impact of Luck to 
interfere to too great an extent in our Legal system i.e. we should seek to exclude 
Luck, as far as practicable, from questions of Legal, and particularly Criminal 
Liability.  It is surely bad enough that the effect of Luck means that in many cases 
we do not have control over what happens to us and the consequences of what 
we do, but it would add a whole additional layer of unreasonableness if, in addition, 
criminal penalties were also applied to us. 
 
Hence in scenarios where substantial degrees of Luck are involved we should be 
wary of criminalising such situations. On the other hand if (as the paradox of Moral 
luck has demonstrated) Luck does intervene to a significant extent in the Moral 
sphere, then it would be much more reasonable to recognise this and ‘contain’ any 
sanctions in such a case to solely moral ones. It might still be felt unreasonable to 
hold an individual to account at all when Luck has intervened in their life, but it is 
infinitely better if any such accountability is simply Moral in nature (i.e. drawing the 
criticism of Society) rather than Legal (i.e. imprisonment). 
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Having said this there is a stronger argument for including a Duty to attempt an 
Easy Rescue within the Law, and to me there is no doubt that if (despite the 
vagaries of Luck), someone goes to the aid of a fellow citizen in distress, then the 
Law should generally protect them from Suit. 
 
I look at all these aspects in the next Chapter of this thesis, where I proceed to 
investigate the jurisprudence concerning Causation and Responsibility. In 
particular, I look at the responsibility for Omissions (given the Failure to Rescue is 
of such great interest to me in my work).  
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4. Causation, Responsibility, Omission, and Failures to Rescue 
Other Chapters of this project consider the crucial question of whether there should 
be a Duty to Rescue in English Law, and also, whether there should be appropriate 
systems for the Protection of Rescuers. However, in order to be able to answer these 
questions it is necessary to investigate the principles of Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence that surround the Moral and Legal interactions between human beings 
and the World at large (including the unusual impact of Moral Luck). This is the 
subject of this Chapter 4. The first part, Sub-Section 4.1 considers Causation in 
relation to Events that occur, Sub-Section 4.2 asks whether, if a human being can be 
identified as causing an event, s/he should be held Responsible for the 
consequences. 
 
The following Sub-Section 4.3 then deliberates on the complications that flow, when 
it is not Actions which are under scrutiny, but Omissions. It also looks at the so-called 
‘Acts and Omissions Doctrine’ and considers the Failure to Rescue as a special type 
of Omission. Given the controversy surrounding this doctrine, my work then proceeds 
in Sub-Section 4.4 to consider a “Different Approach”, by treating human conduct on 
a three (rather than a two) dimensional basis, introducing a (novel) third category of 
‘Stasis’. Sub-Section 4.5 then extends this three dimensional approach, to Rescue 
scenarios themselves (adding ‘Intermediate Rescues; to the usual twofold 
categorisation of just ‘Easy’ and ‘Hard’ rescues). I then correlate both of these three 
dimensional approaches into a matrix methodology in Sub-Section 4.6 to aid a more 
comprehensive analysis of the interaction between types of Rescue and categories 
of Responsibilities. The Paradox of Moral Luck is reintroduced from Chapter 3 at this 
point, particularly in relation to how this impacts on hard Rescues, and whether the 
failure to attempt an Easy Rescue should attract legal, as well as moral censure. 
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Section 4.7 concludes this part of my work and returns us back to the fundamental 
question of the degree to which there should be the separation between Law and 
Morality (such question being at the heart of my entire project). 
 
4.1 Causation 
A great deal has been written about Causation, stemming back from antiquity e.g. 
the writings of Aristotle168, through the emergence of a more scientific approach e.g. 
the works of Galileo169, and especially Sir Isaac Newton170, and particularly his Laws 
of Motion171. But I am most especially interested in Causation in the Law, and in 
looking at this particular aspect, I commence with a review of the works of David 
Hume, and John Stuart Mill. 
 
However before doing this, it is enlightening to quote a recent definition of Events. I 
do this because it is the happening of discrete events in our lives that bring legal 
concepts such as Causation, and Responsibility into play. As the quotation indicates, 
Events can range from the ‘everyday’ to the ‘monumental’ – but they all have 
consequences, and often legal ones: 
 
“a happening, occurrence, or episode e.g. the General Strike, the sinking of the 
Titanic, the arrival of guests, the local jumble sale. Events need not be momentous: 
the fall of a sparrow is as much an event as the fall of the Roman Empire”172. 
  
4.1.1 The Philosophy of David Hume 
David Hume considered the principle of ‘Cause and Effect’ in his work “The Treatise 
of Human Nature”173 in which he suggested “we may define a Cause to be an ‘object’ 
                                           
168  Aristotle, Physics, Book VIII, 257, C. 347 BC last accessed 11/08/08 Stanford   
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   & I Cohen ( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1972) 
171  Ibid  
172 Honderich T, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford, Oxford University  
   Press 2005) 
173  Hume D (1740), Treatise of Human Nature, last accessed on 10/11/12 at        
   www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/trthn10.txt      
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precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the ‘objects’ resembling the 
former are placed in like relations of precedency and contingency to those ‘objects’ 
that resemble the latter”174. He later re-stated a Cause as being “an object precedent 
and contiguous to another, and so united with it … that the idea of the one determines 
the mind to form the idea of the other”175.   
 
Hume then provided a number of Rules for when a Cause and Effect relationship can 
exist, including: (i) The Cause and Effect must be contiguous in Space and Time; (ii) 
The Cause must be prior to the Event; (iii) There must be a constant union between 
the Cause and the Effect; (iv) The same Cause must always produce the same Effect 
 
Summarising the position, it can be posited that in order for a particular effect to have 
occurred, it is NECESSARY for the related cause to have preceded it. In the 
foregoing I have emphasised “the related cause”, since a major criticism of Hume is 
that his explanation only allowed for each effect to be brought about by a single 
cause). 
 
4.1.2 The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill 
John Stuart Mill took Hume’s analysis further, but commenced with the basic 
statement: “It is a Universal truth that every fact which has a beginning has a 
cause”176.   He went on to say that “for every [Phenomenon] there exists some 
combination of objects or events … the occurrence of which will always be followed 
by that Phenomenon”177. Mill clearly identifies that there is a “combination” of objects 
at play, and it is through this plurality that Mill departs from Hume (this combination 
of causes has, since Mill, been termed the “Plurality of Causes”). He recognised that 
                                           
174  Ibid, Vol I, Part III, Section XIV  
175  Ibid 
176  Mill J S (1843) System of Logic, Vol I, Book III, Capter V ‘Of the Law of Universal   
   Causation, accessed10/11/12 at www.google.com/books?id=Y4MEAAAAQAAJ p.395 
177  Ibid, at Page 398  
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causation is most often a combination of more than one factor. This was a very 
important development by Mill, recognising that Causation is not a simple sequence 
of iterative steps, but a complex combination of factors acting both together and in 
series. However, he also realised that some factors (and usually just one of them) is 
more determinant than others, and he added the following statement: “In such cases 
it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination 
of Cause, calling the others mere Conditions”178. 
 
Hence Mill had described the modern day formulation of Causation, i.e. that there is 
a set of Sufficient Conditions which together contribute to a Cause. In addition, he 
recognised that there was usually an ‘operative’ Cause which was the Necessary 
Condition within this set of Sufficient Conditions.    
 
4.1.3 “Causation in the Law” by Herbert Hart and Tony Honore179   
Herbert Hart and Tony Honore published their work in 1959 and carried out a detailed 
review of causation using the linguistic approach in vogue at the time. This involved 
them in looking at the common sense approach adopted by Society as a whole, but 
more specifically the language used by judges/courts in reaching their decisions. 
Their view was that this was more instructive in indicating to lawyers how principles 
of Causation were applied in practice. 
 
Hart and Honore began their work by reviewing the main philosophical ideas that 
preceded them. In many respects they accepted the principles established by John 
Stuart Mill, but criticised his conclusions in a number of ways. In particular they 
pointed out that Mill only generally concentrated on Natural phenomenon, and not 
specifically on human Conduct (where issues of motivation and mens rea apply). 
                                           
178  Ibid, at Page 399 
179  Hart H & Honore T, Causation in the Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1959) 
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Having demonstrated the need to thoroughly review the role of human beings in 
Causation, Hart and Honore separated their own approach into “Explanatory 
Inquiries” being the analysis of factual causation, and into “Attributive Inquiries”, 
being the extension of causal analysis to look at when factual causation could be 
attributed to human fault180. In following this methodology they set the scene for the 
modern approach to causation, whereby Factual Causation, is distinguished from 
Policy Issues. Those Philosophers who have since adopted the wider definition of 
causation (to include both Factual and Policy considerations) have been termed 
‘Causal Maximists’, whilst those who adopt a narrower definition of causation to 
simply include factual elements (leaving policy to be assessed independently) have 
been termed ‘Causal Minimalists’. 
 
In the Preface to the second edition of their book181, Hart and Honore clearly prefer 
the causally minimalist approach, since they believe that the alternative of causal 
maximisation, confuses the picture and prevents actual causation from being 
analysed objectively, due to aspects of Policy being allowed to cloud legal/ judicial 
thought. This, they assert, is unhelpful since the law should confine itself to objective 
rules, which lawyers can identify; and advise upon. If there are Policy reasons why 
an individual should be excused from the consequences of their part in the causation 
of an event, then it should be entirely clear that ‘Policy’ is at play, and if factors, such 
as moral judgements are brought to bear, then it should be clear that this is the case, 
and such factors should be recognised for what they are: post-event rationalisation, 
not pre-event causation182. This approach clearly resonates in Hart’s slightly later 
work: “The concept of Law”183 where he firmly asserts that matters of morality should 
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be kept clearly separate from matters of law (this being of fundamental importance 
in my thesis). 
 
Hart and Honore deplored the confusion which had arisen from the preceding case 
law, where legal causation and legal policy had become intermixed, thereby 
obscuring the role of law and the role of policy. They particularly eschewed the 
practice whereby terms such as “Proximate Cause”; “Remoteness of Damage”; “A 
break in the Chain of Causation”; “Foreseeability”; had entered the vocabulary of 
Causation. Whilst these were useful devices which judges were able to use to justify 
particular decisions, they were insufficiently precise, and masked the fact that legal 
policy was regularly being applied.  
 
It is not necessary to reproduce all the examples which Hart and Honore referred to 
in order to demonstrate the misleading use of such terms, and two will suffice to 
illustrate their disquiet: 
 
“Proximate Cause”  
The term Proximate Cause was identified in a huge number of case reports both in 
England, and in the USA, and was generally used as shorthand for the principle that: 
“because of convenience of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law 
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. 
It is practical Politics” (quoted from Palsgraf v Long Island Railways Co.184).  Hart and 
Honore’s concern was that all the causal steps leading to an event are matters of 
fact. If for policy reasons some causes are considered to be too remote from the 
outcome so as to exclude responsibility, then this should be recognised for what it is: 
Legal Policy. Causal principles should not be ‘debased’ by combining the two aspects 
of fact and policy via linguistic gymnastics to arrive at a term: “Proximate Cause” to 
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artificially describe when a particular event in a series of events is either sufficiently 
proximate or not, to anchor an individual’s responsibility. 
 
“Foreseeability” 
The concept of foreseeability was identified as another device that courts and judges 
used to either penalise or excuse defendants depending upon Public Policy 
considerations. The archetypal situation (occurred in ‘The Wagon Mound No. 1’185) 
and was a case where oil was spilled from a vessel in a wharf in Sydney harbour, 
and this ignited, causing fire damage to buildings around the wharf. From a policy 
point of view, the court clearly wished to avoid penalising the shipowners for the fire 
damage (as it could have extended liability almost without limit, as one building could 
have simply ignited others in a domino effect). The court therefore chose to use the 
device of foreseeability to limit the liability (i.e. it concluded that it was not foreseeable 
that oil on water could ignite unaided, and that the only damage foreseeable, was 
fouling of the wharf perimeter). This approach however masked the situation that the 
oil spillage was the factual cause of the fire, and introduced the device of forseeability 
as an element of causation to achieve a policy objective.  Hart and Honore again 
complained that this ‘debased’ the concept of causation, and that it would be more 
legitimate if the decision was recognised for what it was: a blatant policy decision 
(which should be evaluated as such). 
  
Whilst Hart and Honore were highly critical of most of the linguistic devices which 
judges had used to decide actual cases, they nonetheless considered one such 
device as being more helpful, and this was the “sine qua non” or “But For Test”. They 
accepted that in most cases, the factual cause of an event could be arrived at by 
identifying the factor ‘but for which’ the event would not have occurred. However, 
even they cautioned that no one factor could be regularly separated out as the only 
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sine qua non. They used the example of “Fire” to demonstrate this whereby the 
factors of “Heat”, “Fuel”, “Ignition”, and “Oxygen” were each a sine qua non186. Taking 
this further, they in effect, asked us to recognise that in a situation where the but for 
test, might be applied in an arson case, the guilty person could either be a person 
who ignited the original (small?) fire, or a person who subsequently poured petrol on 
it187. They also clarified that whereas ignition and fuel will often be necessary 
elements for there to be fire, certain other factors are “mere conditions” for the 
occurrence of the same (i.e. Oxygen)188.   
 
Concentrating on situations where there may be more than one factor leading to an 
event, Hart and Honore pointed to other examples where the But for Test will not 
identify a unique cause.  A particularly instructive example is the two gunmen 
situation, where both Gunman A and Gunman B fire a fatal shot at a victim at exactly 
the same time. In the case of a single gunman, the But for Test works because in 
answer to the question “but for the gunman’s shot, would the victim have died? the 
answer is NO, and hence the shot can be identified as the unique cause of the 
victim’s death. However, in the two gunmen case the But for Test will not identify the 
unique cause. This is because in, say, the case of Gunman A, the answer to the 
question “but for Gunman A’s shot would the victim have died”, the answer this time 
is now YES (due to Gunman B’s shot). The same result arises if an identical ‘but for’ 
question is asked of Gunman B. This leads to the outcome that the But for Test will 
not operate satisfactorily in such cases. This is an example of what Hart and Honore 
refer to as “Concurrent Cause” cases189.   
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Having raised this problem with the But for Test, Hart and Honore do accept that the 
test will provide a satisfactory answer in the great majority of cases (provided its 
limitations are recognised)190. Then, in order to try to deal with such limitations, and 
in order to produce an even more helpful algorithm, they developed an extended 
version which has become known as the “NESS” test, that a condition contributes to 
some consequence when it is necessary to the sufficiency of a set of conditions which 
are themselves sufficient for that consequence. This was more simply expressed by 
Richard Wright, who stated that to be the cause of an event a condition should be 
“the Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set of conditions which led to the 
consequence”191.  
 
This revised NESS test was shown by Wright to have generally solved the 
“Concurrent Causes” problem, inherent in the but for test: In the two Gunmen 
example, the but for test would sequentially exclude both Gunman A, and Gunman 
B from being the factual cause of the victim’s death, because neither of them was a 
necessary factor in the killing. By contrast the NESS test successfully includes both 
gunmen as causes of the outcome, because each gunmen’s action was a necessary 
element of a sufficient set of causes of the victim’s death. 
 
It is in unusual cases like this where Courts achieve justice by finding both gunmen 
guilty of murder (consider also the equally difficult, “cut-throat defence” cases, when 
two accuseds seek to avoid a guilty verdict by each blaming the other). 
 
Hart and Honore’s views on Causation became increasingly accepted as the most 
convincing analysis of the subject, but before concluding my summary of the position 
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it is worthwhile spending a short time looking at one particular criticism of their 
approach, as espoused by Jane Stapleton  
 
4.1.4 “Choosing what we mean by “Causation” in the Law” - Jane Stapleton192       
 As she states in her preamble, one of the purposes of Jane Stapleton’s article is to 
critique the work of other primary commentators on the subject. 
 
The writers that Stapleton particularly criticises are Hart and Honore, and their 
publication: “Causation in the Law”. She raised five main criticisms of their work: 
 
a) that they do not specifically include failures to comply with Norms as classes of 
‘causes’  
 
b) that they did not adequately recognise remoteness/scope issues as forming 
 Explanative Inquiries, as well as Attributive Inquiries. 
 
c) that their linguistic conclusions were based on insufficient empirical research. 
 
d) that the causal language they ascribed to the courts was often wrongly identified 
 as mixing fact and policy. 
 
e) that their linguistic approach only reflected causal language in use in the mid 20th 
 century. 
 
The most compelling of the criticisms is the last one which concerns the suggestion 
that Hart and Honore’s linguistic approach is stuck in time: “[their account] rests on a 
snapshot of causal usage frozen in the late 1950’s”193.  Stapleton makes it clear that 
language reflects Society at the time: “Legislators and Courts change the pattern of 
legal obligations over time”194. She particularly refers to the plethora of positive 
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obligations that have been enshrined in law since 1959, and stresses that these are 
prescriptive, and leave much less room for common sense interpretation (e.g. rules 
on control, protection, and prevention (particularly in the sphere of Financial 
Regulation)). 
 
This criticism has some merit, but it is not fatal to Hart and Honore’s work, since the 
analysis of most everyday scenarios still respond to their methodology. Indeed, when 
Tony Honore prepared the revised material for the second edition of their book in 
1985, he did not consider that the intervening 25 years required any significant 
changes to the linguistic analysis within the book (the author of this Thesis has 
contacted Jane Stapleton, who has confirmed that as far as she is aware Tony 
Honore never felt it necessary to respond to her various criticisms). 
 
4.1.5 Conclusions on Causation 
Having traced the philosophy of causation from the mid 18th century to the early 21st 
century, I am convinced that the NESS theory developed by Hart and Honore 
(building on the earlier work of Hume, and Mill) remains the best method of deciding 
whether a particular factor is the Necessary element from a set of competing factors 
each vying for the title of THE cause. 
 
Jane Stapleton causes us to question whether Hart and Honore’s methods are locked 
in the middle of the 20th century, but even she generally concludes that their NESS 
formula still provides a satisfactory algorithm for establishing Causation (in the great 
majority of cases)195. 
 
Reverting back to Hart and Honore, once the factual cause has been identified, 
separate investigation can proceed as to whether responsibility for the identified 
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factor can be attributed to a human being. This separate investigative approach 
enables the principles of Legal causation (characterised by Hart and Honore as 
Explanative Inquiries) to be pursued free from the confusing influence of legal policy, 
which clouded earlier attempts by other philosophers to define causation. It then 
becomes possible to look independently at the Policy issues that may be brought to 
bear (characterised by Hart and Honore as Attributive Inquiries), and thereby clearly 
identify when questions of human responsibility for causing events are really under 
consideration. It is the analysis of the principles of such responsibility that forms the 
next sub-section of this thesis. 
 
4.2 Responsibility                       
In commencing a review of the question of human Responsibility for events, it is again 
useful to consider the thoughts of the 18th, 19th and 20th Century philosophers, and 
also that of at least one 21st Century commentator. 
  
4.2.1 18th and 19th Century Analysis 
John Locke writing in 1764 on “Liberty and Licence”, stressed the importance of 
individual liberty, but tempered with licence for individuals to live their lives free from 
the interference of the State, unless they infringe other peoples’ liberties: “… no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession … and may not, unless 
it be to do Justice to an offender, take away or impair the life,… liberty, health, limb, 
or goods of another”196.  
 
This establishes an elementary principle that whilst we all have basic freedoms, we 
have a responsibility not to harm the interests of others, and should expect to be 
sanctioned if we do so, where justice demands it. 
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This theme of the individual being responsible for injuring his fellow man was 
reinforced by Jeremy Bentham who in his 1789 work “An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation” stated: “There are few cases in which it would 
be expedient to punish a man for hurting himself: but there are few cases, if any, in 
which it would not be expedient to punish a man for injuring his neighbour”197. 
Bentham in expressing this standpoint clearly echoes his Utilitarian philosophy. 
 
John Stuart Mill followed up Bentham’s basic Utilitarian approach towards freedoms 
and responsibilities in his work “On Liberty”198 by stating “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others”199. 
 
Mill takes this further and stresses the importance of individual autonomy, and states 
the basic liberties which go to characterise man as a worthwhile and progressive 
being: “liberty of conscience…liberty of thought and feeling … liberty of expression 
… tastes and pursuits … liberty in their right to unite with others”200. 
 
Mill continues by re-affirming the fundamental necessity of these liberties in defining 
the Human Condition: “No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, 
respected is free ... and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute 
and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our 
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs”201.  
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He then adds further stress to this necessity of respecting the similar rights of others: 
“Though Society is not founded on a contract … everyone who receives the 
protection of Society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in Society 
renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of 
conduct to the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not infringing the interests of one 
another … and secondly, in each person’s having his share … of the labours and 
sacrifices incurred for defending Society or its members from injury or 
molestation”202.  
 
Interestingly Mill also differentiated cases where the Law should hold individuals 
responsible for their harmful actions, and where if no legal norms are violated, one 
should only be held morally responsible: “The acts of the individual may be hurtful to 
others … without … violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then 
be justly punished by opinion, though not by law”203.  This is highly pertinent to my 
work and once again reinforces the view that there should generally be a separation 
between Moral and Legal repercussions.   
 
Mill also refers to cases where sometimes the actions of one individual may harm the 
interests of another, but where neither legal nor moral sanctions are appropriate: 
“Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination 
… reaps benefits from the loss of (the) others … society admits no right either legal 
or moral in the disappointed competitors”204.  
 
If we accept the foregoing philosophical doctrine, as I believe we should, then we 
need to ask ourselves: what is it that justifies Society in interfering with individual 
liberty (restricting someone’s freedom to act or freedom not to act)? and also what  
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entitles us to hold them responsible (with or without sanctions) for their conduct? 
These questions are considered further below.  
 
4.2.2 20th and 21st Century Analysis 
Various answers to the foregoing questions have been provided since Mill wrote on 
the subject. Hart and Honore were amongst the more significant modern writers to 
contribute, and in particular the preface to the second edition of their main work, 
makes reference to various bases of attributing responsibility. Other significant 
writers commenting in the last 25 years include Joel Feinberg, John M Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza. 
 
4.2.2.1 “Causation in the Law”: Hart and Honore205 
Hart and Honore began their consideration of responsibility by adopting the basic 
concept developed by Locke, Bentham, and Mill i.e. that the attribution of 
responsibility will ordinarily flow from whether or not someone who has caused an 
event has created harm or injury to another individual: “In the moral judgements of 
ordinary life, we have occasion to blame people because they have caused harm to 
others”206.  In other words we must ask ourselves whether a person should be 
answerable for the harm they have caused. (Hart independently adopted 
“answerability” from the dictionary definition of Responsibility in his earlier, individual, 
work: “Punishment and Responsibility”207). Hart and Honore developed this 
answerability idea by focussing attention on whether someone is liable to 
compensate other people for harm that has been caused to them208. Through this 
approach they introduced concepts such as vicarious responsibility where an 
                                           
205 Op Cit Note 181 
206 Ibid (Page 63) 
207 Hart HLA, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1968) 
208 Op Cit Note 130, Page 65 
 116 
individual is held answerable for harm which they have not caused personally, due 
to the fault of someone for whom they are responsible (i.e. the Employer/Employee 
situation)209. Conversely they then proceeded to outline a number of situations where 
even though someone has caused harm to another person, they will not be found 
legally responsible e.g. they quoted the law of murder in England where the victim 
must die within one year and a day. They also quoted the situation in New York, 
where someone who causes a fire which spreads to a row of houses, is only legally 
responsible for the damage to the first house210.  
 
As the above examples show, Hart and Honore supported the idea that it is at the 
stage of attributing responsibility where it is most appropriate to apply Public Policy. 
This is consistent with the views they expressed on causation: whether someone 
causes an event is purely a factual matter, and if there are policy reasons why they 
should be not be held liable, then this is where the device of allocating ‘responsibility’ 
can be used by the courts to achieve results which they consider are fair in the name 
of justice (i.e. the New York Fire law prevents a tortfeasor suffering liability for an 
almost unlimited number of damaged properties, when risk allocation amongst many 
owners (probably insured) is a more equitable outcome). 
 
Other writers also refer to the role of policy in providing justifications/ defences for 
individuals who may have caused harmful events, and the subject arises again in the 
subsequent sub-sections below. However it would not be appropriate to leave Hart 
and Honore without noting their ‘summary’ that responsibility is defined by “the 
liability of a person to be punished, forced to pay compensation, or otherwise 
subjected to a sanction by the law”211. More specifically they identify Fault as the key 
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factor upon which legal responsibility can be grounded212. “Fault” may arise in 
different ways i.e. fault in terms of morally deficient behaviour (which may, or may 
not make the person answerable), or fault in terms of breaching legal requirements 
or norms (which will generally make them answerable, with a significant sanction).     
 
4.2.2.2 “Harm to Others”: Joel Feinberg213  
Like many of his predecessors, Feinberg also alighted on ‘Harm’ as the fundamental 
factor on which to anchor responsibility. He commenced by reiterating Mill’s basic 
philosophy i.e. that there should be a general presumption of liberty, and that if an 
individual’s liberty is to be restricted, and responsibility allocated to him/her then a 
valid “Liberty-Limiting Principle”214 must be involved. He also generally adopted Mill’s 
concept of “Harm to Others” as the most promising liberty-limiting principle. However, 
Feinberg posited a wider definition of Harm, by including not only harm to other 
individuals (“Private Harm”), but also harm to the state generally (“Public Harm”). He 
combined both elements in what he termed his “Harm Principle”215. 
 
Feinberg proceeded to define a number of other liberty-limiting principles, although 
in my view he over-complicated matters. The most interesting ideas he put forward 
are: An Offence Principle (he suggested that a person can be offended rather than 
harmed); and A Legal Moralism Principle (he suggested that even if something does 
not cause harm or offence, it may still affront morals216). However, if we consider that 
whatever is offensive to us, or affronts our morals, is ‘harmful’ to our peace of mind, 
we can probably wrap these principles together into the main Harm Principle.    
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Feinberg then proceeded to define “Harm” itself. He began by making the point that 
not all harms are necessarily matters for the law (and especially not the criminal law). 
He provided the example of a bruised/blistered finger which whilst it will represent a 
harm, is not particularly harmful, unless the person involved is, perhaps a concert 
pianist217. He also demonstrated that some uses of the word harm are imprecise, and 
he suggested other similar words that convey a similar idea i.e. “damage”, “tear”, 
“break” etc. etc.218. He therefore decided to establish a specific definition of Harm 
which can be used to attribute responsibility to individuals, and he settled on the 
rubric of “Setting Back of Interests”219.  
 
Feinberg then proceeded to demonstrate how this idea could embrace all the various 
types of harm which need to be covered in order to make his definition all-embracing 
(I will particularly refer to his application of the principle to Omissions in the next major 
Sub-Section of this work, which includes the Special Case of Failure to Rescue). He 
then provided a necessary caveat to the use of his formula, and cautioned (like Hart 
and Honore) that not every setting back of a person’s interests will be actionable in 
law, or subject to legal sanction. He particularly drew attention to those cases where 
there must also have been an intention to cause the harm (the general mens rea 
requirement for most criminal offences), or cases where there may be specific 
defences that might apply e.g. necessity, self-defence, insanity etc. etc.   
 
The key concepts which should be carried forward from Feinberg’s work are that the 
Harm Principle is a major tool which can be used to attribute responsibility, and that 
the way to apply the tool is to analyse whether in causing an event, an individual has 
wrongfully set back someone’s interest. 
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4.2.2.3 “Responsibility and Control”: Fischer & Ravizza220   
The subtitle to this work is: “A Theory of Moral Responsibility” and Fischer and 
Ravazzi immediately made the claim that only human beings can be responsible for 
causing events -  because only human beings have a sense of morality. This idea is 
at the root of their work, which looks at moral responsibility (rather than the more 
limited basis of enquiry into legal responsibility and especially criminal responsibility). 
 
In defining an approach to moral responsibility, Fischer and Ravizza drew on the 
works of Peter Strawson221, and Michael Zimmerman222, to identify the concepts of 
“Reactive Attitudes”, and the “Ledger of Life” respectively.  
 
The reference to ‘Reactive Attitudes’ is a reference to the idea that we only find 
someone morally responsible for causing an event, where their conduct raises within 
us a reaction of blame or praise. If the event, they cause does not provoke any moral 
reaction within the general members of Society then we can interpret this as 
suggesting that the individual should not be held responsible for causing it. 
 
This further reference to a ‘Ledger of Life’ is a reference to the idea that to be held 
morally responsible, a person’s conduct is assessed as though they have thereby 
amassed credits and debits in a moral ledger. If the debits outweigh the credits then 
they are considered to attract a reactive attitude of blame, and if vice versa, a reactive 
attitude of praise. 
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Fischer and Ravazzi then proceeded to explain how they approached the 
assessment of whether an individual’s conduct ‘scores’ sufficiently to create a 
reactive attitude, and determine the allocation of blame. They began by drawing on 
Aristotelian Conditions for imposing responsibility, and identified the two main factors 
which must be established if responsibility is to be validly applied: “Ignorance”, and 
“Force”. In doing this they made direct reference to Aristotle223. In terms of ignorance 
they made the essential point that someone can only be responsible for something if 
they know (have knowledge) of what they are doing, and that it is wrong.  
 
Fischer and Ravizza concentrated on the second Aristotelian condition: Force, and 
they made the reasonable point that someone cannot be held responsible for 
something if they have been forced to do it, and did not act under their own free will 
(they provided an example of a person who causes harm, because in a Gale, the 
wind blows them off balance224). They took this principle further and restated it in 
terms of asserting that a person should only be responsible for their conduct if they 
have Control over the situation in which they find themselves.  In other words: “an 
agent must in some sense control his behaviour in order to be morally responsible”225. 
 
Fischer and Ravizza therefore adopted Control as their overall determinant for 
allocating responsibility, and it is a useful addition to the general Harm Principle 
proposed by others as the key factor. In some cases it may not be possible to identify 
actual harm arising as a means of attributing responsibility, however there may still 
have been someone who was in sufficient control of a situation, such that it would 
not be unreasonable to assign some degree of responsibility to them. This is similar 
to the “Last Clear Chance” doctrine which forms part of the law of Tort in the USA226. 
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It could be particularly helpful in Rescue cases where a bystander is the only person 
available who can exert some control over a situation and perform a Rescue! 
 
4.2.3 Conclusions on Responsibility 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the subject of attributing responsibility is a 
complex matter. However, I think a number of general conclusions can be reached: 
from Locke, Bentham and Mill we can take the idea that assigning responsibility is 
essentially a matter of deciding when a person’s freedom or liberty to act (or not act) 
just as he pleases can be limited by Society, and the main answer proposed is when 
his/her conduct is identified as causing harm. Hart and Honore developed this 
approach further and introduced the related concept of fault. They did this to 
demonstrate that not all harms are actionable (e.g. when public policy provides 
exemptions of various kinds), and that fault will often be more indicative of 
responsibility.  Writing more recently Joel Feinberg re-stated the Harm Principle as 
the key factor, and defined it as the Setting Back of an Interest. However, he also 
cautioned that not all setting back of interests carry sanctions, and referred to the 
role of mens rea in criminal cases, and also the general impact of typical defences. 
Fischer and Ravizza prefer Control as the key factor in deciding whether or not to 
attribute responsibility.  
 
Consequently, it seems necessary to include all of the above mentioned factors in 
any overall approach to assigning responsibility. Hence they will all be borne in mind 
when considering the responsibility for Omissions (and failures to rescue) in the next 
sub-section. 
 
4.3  Omission (especially the Failure to Rescue)  
Having now considered the principles that underlie causation and responsibility, it is 
possible to proceed to investigate how those principles apply to Omissions. The 
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analysis of whether omitting to do something can ever be a cause, and then, whether 
someone can be held responsible for an omission has split philosophers since man 
started thinking about his impact on the world. The question continues to have 
extremely important consequences in very many areas, not least in the medical arena 
where issues such as Euthanasia raise difficult issues connected with preserving or 
not preserving life. Another area where preserving life raises important questions is 
around the subject of Rescue, and especially in relation to Failure to Rescue. This 
topic is of central relevance to this present thesis. However, before specifically 
considering the issues surrounding rescues, it is necessary to review the 
jurisprudence applicable to Omissions more generally. 
     
4.3.1  The Classical Approach to Omissions 
One of the earliest philosophers to turn attention to the character and nature of 
Omissions was St Thomas Aquinas, who, it can also be suggested modelled his 
views on Aristotle’s thinking on the matter of Natural Law and its content (which itself 
was influenced by the legacy of Plato and Socrates).  
 
 Aquinas considered the relationship between Actions and Omissions in his colossal 
work: “Summa Theologica” and commented firstly in Question 71, Article 5 (Whether 
Every Sin Involves Some Act?) and in Question 72, Article 6 (Whether Sins of 
Commission and Omission Differ Specifically?)227.  He also commented, in Question 
79, Article 4 (Is the Sin of Omission more Serious than the Sin of Transgression)228. 
 
In answer to the question of “whether every sin involves some act?”, Aquinas 
considered that “Sin may arise when a man does what he ought not, or by not doing 
what he ought … there can be sin without an act”.  In answer to the question of 
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“whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?” He considered that 
they are formally of the same species of sin (one acting positively, the other 
negatively), and provided the example: “Fire gives forth heat… and [at the same time] 
… it does not give forth cold”. He continued that in his view there is nothing morally 
different in a man who harms a third party either by taking food from their mouth, or 
a man who harms them by not satiating their hunger by giving them his surplus food. 
The outcome for the third party is the same: hunger. 
 
Nonetheless, turning to the question of “Is the Sin of Omission more Serious than the 
Sin of Transgression?”, Aquinas considered that Transgression (an Act) is more 
serious and he provides the example that failing to show respect to one’s parents is 
not as serious as positively insulting them.   
 
 Taking together Aquinas’ writings on both the character of acts and omissions, and 
the relative blameworthiness of each, we can summarise that he considered that both 
acts and omissions are capable of being sins, but that a sinful act is generally more 
serious than a sinful omission. This coincides with our natural intuition on the subject.   
 
However, Aquinas’ conclusion is an oversimplification in terms of the degree to which 
a consistency in approach towards Commission and Omission can be maintained in 
relation to legal duties as compared to moral duties.  Three specific examples help 
make the point and indicate the complexity of the Commission/ Omission conundrum: 
firstly, if there is a moral duty to provide food to a hungry person, then where is the 
boundary of this duty, is it to provide food to a person’s own family, or to his 
neighbours, or to a homeless stranger, or to all the famine victims overseas? (this 
example is provided by Andrew Ashworth)229; secondly, there is instinctively a 
significant difference between letting someone die (omission) and killing someone 
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(commission): this dichotomy comes to the fore whenever the issue of Euthanasia is 
discussed (Jonathan Glover provides a thought provoking analysis of the case where 
resuscitation (or life support) is withheld, compared to where a life shortening drug 
might be administered230, and thirdly it is clear that often, situations which we find 
morally blameworthy do not translate into legal blameworthiness: if there is a moral 
duty to always tell the truth, should there be a corresponding legal duty? i.e. if we 
were to be untruthful and tell someone that we support rugby team A (when in fact 
we support rugby team B), would anyone expect us to be punished under the criminal 
law for this lie? (this example draws on ‘harmless lies’ discussed by Kent 
Greenawalt)231.  
 
These differentiations as to when conduct (act or omission) should incur moral 
disapproval, or when it should translate into legal responsibility is fundamental to my 
thesis, and the key idea that a separation should be maintained between Morality 
and Law (as will be seen from the next sub-section, this separation tends to more 
readily accepted when we are considering Omissions, rather than Acts). 
 
 
4.3.2     Commission and Omission (A More Modern Analysis) 
It has often been said that English Law is hesitant to impose liability for Omissions 
e.g. Sir Edward Coke wrote in the 16th Century that “No man shall be examined upon 
secret thoughts of his heart, or of his secret opinion: but something ought [only] to be 
objected against him what he hath spoken or done”232. This approach continued 
largely unaltered over the next 400 years, and even became somewhat 
institutionalised in the so called “Acts and Omissions Doctrine”. This dictates that we 
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should treat Omissions differently from Acts, and that whilst the law can legitimately 
penalise very many harmful acts, it should generally be hesitant to penalise 
Omissions. This latter admonition was perhaps most forcibly posited by Lord 
Macaulay in his Notes on the Indian Penal Code in 1837 when he stated: “We must 
grant impunity to the vast majority of those omissions … and must content ourselves 
with punishing such omissions only when they are distinguished … by circumstances 
which mark them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation” 233.   
 
4.3.2.1 Acts and Omissions Doctrine 
The Doctrine relies on a principle that generally individuals should be held less 
culpable for omissions than for actions, and this differentiation has been forcibly 
advocated on a regular basis, and particularly in the medical arena, i.e. it is less 
blameworthy to allow someone to die, than it is to hasten their death.  
 
This is despite the fact that the Doctrine has regularly been criticised as obscuring 
the need for the law to approach each individual case on its own merits. The most 
forceful criticism of the Acts & Omissions Doctrine was expressed by Jonathan 
Glover234 writing in 1977. Glover, noted the general rationale for the conventional 
Doctrine (that intuitively we find it morally more reprehensible to take a life than to 
refrain from saving one, and that in terms of personal autonomy it is more 
acceptable to prohibit a limited range of bad acts, than it is to forcibly compel the 
positive performance of a very wide range of good ones). Nonetheless he objected 
to the Doctrine by asserting that [if the doctrine means that] “an act and a deliberate 
omission with identical consequences can vary in moral value, it [the Doctrine] 
should be rejected”235. 
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4.3.2.2       The Ashworth: Williams Debate 
Whilst views on the Acts and Omissions Doctrine were being bandied backwards 
and forwards, a very interesting exchange of opinions took place in a debate at the 
end of the 1980’s on the criminalisation of omissions, between Andrew Ashworth 
and Glanville Williams.  
 
Ashworth 
The debate began with Andrew Ashworth publishing an article on “The Scope of 
Criminal Liability for Omissions”236 in which he purported to separate writers on the 
subject into those adhering to ‘The Conventional View’ and those adhering to ‘The 
Social Responsibility View’.  
 
Ashworth described the Conventional View in terms of a minimalist approach to 
criminalising omissions under which Omissions should only incur criminal sanctions 
in exceptional cases. He quoted a number of arguments for this approach237, mainly 
relying on personal autonomy and liberty principles i.e. that constraints on a person’s 
liberty to either act, or not to act as they wish, should be kept to the minimum, and 
trying to impose general positive duties rather than simply prohibiting harmful 
infringements would be too intrusive to personal autonomy. Ashworth also suggested 
that criminalising omissions on too wide a basis would be overly-paternalistic and 
interfere with self-determination. He further suggested that if we insist on people 
involving themselves in other individual’s lives then we will encourage a society of 
busy-bodies. He added that if we become obliged by law to help others, then where 
should we draw the line: if I have a legal duty to aid the starving, would this require 
me to sell all my worldly possessions in order to fully satisfy my obligation? Finally, 
                                           
  236  Op Cit Note 229 
237  Ibid (Pages 3 & 4) 
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Ashworth stated that it would be impractical to expect citizens to be fully aware of all 
the various positive duties that might apply to them, rather than simply needing to 
know the limited number of things that they are prohibited from doing.  
 
Ashworth then described the alternative Social Responsibility View238, and made his 
main claim that, in exchange for living in a protective society, we all have duties not 
only to avoid harm to our fellow citizens, but also to take positive action to assist them 
(e.g. rescue them) in time of need. He suggested that this would maximise personal 
autonomy by creating the necessary mutually supportive environment in which we 
should all want to live and strive. He also used a Utilitarian argument to justify his 
claim i.e. that we should adopt a system which provides maximum happiness or 
saves the maximum number of lives, consistent with the minimum inconvenience to 
persons generally. He also posited that this approach will create a less selfish, and 
a morally robust society, for the benefit of all239.   
 
Ashworth then proceeded to describe various Duty Requirements in which he 
believes society should impose criminal sanctions, if a citizen fails to fulfil them. He 
set out five broad classes240: 
 
Prior Dangerous Acts – Ashworth stated that if someone creates dangerous 
circumstances, then they cannot simply ignore the situation and there will be a 
positive duty to abate the danger. He quoted the case of R v Miller241 where Miller 
dropped a lighted cigarette in bed, but rather than extinguishing the fire he simply 
moved to another room. He was found guilty of recklessly damaging the house.   
 
                                           
238  Ibid (Pages 5 & 6) 
239   Ibid  
240   Ibid (Page11) 
241   R v Miler [1983] 2 AC 161 
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Relationship Duties – Ashworth made reference to those personal situations where 
a special relationship exists and one party will have a duty to support the other. He 
quoted, as an example, the Children and Young Persons Act242, where both parents 
have a positive duty to prevent injury to the health of a child. It would be an offence 
under this Act to omit to provide food and shelter to a child.  This category would also 
extend to cover a wide range of other relationships i.e. Doctor: Patient, Employer: 
Employee etc. etc. 
 
Undertaken Duties – Ashworth used this category to describe the wide range of 
contractual duties which impose positive duties on individuals. One of the examples 
he quoted was the duty of a Gatekeeper at a railway crossing, to shut the gate when 
a train is approaching.  
 
Duties related to Property – Ashworth’s examples are not compelling but this 
category probably covers the well-known Rylands v Fletcher243 situation, where if a 
person brings a potentially dangerous thing onto their property (a large reservoir of 
water), they have a positive duty to prevent it escaping. 
 
Citizenship Duties – There could be quite a wide range of duties under this heading, 
and a typical example might be the duty to pay Income Tax244. However, from the 
point of view of this present thesis it is the possible inclusion of a ‘Duty to Rescue’ 
which is most interesting about this category. Ashworth also referred to this possibility 
when he quoted: “Should a person who sees another fall into a river be free to walk 
on, without taking any steps towards a possible rescue?”245. However, Ashworth was 
clear that this should only apply to easy rescues246 
                                           
242   Children and Young Persons Act 1933, Section1 
243   Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 3 HL 330 
244   Part I Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 
245   Op Cit Note 229, Page 13 
246   Ibid (Page 14) 
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Having thereby established some clear situations where society would be justified in 
imposing criminal liability, Ashworth then concluded his article by making it clear that 
he favoured ‘The Social Responsibility View’ over ‘The Conventional View (even if 
the Courts, and most commentators - including Glanville Williams - preferred to adopt 
the latter). 
 
Williams 
Glanville Williams responded to Ashworth’s article in 1991247 and expressed disquiet 
at having been labelled a Conventionalist (since in his words this implied a selfish 
and callous outlook compared to the Social Responsibility approach which is held up 
as more virtuous)248. Nonetheless he agreed that there should be no difference 
between an Act and an Omission to perform a duty (when each results in similar 
harmful consequences). However, he stated that he was not prepared to go further 
than that, and preferred the flexibility that the Acts and Omissions Doctrine provided 
to practitioners and to the courts, as compared to the limitations that would flow from 
trying to draft legislation to cover the almost unlimited scope of Omission situations 
(he used the Euthanasia example to underline the point – which is not surprising 
given that at the time he was Vice President of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society!249). 
His arguments in favour of the Conventional View included: the fact that Society 
should concentrate more on repressing active wrongdoing, rather than trying to bring 
the lethargic up to scratch; the fact that society regularly differentiates harmful acts 
and omissions and our blood tends to boil quicker over the former; the fact that it 
would be excessive to try to define every possible actionable omission; and the fact 
that courts, police, and prisons which are already over-stretched in dealing with the 
                                           
247   Williams G, ‘Criminal Omissions – The Conventional View’ LQR 107 (1991) pp 86-98 
248   Ibid  
249  Ibid (Note 87) 
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limited number of prohibited acts under the law, would be completely swamped if a 
wide range of additional offences were created involving omissions250. 
 
Williams then proceeded to take issue with Ashworth’s attempt to expand on the 
broad categories of Duty Requirements, where Omissions should be criminalised. 
However, he also agreed that the duty to assist in the preservation of life, should be 
supported, insofar as it might introduce a legal duty to carry out easy rescues. 
 
Judicial opinion during the debate was somewhat muted, but shortly afterwards the 
highest court in the land reached a landmark decision which, without doubt, provided 
a very strong endorsement of the Acts and Omissions Doctrine. In the case of 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland251 in 1993, the House of Lords decided that it was lawful 
for a doctor to withdraw life support to a patient in a persistent vegetative state without 
such action being treated as causing the patient’s death. Their Lordships reached 
this view by interpreting the doctor’s conduct as an Omission (to maintain life support) 
rather than a positive Act (of shortening a life).  
 
In reaching this result the House breathed new life into the Acts and Omissions 
Doctrine, and in so doing, clearly provided support to the approach taken by Williams, 
rather than that taken by Ashworth (albeit the former fully recognised that some 
omissions - such as the Failure to attempt an Easy Rescue - might legitimately form 
part of the Law (and the Criminal Law at that)). 
 
4.3.3    21st Century Comment 
Writing some 8 years after the House of Lords decision, Tony Honore252, also re-
asserted the main Acts and Omissions Doctrine by stating that “when conduct is 
                                           
250  Ibid (Note 89) 
251  Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) 1 All ER 821   
252  Honore A, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1999) 
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judged from the standpoint of responsibility for the harm it brings about, the acts-
and-omissions doctrine is broadly sound”253. He stated “By and large, positive acts 
cause more resentment than omissions with similar results”254.  However, Honore 
made an important refinement by separating Omissions into two broad categories: 
those which involve the omission to carry out “Distinct Duties” (which are relatively 
uncommon e.g. the duty of a Level Crossing operative to shut the gates when a 
train approaches) and those which involve the omission to carry out “background 
Duties” (which include the very wide range of situations where citizens owe 
reciprocal duties to each other as part of belonging to civilised society).  
 
Honore proceeded to clearly state that where omissions involve the not-doing of 
distinct duties (where the harmful consequences are of a similar degree of 
magnitude to the harm caused by positive acts), then the ‘acts and omissions 
doctrine’ should be rejected, and legal sanctions should be applied to them255. But 
when the omissions involve not-doing background duties, then any harm is usually 
of a much lower degree of magnitude and the ‘acts and omissions doctrine’ should 
be maintained (and legal sanctions should not be imposed). 
 
In taking this line, Honore endorsed that part of Ashworth’s article which proposed 
that there are a considerable number of Duty situations, where Omissions will be 
equally culpable as harmful acts, and where the Social Responsibility approach 
demands that sanctions and often criminal sanctions should be applied (one such 
Omission suggested being the Failure to attempt an Easy Rescue). 
More recently, one of today’s leading Criminal Law textbooks makes the clear 
statement that “Historically the criminal law has been concerned essentially with 
prohibiting (and punishing) positive actions rather than with imposing duties to act 
                                           
253  Ibid (Page 43)                           
254  Ibid (Page 60) 
255  Ibid (Page 61) 
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(and punishing failure to do so)”256. The text however goes on to say that, 
progressively, there have been many situations where liability has been imposed for 
Omissions. This has most been most clearly illustrated by the increasing number of 
regulatory offences and the myriad of modern motoring offences e.g. 
 
a) Failure to Pay Income Tax 
b) Failure to buy a Television Licence 
c) Failure to send Children to School 
d) Failure to have Motor Insurance 
e) Failure to Wear a Seatbelt in a Motor Car 
f) Failure to Stop/provide particulars after a Road Accident.257 etc. 
 
The modern position therefore seems to be that the Acts and Omissions Doctrine is 
alive and well, and in terms of relevance to my thesis, it is clear that this is one of the 
more explicit examples where a separation is maintained between conduct which is 
more often considered a Moral wrong (Omission), and conduct which is more often 
considered a Legal wrong (Acts).  
 
However, there is definitely a growing tendency to impose legal liability for breaching 
an increasing number of positive duties (as itemised above), and one additional type 
of Omission which might justify the application of Sanctions (Moral, Legal, or both), 
is the Failure to Rescue fellow citizens in distress. But before looking at this in detail, 
I need to introduce an innovative line of enquiry. I do this because in analysing the 
dynamic between Acts and Omissions it has struck me that such a polarised view of 
Human Conduct is too simplistic, and that in particular we should not classify all 
conduct other than Actions, as Omissions. 
 
 
                                           
256 Card R, Cross R, Jones P, Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) 17th Ed. 
257  Road Traffic Act 1988 Section 170(2)   
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4.4 A Problem with the word “Omission” 
The approach of categorising human conduct in a polarised manner (covering Acts 
on the one hand, and Omissions on the other) overlooks a fundamental problem in 
the use of the term Omission. This is because the word “Omission” is not in itself 
neutral, it comes pre-loaded with Fault!  
 
Unlike the word “Action” which can include either good acts, or bad acts, the word 
“Omission” by its very nature implies a failure to have done something:  pre-
supposing that that there was a pre-existing obligation to be carried out, or some 
pre-existing duty to be complied with. In other words the idea of “Omission” brings 
with it an assumption that some kind of Norm has been violated. Hence, someone 
can only be said to have omitted something if there was an ‘a priori’ obligation/duty 
upon them to act in a certain way. 
 
Consequently, I consider that the division of human conduct between acts and 
omissions is too simplistic and fundamentally flawed. We should therefore try to find 
an additional, more neutral term which does not pre-suppose fault when describing 
situations where someone simply remains ‘in neutral’ and does not intervene in the 
World (in situations where there is no obligation/duty to do so). Various terms come 
to mind: “inaction”, “non-action”, “non-intervention”, “not doing” etc. etc. However, 
these themselves, all bring with them further negative overtones (all being formed 
by the addition of a negativing prefix to an otherwise positive verb). I have hence 
settled on the term “Stasis”, which I define as: 
‘a condition in which the status quo is maintained, where nothing is done, and 
nothing is not done. Where, by analogy to a motor car, the individual concerned 
stays ‘in neutral’ and simply watches the World go by, behaving in neither a positive 
nor a negative manner`. 
 
I believe that this is vitally important, since if we accept that there are occasions 
when as autonomous beings we are entitled to simply remain a bystander or an 
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onlooker, without incurring an any risk of censure, then this throws an entirely 
different light on the allocation of responsibility when events happen in the World.  
 
We should definitely be held responsible for our Actions (and if these have harmful 
consequences, we should expect to be punished, and often by the Criminal Law). 
 
We should certainly be held responsible when we Omit to carry out specific 
obligations and duties that apply to us (and if there are harmful consequences we 
should expect, in serious cases to be punished under the criminal law, or in less 
serious cases to be required to pay compensation under the Civil Law). 
 
However, we should not be held responsible when all we do is remain in Stasis, in 
situations where there are no legal duties to act. In such cases there should be no 
place for legal sanctions (although in some cases moral censure might apply e.g. 
when someone is shunned as a conscientious objector to war)  
 
4.4.1   A Three Dimensional Approach to Human Conduct and Responsibility  
It is by virtue of the above more logical approach that I propose to analyse human 
conduct and responsibility from a three dimensional standpoint: “Acts, Omissions, 
and Stasis”. I have now clearly differentiated these terms and it may be useful to re-
emphasis the distinctions (a) Acts by which I mean clear positive conduct where the 
individual obviously intervenes in the World and should be held responsible for the 
outcome; (b) Omissions by which I mean failing to perform a Distinct Duty (in 
Honore’s terms), where the individual is clearly expected to intervene in the World, 
and should be held responsible for the outcome if s/he does not; and (c). Stasis by 
which I mean simply maintaining the status quo, where the individual definitely does 
not intervene in the World, and there should be no responsibility one way or the 
other.  
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Using this approach, then human conduct at the two extremes of (a) and (b) should 
clearly incur sanctions where the act, or the failure to act, results in harm. But 
importantly conduct in the neutral space where the individual simply does nothing, 
can be more satisfactorily recognised as un-blameworthy, and not demanding of 
any legal sanction (although there may be an argument for applying moral sanctions 
in some cases). 
 
4.5       Extending a Three Dimensional Approach to Rescues 
The three dimensional approach to human conduct (as described above) is of more 
significance when it is realised that Rescues themselves are not all similar in nature. 
The orthodox approach to rescues is to separate them into two categories: Easy 
Rescues and Hard Rescues. The Easy Rescue situation was perhaps best 
described by Jeffrie Murphy when referring to a man sitting by a swimming pool 
who, as an onlooker, sees a very young girl fall in the water, and whom he can 
rescue by simply putting his arm down and lifting the toddler out258. By contrast I 
can describe a Hard Rescue scenario as one where a heavy, drunken man falls into 
a fast flowing river, and the onlooker on this occasion is a small-framed woman who 
is a non-swimmer.  
 
In the Easy case (where there is no risk to the potential Rescuer) it is likely that 
most people would consider the situation to be one where there should be duty on 
the onlooker to intervene. In other words there should be a duty to rescue, and the 
failure to do so should be classed as an omission and subject to legal sanction.  
 
 
                                           
258  Murphy J, ‘Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry’, The Monist 63, (1980) 2  
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This is the situation in most European countries, and in some US States, and in at 
least one ‘State’ in Canada and Australia259 (indeed in some cases, Criminal 
sanctions apply260).  
 
Conversely in the Hard case (where there is great risk to the potential Rescuer), it 
is likely that most people would consider the situation to be one where there should 
be no duty on the onlooker to intervene. In this scenario there should be no duty to 
rescue; the decision not to rescue should not be classed as an Omission; and there 
should be no sanction whatsoever. 
 
This however is the point at which commentators seem to leave the matter, and 
propose that English Law might introduce a legal duty to carry out Easy Rescues, 
but no legal duty for Hard Rescues. However, I believe this is again an over-
simplification, and that there is a third class of Rescue that should be considered: 
“Intermediate Rescues” (i.e. this time the person in the water is a larger (14 year 
old) adolescent, the onlooker has learnt to swim and the river whilst not overly deep, 
is moderately flowing). It is likely in this situation that there would be no consensus 
among society, and the onlooker would not be expected to put themselves at risk. 
In other words it would be entirely reasonable if the onlooker remained in Stasis. 
There would be no Duty to Rescue, and no legal sanction if the onlooker stands 
back (this is not to say that in other situations different conclusions might be drawn 
i.e. there might be moral criticism if subsequently the adolescent gets into difficulty 
trying to extricate him/herself). 
 
 
                                           
259  Op Cit, Note 183                   
260  French Criminal Code S63(2) 
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4.6    Correlating a Three Dimensional Approach between Conduct and Rescues 
My earlier investigation of Causation relied on the work of Hart and Honore, who 
insisted that causal questions should be limited to factual causation, with any policy 
aspects being deferred to the secondary stage of reviewing Responsibility. My 
preference was then to adopt the NESS test devised by Hart and Honore to 
determine whether any particular factor is causally significant. 
 
The next step was to consider how Responsibility for Causing events is attributed 
to individuals, and the Harm Principle defined by Joel Feinberg (as the setting back 
of an interest) was my preferred tool for this task, backed up by a recognition of 
various excusing factors e.g. capacity (in its various guises). 
 
These two tests of Causation and Responsibility were then considered in relation to 
Omissions and the so called Acts and Omissions Doctrine, which (whilst disputed) 
is still widely accepted as generally valid. In particular the special class of Failures 
to Rescue was considered and it was shown that the NESS test and the Harm 
Principle also explain why certain types of Omission (especially the Failure to 
attempt Easy Rescues) can be treated as deserving of Sanction. 
 
However, I have asserted that a conventional approach to these issues perhaps 
obscures some more complex dynamics. I have challenged the general standpoint 
that there are only Acts and Omissions, and demonstrated that ”Omission” as a 
term is not neutral and that if a bystander simply remains passive in the world this 
can simply be a question of Stasis, not Omission.  
 
I have also challenged the approach whereby Rescues are generally separated into 
two classes: Easy and Hard, and have suggested that a third category should also 
be introduced in this area: Intermediate Rescue. 
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I have done this because adopting the three categories of Act, Omission, and 
Stasis; and three classes of Rescue: Easy, Intermediate, and Hard, enables a more 
sophisticated analysis of duty to rescue situations: ‘Easy Rescues’ which can be 
considered as an omission and probably warranting a duty backed by the Criminal 
Law; ‘Intermediate Rescues’ which are possibly cases of Stasis and warranting at 
most a Civil sanction, and more probably only moral censure; and ‘Hard Rescues’ 
warranting no action or sanction at all. 
 
This three dimensional analysis of Causation/Responsibility, coupled with a three 
dimensional categorisation of Rescues demonstrates that it is not straight-forward 
to simply define different types of Failure to Rescue as either matters for the Law or 
matters of Morality. This approach therefore contributes to the general theme of my 
thesis, that there is no necessary connection between Law and Morality. The idea 
that some un-attempted Rescues (Hard Cases) should involve neither Legal nor 
Moral Sanction; the idea that some un-attempted Rescues (Intermediate Cases) 
may or may not involve either Legal or Moral Sanction; and the idea that some 
cases of un-attempted Rescues (Easy Cases) should definitely involve a Legal 
Sanction, clearly reinforces the principle that a separation between Law and 
Morality should be maintained, as this enables the moral and legal aspects to be 
assessed, case by case, without distortion. The importance of maintaining this 
separation becomes even more important when (referring back to Chapter 3 of this 
thesis) the impacts of Moral Luck are considered in the Rescue scenario. The 
vagaries introduced by Luck throw into question whether even Moral sanctions 
should be directed at potential Rescuers, let alone Legal ones. 
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4.6.1    Moral Luck and Rescue Scenarios 
Having arrived at the conclusion in Chapter 3 that Moral Luck is both very real and 
very helpful in the medical arena, it is helpful to indicate how it affects First Aid 
Rescuers (who are also within the Medical sphere): the impact on First Aiders 
being fundamental to my thesis. 
 
In the First Aid Rescuer context, the impact of Moral Luck manifests itself in various 
ways and the key elements of interest to me are the bad luck in the circumstances 
that have to be faced (i.e. the causal chain of events which have created the 
emergency which has to be dealt with), and the bad luck in the possible outcome 
that results (i.e. in terms of whether the rescue turns out to be successful or not). 
 
Given these ways in which Moral Luck may affect the situation, questions of 
whether the first aider should attempt a rescue, and the degree to which (if the 
rescue goes wrong) they should be responsible to the rescuee (or his/her family) 
are further examples of difficult moral dilemmas that often have to be faced. 
However, these Moral Luck implications can be considerably nullified, if the 
techniques advocated by Donna Dickinson are applied. 
 
In the first case, the question is really: given the bad luck that has arisen to create 
the emergency, should the rescuer attempt a rescue or not? The rescuer may 
consider that they are in a dangerous situation and hence face the dilemma of 
either putting themselves in danger if they respond, or risk the censure of Society, 
if they do not intervene when the general opinion is that they should have done. In 
this context it is helpful to reduce the scope for luck to make an impact by 
attempting to apply a measure of control to the situation, and more particularly - 
probability theory. 
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Thus by weighing up the risks involved, the rescuer can, to a large degree eliminate 
the uncertainty that exists. The degree of danger posed by the emergency can be 
assessed, and if the risk is clearly too great (i.e. the Rescue is a Difficult Rescue), 
then it would not be unreasonable if a decision was taken not to attempt a rescue.  
 
The application of probability theory and risk analysis would therefore insulate a 
would-be rescuer from censure, and his/her bad luck in being present at the scene 
of an emergency would thereby be avoided (with the proviso, of course, that 
sometimes the immediacy and intensity of the Emergency may prevent a risk 
analysis from being carried out at all). 
 
In the second case, the rescuer might intervene (the Rescue being less difficult, 
albeit still with some risk), but the rescue might turn out badly (e.g. a First Aider 
might approach a stricken motorcyclist, and in removing them from the wreckage 
of a crash they might cause the rescuee’s spinal cord to be damaged - resulting in 
paralysis). This would certainly be bad luck in an outcome sense, and could 
influence the degree to which the attempt to rescue would be considered as morally 
correct or not, and whether the rescuer should be subject to a possible claim for 
negligence. In this context two control measures could have been applied: (1) 
Probability Theory i.e. was the probability that the rescuee might be injured by the 
rescuer, outweighed by the risk that the rescuee would have been seriously injured 
(or might even have died in the flames of the wreckage if the rescuer had not 
intervened), and (2) Informed Consent i.e. did the rescuee provide actual consent 
for the rescue to be attempted, or if say, s/he was unconscious, could consent had 
been implied (as it no doubt it might have been if the alternative of doing nothing 
would have resulted in their certain death). Both of these measures: the probability 
of success, and the possibility of consent, would be likely to provide a defence for 
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the rescuer if having decided (in a situation of uncertainty) to try to carry out a 
rescue, the intervention of bad luck causes it to go wrong. 
 
4.6.2        Moral Luck and the Protection of Rescuers 
The above aspects aside for the moment, I maintain that there is a duality to the 
impact of Moral Luck in Rescue scenarios. If despite the uncertainties caused by 
Luck, a Good Samaritan ‘goes out on a limb’ for Society and attempts a Rescue, 
then I believe if Luck then plays a further part, and the Rescuee is injured in the 
process, then it is a moral imperative that Society (and the Law) should act to 
protect the Good Samaritan from suit, unless his actions were so unreasonable as 
to have amounted to Gross Negligence. 
 
In a similar manner, if in attempting a rescue, the Rescuer confronts Bad Luck and 
is him/herself injured in the process (or they suffer loses or damage to their 
property etc.), then again it would seem a moral imperative that Society (and the 
law) should again provide protection (on this occasion by way of compensation). 
 
4.6.3    Moral Luck, Rescues, and Responsibility 
Moving to the allocation of Responsibility in Rescue scenarios, the application of 
Moral Luck facilitates a further degree of clarity in terms of categorising both the 
nature of human conduct involved, and the nature of Rescues themselves. This 
clearly interacts with my different/ novel approach in Sub-Sections 4.4 above, 
where I suggest that Conduct in Rescue scenarios should be separated into three 
categories (Acts, Omissions and Stasis) rather than the traditional two (Acts and 
Omissions), and also with the introduction of the idea in Sub-Section 4.5 that 
Rescues should be separated into three Categories (Hard, Easy and Intermediate) 
rather than the usual two (Easy and Hard). 
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With the reintroduction of Moral Luck, it is possible to combine all three elements 
(type of Conduct, type of Rescue, and type of Luck) into an over-arching 
categorisation of responsibilities. An informative way of demonstrating the 
interactions at play is via the construction of a suggested Responsibility matrix: 
 
Type of 
Rescue/ 
Type of 
Conduct 
Hard Rescue 
(High impact of Bad Luck) 
Intermediate Rescue 
(Moderate impact of Bad 
Luck) 
Easy Rescue 
(Low impact of Bad 
Luck) 
 
Act 
 
a) Action taken despite, 
no Responsibility 
 
b) High Public Acclaim!  
 
c) Society responsibility 
to protect the Rescuer 
from Suit/Loss 
a) Action taken, and 
No Responsibility if the 
Rescue is near the 
Hard end  
 
b) Moral Responsibility 
may arise if Rescue is 
near the Easy end 
 
c) Society should act 
to protect the Rescuer 
from Suit/Loss 
 
Moral Responsibility, 
and for some a  Legal 
Responsibility  
 
 
 
 
 
c) Society should act 
to protect the 
Rescuer from 
Suit/Loss 
 
 
 
 
 
Omission 
 
Not an Omission and 
hence no Responsibility, 
neither Moral, nor Legal  
 
 
No Responsibility if the 
Rescue is near the 
Hard end 
 
Moral Responsibility, if 
the Rescue is near the 
Easy end 
 
Moral Responsibility, 
and for some a  Legal 
Responsibility 
 
Stasis 
 
No Responsibility, i.e.  
neither Moral, or Legal  
 
No Responsibility i.e. 
neither Moral, or Legal 
Moral Responsibility, 
and for some a  Legal 
Responsibility 
 
 
 
Hard Cases  
If the individual acts and intervenes to carry out a Rescue in Hard cases, then this 
is done even though there is no Responsibility to intervene. The Rescuer is likely 
to attract High Public Acclaim. Luck (especially Bad Luck) plays a significant part 
in the scenario, and the State has a moral duty to protect the Rescuer from being 
sued (unless s/he was grossly negligent), and provide compensation in cases of 
injury or loss. 
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By contrast if a bystander does not intervene in a Hard Rescue then I have 
suggested that this not a case of Omission because there is no pre-existing duty 
to Act. Indeed, our insights into Moral Luck would indicate that the impact of Luck 
(and especially Bad Luck) is so pervasive that it would be unreasonable to expect 
anyone to intervene, and hence there should definitely be no Legal responsibility 
and also no Moral responsibility. 
 
As suggested previously, someone who remains in Stasis neither Acts, nor Omits 
to Act, and in Hard cases this is entirely acceptable  
 
Intermediate Cases 
The individual stepping forward in an Intermediate type of Rescue is again doing 
so without this being a Responsibility (although the ‘Easier’ the type of Rescue 
becomes the more likely it is that Legal Responsibility might begin to accrue). The 
individual having acted, the State has a moral duty to protect the Rescuer from 
being sued (unless s/he was grossly negligent), and provide compensation in 
cases of injury or loss. 
 
Looking at the bystander who does not intervene (possibly an Omission, or a case 
of Stasis), then I previously left open the question of whether Legal or Moral 
responsibility should be applied. It is now possible to more fully reflect the 
implications of Moral Luck i.e. there are likely to be aspects of Circumstantial Luck, 
Causative Luck, Consequential Luck, and possibly Constitutive Luck which apply. 
Given all these possible ways in which the individual might have impaired control 
of the situation, it would again seem that even if we might now consider their 
conduct to be in the category of Omission, it is still likely that Society would not 
consider it appropriate to apply Legal responsibility. The question of whether 
Society might apply a degree of Moral responsibility is less clear, but what can be 
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said with more certainty is that, the nearer the situation tends towards a Hard 
rescue the less likely it would be that Moral responsibility might accrue, and the 
nearer it tends towards an Easy rescue the more likely it would be that Moral 
responsibility would be imposed.  
 
The person in Stasis will once more have no Legal or Moral responsibility to 
intervene  
 
Easy Rescues 
Finally, it we look at Easy Rescues then the actor who intervenes will suffer no 
Moral or Legal sanction, but this time his/her reason for intervening could well be 
because s/he had a distinct Responsibility to do so. By contrast, most of Society 
would probably impose at least a Moral Responsibility if a bystander remains 
inactive (whether their non-intervention was a case of Omission, or Stasis). 
Accepting that an individual should be under some obligation to act in cases of 
Easy Rescue (whether this is Moral or Legal) then the State has a Moral, and I 
would suggest Legal, responsibility to protect such a Rescuer from being sued 
(unless s/he was grossly negligent), and provide compensation in cases of injury 
or loss.  
 
4.6.4  Particular Responsibilities in respect of Easy Rescues 
The preceding paragraphs suggest that everyone should have a Moral duty to 
respond to Easy Rescues, but some people (myself included) might suggest that 
this should extend to a Legal duty i.e. it should be an offence to fail to attempt an 
Easy Rescue. The unusual impact that (Moral) Luck can have in Rescue scenarios, 
contributes significantly to the explanation as to why there are differing opinions as 
to criminalising such failure. 
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In her book, Donna Dickerson welcomed the intervention of Moral Luck in certain 
Medical scenarios (e.g. in the allocation of donated organs) because it forced 
practitioners to confront difficult moral issues. We can do the same and use 
aspects of Luck or Chance to suggest why there might still be an unwillingness to 
impose legal responsibility in the Easy Rescue scenario. We can suggest that 
despite elements of Luck having played a part in the situation (not least 
Circumstantive or Causative Luck) some members of Society will expect the 
individual to confront these as being low risk complications, and if the individual 
fails to intervene to save a fellow citizen from harm, then they should suffer Legal 
Sanctions. However, at present, other members of our Society will recognise that 
Rescues involve significant elements of Luck (and especially Bad Luck), and hence 
this factor should absolve the individual of any Legal responsibility. This is likely to 
be a contributory factor (alongside the reluctance of the English Legal System to 
criminalise Omissions – and its preference to promote ‘Freedoms’) which has 
determined that to date there is no Legal Duty to Rescue in English Law. 
 
Different Legal Jurisdictions take a different approach as to whether a Failure to 
attempt an Easy Rescue should be treated as either a Moral Wrong, or a Legal 
Wrong. In many cases it is a question of whether the jurisdiction is one based on 
individual Freedoms (like our Common Law system) or one based on individual 
Rights (like the Civil Law systems in much of mainland Europe). It is also a matter 
of the degree to which individual States have been exposed to particularly heinous 
cases of Failures to attempt Easy Rescues (which cases are usually impacted by 
elements of Luck - and especially the complications of Bad Luck and Moral Luck). 
 
4.7 Conclusions on Causation, Responsibility, and Failures to Rescue 
The outcomes of the preceding sub-sections have demonstrated that different 
Moral and Legal conclusions have been reached when considering the 
 146 
philosophical and jurisprudential characteristics of Causation and Responsibility as 
they arise in Rescue scenarios. These conclusions (and particularly the survival of 
the Acts and Omissions Doctrine) help us to understand why the English legal 
system still prefers to maintain a separation between Law and Morality. However 
they also indicate why some type of good Samaritan Act (at least one protecting 
would-be Rescuers) should become Law.  
 
Chapter 5 now takes up the discussion, and includes an investigation of the legal 
position in England and Wales, and how in a departure from the English model, 
many other ‘Western’ Jurisdictions have proceeded to introduce Good Samaritan 
Laws of various kinds. 
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5. The Law of Rescue in England and Wales, and some other ‘Western’ 
 Jurisdictions  
 
Earlier in this Thesis I touched somewhat briefly on the law in relation to Rescue 
in England & Wales and now, in this Chapter, I wish to trace the position in more 
detail, to demonstrate why it is still the ‘Traditional’ approach to declare that there 
is no such defined Law in this Country. This analysis forms the first part of this 
Chapter 5 of my work, and in the subsequent parts I have considered the position 
in some other ‘Western’ Legal Systems, particularly in the United States of 
America, and to a lesser extent, in Canada, and Australia (i.e. in other English Law 
based jurisdictions). I have also briefly considered the position in France and 
Germany (which have Good Samaritan Laws) which is interesting given the 
growing (until recently) impact of European Law on English Law. 
 
As a preliminary however, I would like to expand on the approach that I have been 
taking in this thesis: that in considering the inter-relationship between Law and 
Morality as this applies to individuals confronted with Rescue situations, there are 
three types of what are often termed ‘Good Samaritan Laws’: (1) A Law of Rescue 
in terms of a Duty on Individuals to Rescue others (Legal Obligations of ‘Good 
Samaritans’); (2) A Law of Rescue in terms of the Protection of Rescuers who 
respond to emergencies (Legal Protection of ‘Good Samaritans’); and (3) A Law of 
Rescue in terms of providing Rescuers with a right to recover for any Injuries or 
Losses incurred through carrying out a Rescue (Legal Compensation of ‘Good 
Samaritans’). 
 
The three laws could be considered as the ‘Triumvirate of Good Samaritan Laws’ 
and I have taken this approach because in my view there is a kind of ‘Hierarchy of 
Needs’ in terms of Motivating individuals to act as Rescuers when fellow citizens 
are in danger. In doing this I am pursuing a similar system of categorisation which 
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Frederick Hertzberg applied in his famous Hierarchy of Needs in terms of employee 
motivations261.  In summary Hertzberg’s research indicated that in terms of 
motivating human beings to do things, some elements are simply ‘hygiene’ factors 
i.e. basic comfort factors (e.g. an adequate working environment) which are not 
particularly motivating (unless they are entirely absent); and other more 
‘aspirational’ factors (e.g. recognition) which are highly motivating if they are 
encouraged.  If this type of approach is applied to the motivation of Rescuers it 
might be suggested that a basic legal environment is essential to encourage would-
be rescuers to act. However, beyond this there would be the ‘higher’ ideals of 
‘Good Citizenship’ (e.g. public spiritedness or bravery etc.) which would inspire 
people to act. This latter idea embraces the Moral Sphere, and the influences of 
Moral Luck have been highlighted in earlier Chapter of this work. 
 
In this sense it can be argued that there is a hierarchical structure in terms of how 
individuals might be motivated to respond as a Rescuer in emergency situations: 
(1) If a person knew that if they responded to an emergency, they would be 
compensated for any injury or loss, this would provide one level of motivation. If 
then (2) the person knew that if things turned out unexpectedly they would be 
protected from suit, this would provide another level of motivation. Further (3) if 
they knew they could be prosecuted if they did not respond to an Easy Rescue, 
this would provide the highest level of motivation.  
 
I have therefore adopted this Triumvirate approach to reviewing Good Samaritan 
Laws/ Laws of Rescue in, first England and Wales, and then in other jurisdictions. 
 
 
                                           
261 Hertzberg F (1959) ‘Motivation to Work’ in One more Time: How do You Motivate 
Employees (Harvard, Harvard Business School Press 2008) 
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5.1   The Law of Rescue in England and Wales 
 
5.1.1  The Law of Rescue in terms of any Duty to Rescue    
Previously in this work I stated that the position in England and Wales, in relation 
to the Law of Rescue was ambiguous, and I did this because whereas the 
considered opinion is that there is no Duty to Rescue in our jurisdiction262, there 
are undoubtedly situations where distinct classes of individuals are legally obliged 
to help others in distress e.g. the State Rescue Services (or others under a special 
obligation i.e. parents). However, these ‘special’ types of scenario are not the focus 
of my research, and hence the remainder of this Chapter will be concerned with 
Rescue more generally i.e. with members of the general public as rescuers. 
 
In the first instance, there is no Statutory Offence of Failure to Rescue, and in 
addition there is no identified Common Law Offence. Hence there is no Criminal 
Law Duty to Rescue in this Country.  
 
Turning to any possible Civil Law duty, the textbook position is entirely 
straightforward, and typically, Markesinis and Deakin in their work ‘Tort Law’ 
confirm that in English Law there is an “absence of any general duty to come to 
the rescue of another who is in a situation of danger”263. This conclusion is based 
on the long standing principle in our Jurisdiction, which has been outlined earlier 
in this work, that generally there is a reluctance to impose liability for Omissions. It 
also flows from the earlier common law position whereby there was no positive 
obligation to assist a stranger, nor to concern oneself with the impact of your 
actions on a stranger unless the law specifically required you to do so (e.g. if you 
created a nuisance).  
                                           
262 Op Cit, Note 5 
263 Markesinisis B and Deakin S, Tort Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 
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Tort Law is however regularly evolving, and the general categories of Negligence 
recognised by the law have gradually expanded. However, the position regarding 
Omissions (i.e. that they are not generally actionable) still remains largely 
unchanged (unless Statute has prescribed otherwise). Five particular legal cases 
can be referred to in tracing the evolution of the law of negligence, the earliest 
arising from around the middle of the 19th Century, and the latest towards the end 
of the 20th Century (the most informative of which is, as it is in relation to many 
other aspects of Tort Law, the case of Donoghue v Stevenson): 
 
Gautret v Egerton (1867) 
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd (1970) 
Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978)  
Stovin v Wise (1996) 
 
5.1.1.1      Gautret v Egerton (1867)264 
Gautret appears to be the earliest case which confirmed that there is no legal duty 
to take positive steps to preserve the life of persons who may be in danger. 
 
In this case the defendant, Egerton was the owner an area of land on which 
numerous waterways and docks were sited. The plaintiff, Mr Gautret was legally 
travelling on the land and fell into one of the docks and died from drowning. Mr 
Gautret’s wife sought to establish a duty on Egerton to have taken positive steps 
to protect her husband. However, the Judge (Willes) is recorded as stating that in 
English Law “there is no duty to do anything, but there is a duty to abstain from 
doing anything that would injure”. He is also referred to as saying “no action will lie 
against a spiteful man who seeing another running into a position of danger, merely 
                                           
264  Gautret v Egerton (1867) L R 2, C P 371     
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omits the warning”. The upshot of this was that as Mrs Gautret could not prove that 
there was any positive duty, obliging Egerton to act, she had no legal redress. In 
effect there was no recognised Tort which applied to her husband’s case and 
hence there was no cause of action.           
 
This reluctance of English judges to expand the classes of action within the law of 
Tort continued, and in general the only recognised categories were: Trespass to 
the Person, Trespass to Land, Nuisance, Defamation, Interference with Another’s 
Goods, Interference with Business Interests, and Allowing the Escape of 
Dangerous objects (The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher). Indeed, it was very unusual 
for new torts to emerge around that time, and Rylands v Fletcher itself only arose 
in 1868265. This situation continued with little if any change until 1932 and the 
monumental case of Donoghue v Stevenson, and Lord Aitkin’s famous “Neighbour 
Principle”. I therefore intend to devote a considerable amount of attention to this 
highly pivotal case in this Chapter of my work. 
 
5.1.1.2    Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)266 
The facts in Donoghue v Stevenson are well known, and concerned Mrs May 
Donoghue who decided to have a drink with a female friend in a café in Paisley 
(near Glasgow), Scotland on 26 August 1928. This and some of the following 
information has been sourced from a number of the websites which have been 
created in celebration of the case and particularly the “Donaghuev” site267. 
 
The friend purchased a Ginger Beer drink for Mrs Donoghue, and a Pear drink for 
herself. The Ginger Beer which was provided to Mrs Donoghue came in a brown 
opaque bottle and after consuming a considerable part of the ginger beer, Mrs 
                                           
265 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 
266 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL)  
267 www.Donoghuev.info last accessed 15.12.2012 
 152 
Donoghue had a top up, only to find the remains of a partly decomposed snail. She 
suffered shock and illness from the nauseating discovery that she had already 
drunk other parts of the snail, and subsequently commenced legal action. 
 
It was at this stage that Mrs Donoghue came up against a number of legal 
problems. Her initial approach was to try to sue the café owner, who had sold the 
ginger beer, but she had no direct contractual relationship with him, as it was not 
her, but her friend who had purchased the drink (the established principle being 
that there had to be privity between the parties for a plaintiff to sue in negligence: 
Winterbottom v. Wright (1842)268). Therefore, the only option open to her was to 
try and sue the Manufacturer of the drink, Stevenson, for Negligence. However, 
she faced a similar problem as before, in that in order to establish negligence 
against the defendant, she would have to show there was a contract in place 
between the parties which had been performed negligently. 
 
Hence just as Mrs Donoghue could not prove an actionable link with the café owner 
(she had no contract with him), she also found that she had no action against the 
Manufacturer, Stevenson (she had no contract with him either). 
 
The situation therefore looked bleak, but her lawyers felt that they had a sufficiently 
arguable case to pursue the case right up to the House of Lords where it was heard 
by Lords Buckmaster, Atkin, Tomlin, Thankerton, and Macmillan. Whereas Lords 
Buckmmaster and Tomiln found against Mrs Donoghue, Lords Thankerton and 
Macmillan (and especially) Lord Atkin found in her favour, and created a seminal 
moment in the history of English Law, with the creation of the freestanding Tort of 
Negligence (as opposed to negligent performance of a contract). 
The most famous of the speeches was delivered by Lord Atkin and he felt the 
starting point in analysing the situation was to consider what Society would deem 
                                           
268 Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 
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the appropriate moral position (fully recognising at that stage that moral codes were 
different from legal codes). He therefore stated at Page 44 in the Judgement that: 
 “The liability for negligence, whether you style it such … is no doubt based upon 
a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing”. He continued: “But acts or 
omissions which any moral code would censure cannot, in a practical world, be 
treated so as to give a right to every person injured … to demand relief”. He went 
on to say: “In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complaints and the 
extent of their remedy”. 
 
In the following, and well known part of his judgement, he expressed what has 
subsequently become known as his “Neighbour Principle”, and in expressing the 
same he borrowed heavily from the Parable of the Good Samaritan, which merits 
being repeated here in full (I have underlined the references to neighbourliness): 
 
25 A teacher of the Law came up and tried to trap Jesus. “Teacher,” he asked, 
“what must I do to receive eternal life?” 
26 Jesus answered him, “What do the Scriptures say? How do you interpret 
them?”  
27 The man answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all 
your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind’; and ‘Love your neighbour 
as you love yourself.’”  
28 “You are right,” Jesus replied; “do this and you will live.”  
29 But the teacher of the Law wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, 
“Who is my neighbour?”  
30 Jesus answered, “There was once a man who was going down from 
Jerusalem to Jericho when robbers attacked him, stripped him, and beat him up, 
leaving him half dead. 31 It so happened that a priest was going down that road; 
but when he saw the man, he walked on by, on the other side. 32 In the same 
way a Levite also came along, went over and looked at the man, and then walked 
on by, on the other side. 33 But a Samaritan who was travelling that way came 
upon the man, and when he saw him, his heart was filled with pity.  
34 He went over to him, poured oil and wine on his wounds and bandaged 
them; then he put the man on his own animal and took him to an inn, where he 
took care of him. 35 The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to 
the innkeeper. ‘Take care of him,’ he told the innkeeper, ‘and when I come back 
this way, I will pay you whatever else you spend on him.’ ”  
36 And Jesus concluded, “In your opinion, which one of these three acted like 
a neighbour towards the man attacked by the robbers?”  
37 The teacher of the Law answered, “The one who was kind to him.”  
Jesus replied, “You go, then, and do the same.”269  
 
Lord Atkin extended the story of the Good Samaritan and made the following 
remarks: 
                                           
269  Op Cit, Note 2 
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“The Rule that you are to love thy neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour, and the lawyer’s question who is my neighbour? receives a 
restricted reply”270. 
 
“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions [my emphasis] which  
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour”271 
 
“Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be, persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts and 
omissions which are called into question”272. 
 
Lord Atkin then expanded on this principle of ‘Neighbourliness’ and demonstrated 
that sufficient ‘proximity’ existed between Mrs Donoghue and the manufacturer, 
Stevenson to make the latter legally liable to the former. In so doing, he and his 
two colleagues who found in favour of Mrs Donoghue, thereby established our 
modern Law of the Tort of negligence, which has now been extended in so very 
many ways.  
 
From the foregoing it might be considered that Donoghue v Stevenson paved the 
way for the creation of a Tort of ‘Failing (neglecting) to Help a Neighbour in 
Distress’. However there have been no cases since 1932 in which the courts have 
been prepared to take the necessary additional step to extend the law of tort in this 
way. The door does however remain open but there still seems to be a general 
reluctance to create further laws which would extend the categories of legal liability 
for omissions (and the Failure to Rescue is in many ways, a major type of 
omission).  
 
 
                                           
270  Op Cit, Note 266 at page 44 
271  Ibid 
272  Ibid 
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5.1.1.3   Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd (1970)273     
Having concluded the last sub-section in a rather pessimistic manner, it can be 
suggested that Lord Atkin had laid down a challenge to subsequent judges to 
ensure that the law continued to develop to provide redress where it was just and 
equitable to do so. Another quotation from his famous judgement reinforces this: 
“I do not think so ill of our Jurisprudence as to suppose its principles are so remote 
from the ordinary needs of civilised society, and the ordinary claims it makes upon 
its members as to deny a legal remedy where there is so obviously a social 
wrong”274.  
 
However, it took almost 40 years before a further significant development in the 
law occurred in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, which can be considered as a 
case in which the courts went a step further to impose liability where a defendant 
failed to take steps to intervene to prevent harm to a third party. 
 
In the Dorset Yacht case, the House of Lords held the Home Office liable for not 
intervening to prevent seven Borstal boys, who were under its control, from causing 
damage to the Yacht Company’s property. The facts disclosed that the seven boys 
had escaped from a detention centre, and up until this time the State had never 
been held liable for escaped prisoners. There were various policy reasons for this, 
but of particular interest for this work was the point argued by the Home Office 
lawyers which was that the failure to prevent the boys escaping, or the failure to 
recapture them sufficiently promptly, were both Omissions, and the law did not 
generally impose a liability for Omissions. The main policy reasons for not 
extending liability were expressed by Lord Denning in his Judgement in the Court 
of Appeal275: 
“Many, many a time has a prisoner escaped, or been let out on parole, and done 
damage. But there is never a case in our law books when the prison authorities 
have been liable for it. No householder who has been burgled, no person who has 
been wounded by a criminal, has ever recovered damages from the prison 
                                           
273 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2 
274 Op Cit, No. 266 at Page 46  
275 Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 
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authorities …; The householder has claimed on his insurance company, and the 
injured man can claim on the compensation fund. None has claimed against the 
prison authorities. I would be reluctant to alter this, if by so doing, we should 
hamper all the good work being done by our prison authorities”.    
 
However, the House of Lords found in favour of the Yacht Company, and Lord Reid 
delivered a key speech including the following extract: 
“…there has been a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as 
depending on principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not 
whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it. 
Donoghue v. Stevenson may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known 
passage in Lord Atkin's speech should I think be regarded as a statement of 
principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require 
qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can 
and should say that the principle ought to apply unless there is some justification 
or valid explanation for its exclusion”276. 
 
Consequently, it was held that that the Home Office officers should have foreseen 
that if they allowed seven Boys to escape Borstal, then the escapees were very 
likely to cause damage. Hence the state as the defendant could be considered to 
owe a duty of care to protect third parties from the effects of their negligence in 
allowing the escape.  
 
This judgement was considered to have taken the law of negligence for omissions 
a considerable way forward, and Dias and Markesinis writing in their textbook, ‘Tort 
Law’277 stated:  
“It would seem that the law is moving towards a principle of liability for omissions 
that whenever a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would have acted, 
then the defendant should be liable for damages resulting from inaction. Such a 
test would exclude liability where, for example the defendant is physically unequal 
to performing the necessary action, such as rescuing a drowning man if he is not 
a strong swimmer [my emphasis] … The test of reasonableness in the 
circumstances should provide a sufficient control on liability just as it does in other 
aspects of liability for negligence”. 
 
Given this decision in the House of Lords it seemed possible that there might be 
further scope for the development of the law to provide a remedy where (unlike in 
                                           
276  Op Cit, No. 273 at Page 26 
277  Dias R and Markesinis B, Tort Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1988) 
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the Dorset case – when the Home Office directly caused the risk) a person suffers 
loss when a third party omits to protect them from more indirect risks. This type of 
scenario arose in the Anns case which follows.  
      
5.1.1.4.    Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978)278 
In this case Merton BC approved the building of a block of flats in 1962 (the plans 
for which showed Foundations of at least 3 feet in thickness.  Merton’s byelaws 
provided the Council with the Power (but no Duty) to inspect the foundations before 
the groundworks were covered over. The flats were finished later that year and 
sold on long leases. The plaintiffs bought some flats in 1965, but by 1970 major 
subsidence and cracking developed. On investigation it was found that the 
foundations were inadequate (being only 2 feet 6 inches in depth). The Plaintiffs 
therefore sued the Council for not having inspected the Foundations in 1962 (any 
question of limitation being overcome, given that the defect was latent, and only 
discovered when excavating around the area of the problem). 
 
The matter which the House of Lords was asked to consider was whether the 
Council had any liability to strangers (e.g. subsequent purchasers like the Plaintiffs) 
and whether there was any legal obligation at all, given the Council’s Byelaws had 
not imposed a duty to inspect the Foundations, only a power to do so. The case 
was different from the Dorset Yacht case as the Council had no duty to require its 
staff to prevent potential harm (unlike the Home Office which was held to have a 
direct duty to prevent the Borstal boys from escaping). 
 
The House of Lords found unanimously in favour of the Plaintiffs, and Lord 
Wilberforce provided the leading Judgement. In particular he stated: 
 “Through the [series] of cases in this House … the position has now been reached 
that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not 
                                           
278  Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C. 728 
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necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in 
which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be 
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient 
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable 
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause 
damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if 
the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether 
there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the 
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to 
which a breach of it may give rise”279. 
 
This was a major advance in the law of negligence and was considered to have 
introduced a simple two stage test: (a) was there a sufficient relationship of 
proximity (neighbourliness) between the parties whereby harm could be foreseen 
to a plaintiff stranger if the defendant failed to act (i.e. ignored a duty of care), and 
(b) was there any overriding public policy reason to displace such duty of care. On 
this basis, the imminent recognition of a Duty to Rescue might have been expected, 
had a sufficiently compelling case have come before the courts.  
 
However, any optimism in this respect was premature, and the next major case on 
omissions did not occur until 1996, when a significant reversal took place. 
 
5.1.1.5.  Stovin v Wise (1996)280 
The case of Stovin v Wise was specifically referred to by Jeroen Kortman in his 
book “Altruism in Private Law – Liability for Non-Feasance”281, and in focusing his 
work on Private Law he reinforces a very important factor in Stovin v Wise 
regarding the difference between Public Law obligations and Private Law liabilities. 
In the period following Anns v Merton Borough Council there was considerable 
criticism that a Public Authority (even if it had fallen short in a Public Law sense) 
should not as a consequence be forced to pay a private person compensation in a 
                                           
279   Ibid 
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281   Kortman J, Altruism in Private Law – Liability for Non-Feasance and Negotiorum Gestio 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) 
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private law action (especially if in imposing the Public Duty, Parliament had not 
intended to create any private law repercussions). 
 
The decision in Anns v Merton Borough Council was therefore treated very much 
as a case decided on its own particular facts, and it was viewed as an unwelcome 
‘high watermark’ in the law of negligence. It was not therefore a complete surprise 
when Stovin v Wise was decided in a contrary manner. 
 
The facts in Stovin v Wise were that Mr Stovin was driving his motorcycle when he 
was struck by a car driven by Mrs Wise exiting (what was for her) an almost ‘blind’ 
junction. Norfolk County Council were joined as defendants because it was alleged 
that they should have taken action to remove a bank of earth on the land adjoining 
the highway which obscured a clear view of oncoming traffic at the junction. Mr 
Stovin won his case at first instance, and in the Court of Appeal (following Anns), 
but the Council decided to Appeal the matter to the House of Lords hoping that the 
controversy during the intervening years might lead to a different result.  
 
On the facts, the situation was very similar to the position in Anns, i.e. a Local 
Authority had failed to act to prevent harm to a private individual. However, in this 
case there was even less of a link to Mr Stovin in that the Council had not had any 
part in creating the situation, whereas in Anns the Council had given approval for 
the building of the block of flats in the first place (in Stovin, the bank of earth 
involved had always been there, it was actually situated on private land adjoining 
the Council’s Highway). 
 
This might have been a basis for the House of Lords to treat Stovin differently from 
Anns but the majority of their Lordships only had a temporary difficulty in applying 
the first stage of Lord Wilberforce’s two stage test (from Anns). Whilst the Council 
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had no obligation to remove the bank of earth, they had a power to ask the 
landowner to do so (or do it themselves and recover the cost). However, this was 
not enough in itself to impose a duty on the Council (as unlike in Anns they had no 
involvement at all in creating the hazard). However, and unfortunately for the 
Council, at least one year before the accident they had decided to exercise their 
power of requiring the removal of the bank, but had not followed this up due to an 
error. The House of Lords therefore concluded that a Duty of Care had arisen. 
 
It was therefore then necessary to look at Lord Wilberforce’s second test i.e. as to 
whether there was any Policy reason why the duty of care should be overridden. 
The main speech in the House was given by Lord Hoffman (with Lords Goff and 
Jauncey agreeing with him, and Lords Nicholls and Slynn dissenting). His main 
line of argument was to stress that Parliament had only provided the Council with 
a Power (and not imposed a duty) in relation to the Highway, and if Parliament had 
intended to create a duty (and possibly private law consequences) then they would 
have made the Council’s intervention mandatory. He also commented that the law 
should be very wary of creating Private liabilities, as a consequence of a Public 
Law duty. He commented that a Local Authority’s budget was limited and it would 
be against public policy if Council’s were forced to pay compensation every time it 
used its discretion and refrained from exercising a power available to it. In effect 
he was saying that it was more appropriate for a council to use its resources to 
provide public education, or clear public waste, or maintain public recreation 
grounds etc, than to pay compensation to private individuals against Parliament’s 
intentions. He also made the point that it was inherent in riding/driving on the 
highway that there would be hazards that everyone would have to face (i.e. rain, 
fog, animals in the road etc. etc.). It would be unreasonable to remove every hazard 
and if people wished to use the roads they would have to do so at their own risk. 
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The Council’s Appeal was therefore upheld and the decision in Anns v Merton 
Borough Council was effectively reversed. 
 
5.1.1.6  Conclusion regarding a possible Legal Duty to Rescue in English Law  
 
Despite the promising line of cases involving Donoghue v Stevenson, Home Office 
v Dorset Yacht co Ltd, and Anns v Merton Borough Council, it was a 
disappointment that Stovin v Wise effectively halted the ‘march’ of Tort Law 
towards a general duty to assist strangers who find themselves faced with danger 
(i.e. one which might include a legal duty to Rescue citizens in distress). 
 
What is probably needed if the ‘march’ is to recommence is an outrageous example 
of a perfectly fit individual, failing to rescue a vulnerable person, in circumstances 
where there is absolutely no risk to the potential rescuer, and where the vulnerable 
person dies as a result (i.e. a case which would cause our collective blood to boil 
to such an extent that the Government would be moved to create either a Criminal 
Offence or, more likely, a Civil Law Duty).  
 
The wider possibility of a specific Rescue Law being created in English Law is 
covered in the next major Chapter (6) of this work. However, referring back to 
Donoghue v Stevenson, it is worth mentioning that whilst the Common Law had 
been amended by the case, it took another 50 years before relevant Legislation 
was enacted, being the passing of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (and eventually the 
Consumer protection Act 1987 - albeit this followed the prompting of a European 
Directive). The Wheels of Statutory intervention turn very slowly, and we may have 
to wait a long time for the heinous example to arise which might prompt a 
Legislative approach to prescribing a Legal Duty to Rescue. 
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5.1.2  The Law of Rescue in terms of the Protection of ‘Rescuers’ 
The law in this area is also somewhat undeveloped (although the Social Action, 
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 has provided some very recent assistance). 
However, as will be seen in Chapter 6 of my thesis, this so-called ‘SARAH’ Act 
does not exempt Heroes (Rescuers?) from liability, it simply encourages Courts 
towards a more favourable interpretation regarding any duty of care involved. 
 
In terms of the common law (and restrictive interpretations of the duties of care) I 
have been able to identify five cases which have some bearing on the matter: 
 
Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd (1946) 
Watt v Hertfordshire County Council (1954) 
Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee (1957) 
Cattley v St John Ambulance (1988)  
Day v High Performance Sports Ltd (2003) 
 
5.1.2.1 Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd (1946) 2 All ER 333282  
The first case I have identified involved the driving of an Ambulance during World 
War II. The defendant’s driver had been driving a left hand drive Ambulance which 
displayed warning signs to this effect (there were no right hand drive vehicles 
available due to war time pressures) As a consequence she had been unable to 
provide the usual hand signals to alert other road users as to changes in the 
vehicle’s direction. The Plaintiff was injured and alleged that the Ambulance 
Company had breached the duty of care which they owed to him. 
 
The main decision in the case was given by Asquith L J who stated: 
“the standard of reasonable care is that which is reasonably to be demanded in the 
circumstances. A relevant circumstance to take into account may be the 
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importance of the end to be served by behaving in this way or in that. As has often 
been pointed out, if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of 5 miles 
per hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably 
slowed down. The purpose to be served, if sufficiently important, justifies the 
assumption of abnormal risk … In considering whether reasonable care has been 
observed, one must balance the risk against consequences of not assuming that 
risk”283.     
 
The court therefore decided that the defendants were not liable as the 
importance/desirability of their actions outweighed the detriment (or any duty of 
care) to the plaintiff. [This is a very interesting outcome and the concept of 
‘desirable activity’ eventually found its way into Legislation 60 years later, in the 
Compensation Act 2006, and the need to balance risk against the consequences 
of deterring Socially Responsible Action (or Heroism) found its way into the SARAH 
Act 2015 (I will refer to these two pieces of Legislation in more detail in the 
penultimate Chapter of this thesis).          
   
 
5.1.2.2   Watt v Hertfordshire county Council (1954)284  
 
‘Daborn’ was succeeded eight years later by the Watt case which involved the Fire 
service rushing to save someone who was trapped under a heavy vehicle following 
a road crash. The fireman involved had to transport a jack to the scene, but the 
normal HGV vehicle was not available and so he transported the jack in an ordinary 
truck in which it could not be so well anchored. The jack broke free and injured the 
plaintiff.   The main judgement was given by Denning L J who again found that the 
emergency circumstances excused the defendants from liability, i.e. “Saving Life 
and Limb justified a considerable risk being taken”285.  
 
However, Lord Denning went on to state an important qualification: “fire engines 
ambulances and doctor’s cars should not [just] shoot past the traffic lights when 
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285  Ibid at 370 
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they show a red light. That is because the risk is too great to warrant the incurring 
of the danger”286.  
 
Nonetheless Lord Denning restated the general principle i.e. “It is always a 
question of balancing the risk against the end”287. He thereby, once again, 
emphasised the importance of the ‘Desirable Activity’, and ‘Social Responsibility’ 
concepts. 
 
5.1.2.3   Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee (1957)288 
The two previous cases are instructive in terms of the Court’s approach to 
‘Rescuers’ operating under emergency conditions. However, it is more relevant for 
my project to consider the Court’s response to situations where Good Samaritan’s 
provide personal attention to people in distress or suffering injury. 
 
In the Bolam case the person in distress was a patient in a mental hospital who 
was being treated for severe depression, with various procedures including Electro 
Convulsive Therapy. This treatment involved passing an electric current through 
the patient’s brain to create an artificial seizure which could have the effect of 
displacing their depression.  
 
In Mr Bolam’s case he was not strapped down whilst being treated, and as a 
consequence he flailed around when he was shocked, and suffered various injuries 
including a serious fracture of his pelvis. The Hospital was then sued for 
negligence. 
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During the Hearing the Court heard that there were differing medical opinions about 
the way Mr Bolam’s treatment was carried out: some considered that restraints 
were essential, whilst others testified that restraints should not be used in such 
cases as the actual practice of strapping people down increased the likelihood of 
fractures. 
 
The Bolam Hearing was conducted before a jury, and the judge who summed up 
the case for them was McNair J. He made a number of comments including:  
“How do you test whether an act or failure is negligent? In an ordinary case it is 
generally said, that you judge that by the action of the man in the street. He is the 
ordinary man. In one case it has been said that you judge it by the conduct of the 
man on the top of a Clapham omnibus. He is the ordinary man. But where you get 
a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the 
test whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top 
of a Clapham omnibus, because he does not have this special skill.   The test is 
the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill. A man need not possess the highest skill at the risk of being found 
negligent …”289 
 
This has since become known as the ‘Bolam Test’ and established the general 
principle that has been subsequently applied to all allegations of medical 
negligence.  
 
Interestingly the judge in the Bolam case also went on to say: 
“It is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man 
exercising that particular art. That is a perfectly accurate statement, as long as it is 
remembered that there may be one or more perfectly proper standards; and if a 
medical man conforms with one of those proper standards then he is not negligent 
…”290. 
 
Given that the doctors at the Frien Hospital had performed the treatment on Mr. 
Bolam in accordance with the views of one major section of medical opinion, then 
the court held that they had not been negligent. However, if they had acted less 
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reasonably, or recklessly, or worse, in a grossly negligent manner, then they would 
have clearly been found liable.  
 
5.1.2.4   Cattley v St John Ambulance (1988)291    
The Cattley case is of particular interest to me in my research, in that I am the 
General Counsel for St John Ambulance (the County’s leading First Aid charity) 
and it was the increasing perception that First Aid Volunteers (Good Samaritans) 
were vulnerable to being sued for negligence, that led me to commence this 
project.  
 
The facts in the case were that the Plaintiff, a fifteen year old boy was taking part 
in a motor bike race, and hit a rut and fell on his back. The First Aiders at the scene 
were trained volunteers of St John Ambulance. They assessed Mr Cattley and 
decided that it was necessary to get him to his feet to get him out of danger from 
other motorbikes, and they helped him to the side of the course. The Plaintiff was 
then taken to Hospital where it was established that he had some fractured ribs 
and vertebrae (and some damage to his spinal cord). By the time of the Hearing 
Mr Cattley was able to walk and move normally, but had a permanent lack of Bowel 
and Bladder control. 
 
Judge Prosser considered that St John Ambulance owed the Plaintiff a duty of 
care, but the major issue to be resolved centred on the standard of that duty. The 
Judge decided to apply the Bolam Test (referred to above) but translated it from 
the Doctor scenario to a First Aid scenario.  
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He reiterated the Bolam Principle: ‘The appropriate test is the standard of the 
ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill’, but he 
then re-stated it for a qualified First Aider and decided that such a ‘specialist’ would 
be negligent “if he failed to act in accordance with the standards of the ordinary 
skilled first aider exercising and professing to have that special skill of a first 
aider”292. 
 
The next question was therefore whether the First Aiders had met this standard, 
and the Judge went on to state: 
 
 “if it can be shown that the defendant acted in accordance with the general and 
approved practice current at the time in question, then he is unlikely to be viewed 
as having fallen short of the skill required of him. Furthermore even if there is no 
complete agreement as to what is approved practice, provided he acts in 
accordance with any practice approved by a responsible body of medical opinion, 
this will be sufficient”293.  
 
The Judge then found that the defendants’ approach to the Plaintiff had been in 
accordance with the latest version of the Industry First Aid Training Manual, as 
published jointly by St John Ambulance, St Andrews Ambulance, and the British 
Red Cross Society. In actual fact he stated that the Manual was: “nothing less than 
the First Aider’s Bible”294. 
 
The Defendants were therefore found not to have been negligent and the case was 
dismissed.  
 
This outcome was extremely important for St John Ambulance, and its volunteers, 
and for first aiders generally, and in addition to reinforcing the Bolam Test in the 
field of First Aid, it also included elements of the Daborn, and the Watt decisions, 
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in that the emergency nature of the accident at the Motor bike race was relevant. 
Furthermore, there were clearly public policy aspects and the Court was keen to 
ensure that Good Samaritans were not discouraged from stepping forward to help 
persons in distress (unlike the situation in some other ‘Compensation Culture’ 
jurisdictions).  
 
In short, the Court in Cattley also recognised that the enthusiastic, and proficient 
intervention of First Aiders in Emergency situations was another example of the 
‘Desirable Activity/ Social Responsibility Defences’ which Asquith LJ and Denning 
LJ had previously alluded to in Daborn, and Watt respectively, and which have now 
appeared to varying degrees in the Compensation Act 2006, and the SARAH Act 
2015. 
 
5.1.2.5    Day v High Performance Sports Limited (2003)295 
 
 
In this case the female Claimant was participating in an indoor wall climb at the 
Defendant's climbing centre, and as she reached the higher levels she realised 
that she was not secured with the necessary anchor ropes. She called out for 
assistance and the Defendant’s Manager decided that the best way to rescue her 
was to guide a neighbouring climber to help her. Unfortunately, the other climber 
was relatively inexperienced and before the rescue could be completed, the 
Claimant fell, hit the ground and suffered severe head injuries and brain damage. 
 
The Claimant therefore sued the Defendants for negligence, claiming that the 
method of rescue was unsuitable, and that the Defendant’s Manager had breached 
a duty of care that was owed to Ms Day, to carry out the rescue to a satisfactory 
standard. 
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The Judge hearing the case decided as a first principle that there was no duty on 
the Defendants to attempt a rescue, but having established that a rescue had been 
commenced, considered that a duty of care to carry out the rescue in an 
appropriate manner had been assumed.  
 
Nonetheless having taken this stance the Judge also differentiated between what 
might have been an error of judgment and what might have been negligence. He 
stressed the fact that in the case under consideration the Manager faced a pressing 
emergency and that he had needed to make a decision very quickly. The Judge 
therefore considered that the defendant's actions should not be assessed to the 
same standard as other action he may have taken if he had had more time to 
consider all the variety of possible alternative approaches. The Judge therefore 
decided that the Defendant's actions must be viewed in the emergency context. 
 
Hence the Judge found that even though the Manager had made an error, the error 
was one of judgment in difficult circumstances, but not an error amounting to 
negligence.  
 
5.1.2.6   Conclusion in relation Rescue in terms of Protection of Rescuer’s 
 
By analysing the series of cases referred to above it can be seen that, in general 
the Courts are hesitant to conclude that, well-meaning individuals responding in 
emergency situations, should be found to have been negligent if their interventions 
turn out to be less than successful. The case of Daborn v Bath Tramways 
established that in emergency situations the standard of any duty of care owed 
towards a defendant will be at a considerably lower level than might apply in more 
normal circumstances. However, Watt v Hertfordshire Co Council (and the words 
of Lord Denning) make it clear that this does not create a free for all and that even 
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in emergency situations a defendant cannot act recklessly and expect the Courts 
to protect them (e.g. carelessly ‘jumping’ a red traffic light will still lead to culpability 
regardless of the emergency situation). 
 
Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee transferred these principles into 
the medical arena, and indicated that when assessing the standard of care 
applying to Medical Good Samaritans, the test is whether or not the defendant met 
the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have the 
special skill that a doctor in his position should have had.   The defendant was not 
expected to have the Absolute skill of the most proficient doctor in that field. The 
case also indicated that if there was more than one body of medical opinion as to 
an acceptable treatment for a patient, then it was sufficient that a doctor met one 
of them. 
 
The case of Cattley v St John Ambulance applied the Bolam Test in the area of 
First Aid, and a similar result arose. In this case it was sufficient if a First Aider 
applied the procedure set out in the current First Aid Manual published in the sector 
(even if other First Aid opinion considered that different approaches might be 
appropriate). 
 
The Cattley case was decided in 1988 and reference to the more recent case of 
Day v High Performance Sports Limited re-affirmed that in addition to applying the 
Bolam Test to ‘Rescuers’ it was still essential to recognise that in Emergency 
situations a defendant’s actions must be evaluated in that context, and not in the  
cold light of day, when more time might be available to fully consider all possible 
risks and options. 
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It should also be stated that in relation to my particular work, the results of my 
research of the case law involving the possibility of Volunteer First Aiders being sued 
for negligence was very sparse (the Cattley case being the only one actually 
identified and even this was not reported in the main series of law reports). Given 
this dearth of evidence of First Aid volunteers being sued, a question could be 
legitimately raised as to why there is such a concern about the possibility of this 
happening. However, the critical factor is that there is a widespread perception that 
such Volunteers are regularly sued. It is the widespread perception which creates 
the mischief, and referring back to my Introduction to this Thesis I quoted the words 
of Derek Twine, Chief Executive of The Scouts Association who in giving evidence 
to Parliament stated that: “69% of his front line volunteers quote the ‘fear of being 
sued’ as the predominant reason for reducing numbers of voluntary leaders296.    
 
It is the chilling effect that this kind of ‘urban myth’ has on volunteering, that 
originally prompted my research project, and this is the reason why I feel that 
specific Legislation would be helpful to help dispel the myth, and encourage more 
people to volunteer as First Aiders and help save more lives. However, I raise this 
subject in much more detail in the penultimate Chapter (6) of this work (especially 
in relation to the Compensation Act 2006 and the SARAH Act 2015), and no further 
consideration of the topic is necessary at this stage. 
 
5.1.3  The law of Rescue in terms of a Rescuer’s right to Recover Losses 
This is the third element of the law relating to rescue, and concerns whether the 
Rescuer can recover compensation for any losses suffered in responding to an 
emergency, and in the most extreme of cases whether the Rescuer (or indeed their 
estate) can recover for their personal injuries (or worse, their death). 
 
                                           
296  Op Cit, Note 8 
 172 
There is again no Legislation in English Law which covers this situation, and the 
traditional position in relation to the general recovery of any outgoings was 
summarised as late as 1996 in the Stovin v Wise case (referred to earlier), where 
it was stated: “English Law does not reward someone who voluntarily confers a 
benefit on another”297. The position in relation to compensation for personal injury, 
or death is however more complicated, and there is a certain body of case law 
covering the situation. The cases that I have reviewed in this respect are: 
 
Cutler v United Dairies (1933) 
Haynes v Harwood (1935) 
Baker v Hopkins (1959)  
Videan v British Transport Commission (1963) 
 
5.1.3.1  Cutler v United Dairies (London) Limited (1933)298 
In this case the Defendant’s horses had been unhitched from a milk float and were 
resting in a field when one of them bolted. The Plaintiff observed the situation and 
fearing that the horse might cause damage or injure itself he decided to try and 
bring it under control. Unfortunately, he was unsuccessful and was personally 
injured. He therefore decided to try to recover compensation from the Dairy in 
connection with trying to rescue the situation/the horse. However, the court 
decided that the Dairy owed no duty towards him, and applied the well know 
maxim: “Volenti non fit injuria”: ‘to one who is willing, no harm is done’. The actual 
words used by the court were: 
 “A man is under no duty to run out and stop another person’s horse, and if he 
chooses to do an act, the ordinary consequences of which is that damage may 
ensue, the damage must be on his own head”299.  
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The Judge also suggested that the Plaintiff’s intervention could not have been 
reasonably foreseen by the Defendant. 
 
Hence the main rationale for the decision was that the would-be ‘Rescuer’ had 
acted voluntarily, and that as there was no imminent danger from the horse it was 
not reasonably foreseeable that he would intervene. Consequently, the Defendant 
did not owe the rescuer any duty of care and there was no liability. 
 
5.1.3.2    Haynes v Harwood (1935)300             
The case of Haynes v Harwood was a little similar to that of Cutler v United Dairies, 
and arose just a year or so afterwards. 
 
In the Haynes case the Defendant’s horse was left unattended in a street, and 
adjacent to a group of children playing together. One of the children threw a stone 
at the Horse which bolted and which then posed a significant threat to a woman 
and child nearby. The Plaintiff was a policeman who had seen the events unfold, 
and who rushed forward to try to restrain the horse. Unfortunately, he was injured 
in the process.      
 
On this occasion the Court found in favour of the Plaintiff, and the Judge made the 
following comment: 
 
“a wrongdoer cannot be heard to say that a man is the author of his misfortune 
because, acting in pursuance of a moral [my emphasis] duty, he attempts to deal 
with the situation created by the wrong”301 
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This outcome was clearly more promising for would-be rescuers, but the facts of 
the case were somewhat narrower than in Cutler, since the Defendant Harwood  
was initially in the wrong  (in having left the horses unattended), and because the 
Plaintiff was a policeman who could be considered to be under an official duty to 
act in such an emergency. 
 
It was not therefore a typical ‘Rescue’ case i.e. in the Haynes scenario the 
defendant had positively created the situation (rather than it being a truly 
spontaneous occurrence), and the rescuer was not just an ordinary member of the 
public with no pre-existing obligation to help, but was a public servant who would 
be expected to go to the aid of someone (e.g. a woman and child) in distress. 
 
5.1.3.3   Baker v T E Hopkins and Sons Ltd (1959)302 
The situation in Baker v Hopkins was more tragic, and the courts took a wider 
stance and allowed a rescuer to recover, even when he was not a public official.   
 
The facts in the Baker case were that a gang of men employed by the Defendants 
had been set to work on cleaning and emptying an old well. A petrol pump was 
used to help empty the well but there were problems with ventilation in the confined 
space, and the workmen were overcome by the fumes. A doctor was called to the 
scene, and realising that the men could die, he went down the well to rescue them. 
Unfortunately, the rescue was not successful, and worse, the doctor himself was 
also overcome by the fumes, and all the men died.  
 
The doctor’s estate sued the defendants and the court found in the doctor’s favour. 
In particular the court held that given the emergency situation that had arisen, the 
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doctor had not been able to assess all the possible risks involved and whilst he 
had bravely volunteered to intervene and try to go to the men’s rescue,  
the defence of volenti non fit injuria was not applicable. The Court held that it was 
foreseeable to the defendants that if they had placed their workmen in a position 
of danger, it was entirely likely that a brave person would seek to rescue them. The 
court awarded the doctor’s estate significant compensation. 
 
This result seemed much more satisfactory, but it still left some doubt as to whether 
a general precedent had been set, given the rescuer was a doctor who, it could 
also be suggested, had a pre-existing professional duty to try to preserve life 
(although probably not a duty to climb down into a dangerous well to do so).  
 
5.1.3.4   Videan v British Transport Commission (1963)303                 
In the Videan case the facts were that a young child (the daughter of the Station 
Master employed by the Defendants) had strayed onto a railway line adjacent to 
the Station House and was at risk of being run down. A small train vehicle was 
approaching the station, and seeing the danger, the Station Master jumped on the 
tracks and managed to throw the child clear, but in so doing was killed himself.  
 
The Plaintiff’s Estate sued the Defendants and the courts held in the Estate’s 
favour, again holding it to be foreseeable that if a situation had been created where 
a child could stray onto a railway track, then it was very likely that if someone 
observed this, then they would seek to rescue the child. 
 
There was an interesting argument in the case and Lord Denning, in a minority, 
considered that the Railway Operator should not be responsible, given that the 
child was not authorised to be on the tracks (she was in law a trespasser), and  
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they could therefore not have foreseen her presence. By contrast however, the 
Court of Appeal considered that whilst the presence of the Trespasser could not 
be foreseen, it could be anticipated that someone observing the situation would 
attempt a Rescue. Hence the Defendant should be held liable to the Rescuer. 
 
This liability of Occupiers towards Trespassers is beyond the scope of this work 
(and subsequently the Occupier’s Liability Act 1984 has established that occupiers 
have a lower (but not a nil) duty of care in relation to trespassers (as opposed to 
authorised visitors)). 
 
Whilst the Videan case is instructive about a defendant’s potential liability to a 
Rescuer, there are facts about the case which could again suggest that it may not 
create a general precedent. This is because the Station Master was not a complete 
stranger to the tragedy: he was an employee of the Railway Company who might 
be expected to react to a danger on his employer’s property (especially as he was 
the station Master), and in addition he was the child’s father, and might be expected 
to do everything he could to ensure her safety. 
 
5.1.3.5   Conclusions in relation to Compensating Would-be Rescuers 
 
Whilst this aspect of the law of rescue is much narrower than the other two, there 
remains considerable doubt as to whether, if a Stranger acts as a Rescuer, s/he 
will be able to recover compensation for loss/injury.  This is not satisfactory, and it 
would be preferable if there was also Statutory certainty in this area.  
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5.1.4  General Conclusions on the Law of Rescue in England and Wales 
 
The above sections dealt with the Law of Rescue in England and Wales in three 
categories: The Duty to Rescue; the Protection of Rescuers; and the 
Compensation of Rescuers. 
 
In relation to the Duty to Rescue it was noted that there is no legislation compelling 
an ordinary citizen to go to the aid of a stranger in distress. It was also established 
that the traditional position under the common law was also that there was no legal 
duty to rescue. Various cases have extended the law of negligence generally, but 
there remains no Legal Duty to Rescue in England. 
 
A similar scenario exists in relation to protecting Rescuers from suit/compensating 
Rescuers for harm/losses (there being currently no explicit legal protection, albeit 
steps are being taken to reinterpret general duties of care). 
 
In Overall Summary, it can be seen that the situation concerning the Law of Rescue 
in England and Wales is unsatisfactory, and it is for this reason that towards the 
end of this work, I suggest that specific Legislation is essential to bring more 
certainty. This is the more so given the pervasive intervention of Moral luck in these 
types of extreme situations. It seems entirely unreasonable that Luck should be 
allowed to play such a large part in the way that human activity is ‘regulated’ in the 
vital area of Rescuing fellow citizens in distress.  
 
It will be seen from the following sections that, to varying degrees, the legal position 
in various other ‘Western’ jurisdictions is more favourable to Rescuers. 
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5.2 The Law of Rescue in the United States of America 
Given that the legal system in the United States of America was originally based 
on English Law, it still retains a substantial body of English Law principles, and a 
combined Statute and Common Law composition. A very major difference however 
is that as the USA is a Federation of individual States, then in addition to any 
Federal Laws, each separate State has its own body of ‘local’ law. It is not therefore 
possible to refer to a general United States Law in many areas, and hence in the 
field of the Law of Rescue, it is necessary to consider the law as it applies in each 
particular State. However for the purposes of this thesis I intend to limit my 
research to particular states that have taken specific steps in relation to the three 
component elements of the Law of Rescue (i.e. A Legal Duty to Rescue, Protection 
of Rescuers, and Compensation of Rescuers). My purpose is not to present a 
comprehensive review of the Law of Rescue in every US state, but simply to 
demonstrate that, in at least some states, specific law has been developed. 
 
5.2.1 The Law of Rescue in terms of a Duty to Rescue 
The starting point is to consider the ‘traditional’ position which, as in English Law, 
held that there is no common law duty to rescue in the USA. This situation is 
confirmed by Charles O Gregory in his essay “The Good Samaritan and the Bad: 
The Anglo-American Law”304. In comparing the situation in US law to the parable 
of the Good Samaritan, Gregory specifically quoted from the New Hampshire case: 
Buch v Amory (1897) 305,  
“with purely moral obligations the law does not deal. For example the Priest and 
the Levite who passed by on the other side of the road were not, it is supposed, 
liable at law for the continued suffering of the man who fell among thieves, which 
they might, and morally ought to have prevented or relieved”306.  
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Having confirmed that the Law does not impose a general duty to rescue in 
America, he then proceeded to point out the ‘usual’ exceptions to the rule i.e. the 
familial obligations of, say, parents for rescuing their child, or the duty of a Master 
of a ship to his passengers, or an Employer to his employees injured at work, or a 
member of the Emergency Services (e.g. a medical professional called to the 
scene of an accident). 
 
This general position remained unchanged until the mid 1960’s when a particularly 
heinous incident arose in New York: the Genovese case307. Katy (Kitty) Genovese 
was 28 and on the evening of 13th March 1964 she returned home from her job as 
a manager at a Nightclub Bar. She parked her car near her home but as she got 
out she was accosted by a 29 year old married man, Winston Moseley, who 
stabbed her, but who was frightened off by someone turning their light on, and 
shouting from a nearby apartment. Miss Genovese cried for assistance but no-one 
came to her aid, despite it later transpiring that at least thirty eight onlookers had 
seen the incident! Seeing that no-one had gone to her aid, the assailant attacked 
her again, stabbing her many more times, and raping her. Moseley then 
disappeared and his victim staggered to her own apartment where a neighbour 
finally called the police. When they arrived Kitty Genovese was already dead from 
the seventeen stab wounds she had suffered. 
 
Winston Moseley was not immediately identified as the Murderer, but he was 
subsequently arrested for burglary, and during his interrogation, he confessed to 
the Murder of Kitty Genovese. He was found guilty and sentenced to death, but 
this was commuted on Appeal to life imprisonment, due to evidence of his mental 
state not being taken into account at his trial308.    
                                           
307 Gansberg M, ‘Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call The Police, New York Times 
 (New York 1964)  
308 People v Moseley 43 Misc 2d 505 (N.Y.S. 1964) 
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The details of this incident are clearly shocking, and although some of the reports 
were sensationalised, it remains the case that a significant number of Kitty 
Genovese’s neighbours simply turned the other way when a very simple telephone 
call to the Police may have been all that was required to have saved her life. 
 
The Genovese case created a substantial outcry, and a heated debate took place 
regarding the desirability of a Good Samaritan Law to oblige citizens to go to the 
aid of a neighbour in distress. In particular a high level Conference was arranged 
for Criminologists and Sociologists at the University of Chicago in 1965 entitled: 
“The Good Samaritan and the Bad”309.  In particular one of the presenters at the 
conference specifically produced a draft of a proposed Statutory provision for a 
legal Duty to Rescue: 
 
“A person has a duty to act whenever: 
 
1) Harm or loss is imminent and there is apparently no other practical alternative to 
avoid the threatened harm or loss except his own action; 
2) Failure to act would result in substantial harm or damage to another person or his 
property and the effort, risk, or cost of acting is disproportionately less than the harm 
or damage avoided; and 
3) The circumstances placing the person in a position to act is purely fortuitous”310  
 
 
It might therefore have been considered that a watershed may have been reached 
and that there was every likelihood that the creation of a legal duty to rescue was 
imminent. However, despite the appalling nature of the crime and the shocking 
absence of good neighbourliness demonstrated by the 38 people living near to 
Miss Genovese, and the intense interest taken in the case by some of the most 
eminent legal writers on Jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic, it was 
surprising that the State of New York did not (and has not) acted to Legislate. 
Indeed, none of the other 49 states in the USA acted immediately to so Legislate.  
                                           
309 Op Cit, Note 304  
310 Op Cit, Note 304 Rudolph WM (1965) “The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule”  
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This was not a particularly promising outcome, but whilst most states seemingly 
ignored the situation, the three states of Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island 
(two of which states are adjacent to New York) did actually create specific 
legislation compelling citizens to attempt ‘easy’ rescues within a decade or two 
afterwards311.  In addition, as recorded by Eugene Volokh (Gary Scwartz Professor 
of Law, UCLA School of Law) another seven states (California, Florida, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin) subsequently introduced a Statutory 
duty to at least report observed violent crimes to the Authorities312.          
  
The nature of the laws enacted by the states of Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode 
Island are therefore of considerable interest and are reproduced below:  
Vermont (1973)313  
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to 
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or 
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable 
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided 
by others. 
 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection 
(a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute 
gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. 
Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort 
liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course 
of his practice. 
 
(c) A person who wilfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $100.00.  
 
Minnesota (1983)314 
A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed 
to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do 
so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to 
obtain aid from law enforcement. Failure to do so is a Petty Misdemeanour, 
involving a fine of less than $100. 
 
                                           
311 Hyman DA, ’Rescue without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue,, 
University of Illinois College of Law – Working Papers (2005), Paper 32   
312 Volokh E) ‘Duty to Rescue/ Report Statutes’( 2009), www.volokh.com – last accessed 
 08/01/13 
313 Vermont Statutes Ann Tit 12  Ss 519 
314 Minnesota Statutes. Ann. Ss 604A.01 
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Rhode Island (1984)315  
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is 
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she 
can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable 
assistance to the exposed person. Any person violating the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanour and shall be subject to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months, or by a fine of not more than 
five hundred dollars ($500), or both.  
 
As can be seen, each of these provisions only applies to ‘easy’ Rescues, and each 
involves criminal sanctions. In Vermont this is a fine of up to $100, and in 
Minnesota the level of fine is the same, but the offence is specifically classed as  
a petty misdemeanour (which does not therefore result in a criminal record). 
However, in Rhode Island the penalty is a fine of $500, or imprisonment for up to 
six months, or both! This is clearly a much more severe penalty, and represents 
the high-water mark for this type of omission in America. 
 
Having established that at least three states in the USA have introduced a Legal 
Duty to Rescue into their legal system, it is now possible to move on to the next 
category of the law of Rescue within that Country, and consider the degree of 
protection provided to Rescuers who might be sued as result of their Good 
Samaritanism. 
 
5.2.2 The Law of Rescue in terms of the Protection of Rescuers from Civil Suit 
When I looked at the legal duty to carry out Rescues in the last sub-section, it was 
interesting to note that one of the three relevant states (Vermont) had also 
introduced a law protecting a rescuer from civil suit, provided he/she was not guilty 
of Gross Negligence. It can also be demonstrated that whilst only three states have 
introduced a legal duty to rescue, all the states in America have actually passed 
laws of one form of another to protect rescuers from civil suit: 
                                           
315 R I Gen Laws Ws 11-56-1 
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State Law State Law 
Alabama Section 6-5-332 Montana 27-1-714 
Alaska SECTION 09.65.090 North Carolina G.S. 90-21.16 
Arkansas A.C.A. § 17-95-101   North Dakota § 20-9-4.1 
Arizona A.R.S. § 9-500.02.  Nebraska 25-21,186 
California 
Ann.Cal.Bus. & 
Prof.Code §2395. 
Nevada (NRS) 41.500 
Connecticut C.G.S.A. §52-557b.  New Hampshire Section 508:12 
Colorado CRS title 13-21-108 New Mexico 24-10-3 
Delaware 16 Del.C. §6801 (a) New Jersey  
Florida Section 178.13 New York Article 30 
Georgia §31-11-8 Ohio § 2305.23 & § 4765.49 
Hawaii Sec. 663-1.5 Oklahoma 
Title76.Torts Sec 5 
Title 76. Torts  Sec 5.4 
Idaho I.C. §5-330 Oregon (ORS) 30.800 
Illinois 210 ILCS 50/3.150  Pennsylvania 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8 332  
Indiana IC 16-31-6-1  Rhode Island § 9-1-27.1 
Iowa I.C.A. §613.17 South Carolina SECTION 15-1-310 
Kansas K.S.A. §65-2891 South Dakota § 20-9-4.1.  
Kentucky KRS §411.148 Tennessee 63-6-218. 
Louisiana LSA-R.S. 37:1731 Texas 6701d 
Massachusetts 5-309 Utah 78-11-22 
Maryland Maryland Law 5-309 Virginia H.B. 2097 
Maine Title 14 164 Vermont SS 519 
Michigan 333.20965 Washington 4.24.3000  
Minnesota 604A.01 Washington DC 
D.C. CODE 1981 §2-
1344. 
Mississippi §73-25-37. Wisconsin 895.48 
Missouri Section 190.092     
Table of USA Good Samaritan Laws Protecting Rescuers316 
 
It is beyond the scope of my thesis to analyse all the various wordings adopted by 
the individual American states, but it is instructive to note the general rubric 
adopted by those States which have put in place legislation to protect would be 
Rescuers in the manner which most accords with the aims of this project. This is 
best illustrated by the law in Delaware: 
“… any person who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other 
compensation from the person aided or treated, renders first aid, emergency 
treatment or rescue assistance to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in 
                                           
316 www.cprinstructor.com/legal.htm - last accessed 08/01/13 
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need of rescue assistance, or any person in obvious physical distress or discomfort 
shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such 
person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by 
reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid, emergency treatment 
or rescue assistance, unless it is established that such injuries or such death were 
caused wilfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of such 
person”317 
 
 
Particular attention is drawn to the ‘exception’ whereby there is no immunity if the 
Rescuer/Good Samaritan acted with Gross Negligence. 
 
5.2.3. The Law of Rescue in terms of Compensating Rescuers 
Unlike the previous two sub-sections regarding the Duty to Rescue, and regarding 
the Protection of Rescuers, it is not necessary to refer to Legislative sources in this 
instance, since the availability of Compensation for Rescuers has a comparatively 
long history in America. 
The Common Law position in America, was effectively established by Judge 
Benjamin Cardozo in the famous American case: Wagner v International Railway 
Company (1921)318.   
 
In this case, the Plaintiff, Arthur Wagner had boarded a New York train at night-
time with his cousin Herbert. At the point at which they boarded the train, the track 
became an elevated section encompassing a bridge, and at certain stages the 
carriages overhung the ground, and at a considerable height. The carriage had 
been allowed to become overcrowded, and having failed to make himself secure 
Herbert Wagner fell overboard, when the train lurched around a bend on the bridge. 
Once the train had stopped a number of people decided to try to rescue him. The 
Plaintiff decided to step down to the rails and edge back along the track, and many 
others descended right to the ground to make a search. 
                                           
317 16 Del C Section 6801(a)  
318  Wagner v International Railway Company (1921) 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437. 
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The Plaintiff proceeded in the dark but whilst he could not locate his cousin, he did 
find his hat, and decided to try to climb down the bridge trestles at that point thinking 
Herbert might be trapped within them. The people on the ground below had also 
reached this point, and came across Herbert’ Wagner’s dead body.  Whilst 
standing there they were shocked when the Plaintiff’s body fell at their feet, he 
having lost his footing in the dark on the tracks above. 
 
The Defendants were sued for compensation, and whilst the issue of liability to 
Herbert Wagner was not in question, it was a very different situation regarding 
Arthur Wagner (the would-be Rescuer), and the point to be decided was whether 
it was foreseeable that after one man had fallen off the train, another would attempt 
a rescue. If it was foreseeable, then the defendant would owe the Rescuer a duty 
of care, i.e. a duty to accompany him, or provide him with a lamp to light his way. 
 
The Court at first instance found for the Defendant and decided that the fact that 
another passenger might attempt a rescue was not foreseeable. However, on 
Appeal Judge Cardozo reversed this decision, and stated the following words 
which have since become famous: "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is 
the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in 
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their 
effect within the range of the natural and the probable. A wrong that imperils life is 
a wrong to the imperiled victim, it is also a wrong to his rescuer…The risk of rescue, 
if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. 
The (Defendant) may not have foreseen the coming of the deliverer. He is 
accountable as if he had [my underlining to give emphasis]”319. 
 
                                           
319 Ibid 
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A key element of the decision was that the attempted rescue must not have been 
wanton, and the Judge found in favour of the Plaintiff in this respect also. Whilst it 
might have appeared unreasonable for Arthur Wagner to start to descend the 
bridge trestles, it was not in fact fanciful, given that he had found the victim’s hat! 
 
This case has since provided authority for the principle that if a defendant is 
responsible for a situation in which a third part attempts a rescue, then provided 
that rescue is not reckless, the defendant will be liable to the rescuer for 
compensating him for reasonable losses/injury.  
 
5.2.3 Conclusions as to the Law of Rescue in the United States of America 
 
From the foregoing parts of this sub-section it has been established that at least 
some States impose a Legal Duty to attempt “Easy Rescues”; most States have a 
law Protecting general Rescuers from suit; and there is also a general Law 
providing Rescuers with Compensation if a reasonable attempt at a rescue results 
in losses/injury. 
 
5.3 The Law of Rescue in Canada 
The situation in Canada is not too dissimilar to that in the USA in that, in terms of 
a Legal Duty to Rescue, only a minority (in fact only one) of the Provinces has 
imposed such a duty, and this is the Province of Quebec. This is not surprising 
given the Province’s French Constitutional heritage/ character. By contrast, all but 
one of the Provinces provides legal protection to Good Samaritans.  
 
5.3.1 Legal Duty to Rescue in the province of Quebec 
The legal duty to rescue in Quebec arises from the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms, which as translated states: 
“Every person must come to the aid of anyone whose life is in peril, either 
personally or calling for aid, by giving him the necessary and immediate physical 
 187 
assistance, unless it involves danger to himself or a third person, or he has another 
valid reason."320 
 
As can be seen this duty is again limited to ‘Easy Rescues’ i.e. the citizen is 
absolved if the assistance required involves danger to himself. 
 
I will next proceed to look at the legal protection of Good Samaritans in Canada, 
but before doing so it is interesting to note the well known Canadian case of ‘The 
Ogopogo’ (Horsley v. MacLaren)321.  The case is not entirely relevant to the core 
of my Thesis which is concerned with the obligations of the general public, since 
the Ogopogo case, whilst famous, was concerned with the obligations of a host 
(and an owner of a boat) towards his guests, being passengers on the boat (i.e. a 
‘special duty’ case). 
 
The case reiterated the common law position in Canada (following the position in 
England) that there is no general duty to rescue fellow citizens. However, a 
particularly interesting aspect of the case was the famous statement of Judge 
Arthur Jessup, when the case went on Appeal: 
 "So, despite the moral outrage of the text writers, it appears presently the law that 
one can, with immunity, smoke a cigarette on the beach while one’s neighbour 
drowns and, without a word of warning watch a child or blind person walk into 
certain danger"322. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the Ogopogo case was that the court also expressed 
the view that if someone starts to carry out a rescue, then unless the risk to them 
personally becomes unreasonable, then they have a duty to continue the attempt 
(especially if their intervention has dissuaded others from helping).  
 
                                           
320 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 1975, Article 2 
321 The Ogopogo [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 257 
322 Horsley v. MacLaren [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11 D.L.R. at 277  
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I shall also refer to the Ogopogo case later in this sub-section 5.3, when I look at 
the right of a rescuer to recover their losses, if they go to the aid of someone in 
distress. 
 
5.3.2  Legal Protection of the Good Samaritan in Canada 
There are ten Provinces in Canada: Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and 
New Brunswick (there are also three territories in the North: Yukon, Nunavut, and 
Northern Territories). For the purposes of this thesis I have concentrated on the 
Provinces, to develop my analysis, and all of the Provinces have specific Statutes 
protecting Good Samaritans except New Brunswick, which has presumably 
decided to accept the vagaries of the common law approach. 
 
Once again, it is not necessary for my thesis to review the wording of each of the 
relevant Statutes, and the most pertinent formulation is that adopted by Nova 
Scotia:  
“Where, in respect of a person who is ill, injured or unconscious as a result of an 
accident or other emergency, a volunteer renders services or assistance at any 
place, the volunteer is not liable for damages for injuries to or the death of that 
person alleged to have been caused by an act or omission on the part of the 
volunteer while rendering services or assistance, unless it is established that the 
injuries or death were caused by gross negligence on the part of the volunteer, and 
no proceeding shall be commenced against a volunteer which is not based upon 
his alleged gross negligence”323 
 
It is also interesting to note that Quebec again takes a somewhat more extensive 
approach (although this stems from its French history); 
“Where a person comes to the assistance of another person …he is exempt from 
all liability for injury that may result from it, unless the injury is due to his intentional 
or gross fault”324 
 
 
                                           
323 Volunteer Services Act 1987. R.S. c. 497, s. 1. 
324 Quebec Civil Code 1991, Chapter 64 a. 1471 
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5.3.3 The Law of Rescue in Canada in terms of Compensating Rescuers     
Only one Province in Canada has provided a specific Statutory right for rescuers 
to recover compensation, and unsurprisingly this is Quebec (again following its 
French law roots). The Quebec wording is: 
 
2. A rescuer who sustains an injury or, if he dies therefrom, a dependant, may 
obtain a benefit from the [Public Commission]. 
… 
 
3. A rescuer must apply to the commission in writing within one year after the 
injury was sustained; in the case of a dependant, such application must be made 
within one year after the death of the rescuer.”325 
 
 
The other Provinces have therefore left the matter to the common law, which given 
that Canadian Law has its base in English Law, means that the general line of 
English cases will also apply in Canada e.g. Haynes v Harwood326, and Videan v 
British Transport Commission327. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a key Canadian case which underlines the common law 
position is Horsley v McLaren, The Ogopogo (1971)328. In this case, McLaren 
owned a boat and took his friends (including a Mr Mathews and a Mr Horsley) on 
a boating Trip. Unfortunately, Mr Matthews fell overboard in the icy water, and was 
unable to swim back to the boat. Mr McLaren therefore undertook a rescue but 
instead of circling around to Mr Matthews (in the more usual procedure for 
rescues), he tried to back the boat up, which took an unexpectedly long time. 
Seeing the attempted rescue beginning to fail, Mr Horsley then dived into the water 
to save his friend, but he too became overcome by the conditions and both men 
died. 
 
                                           
325 An Act to Promote Good Citizenship 1977 R.S.Q. Chapter C-20 
326 Op Cit, Note 300 
327 Op Cit, Note 303 
328 Horsley v McLaren, The Ogopogo [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410  
 190 
Horsley’s dependants sued for compensation, and in the Court of first instance the 
Judge followed the principle that if Party A causes a situation of danger to Party B, 
then it is foreseeable that Party C, might attempt a rescue, and if C is killed his 
executors should be able to recover damages.  
 
However, in the relevant Canadian Court of Appeal it was decided on a 3:2 majority 
that McLaren was not negligent (backing up the boat to rescue Matthews was not 
orthodox, but it was reasonable). Hence it was not foreseeable that Horsley would 
see a need to dive in himself, and hence McLaren had no liability towards Horsley. 
 
This was unfortunate for Horsley’s dependents, but the case reiterated the general 
situation, that if a Rescue was foreseeable, then the party whose conduct raised 
the need for the rescue, is likely to be liable to the rescuer for compensation (unless 
the rescuer’s intervention was in itself foolhardy). 
 
5.3.4 Conclusions on the Law of Rescue in Canada   
 
In summary it has been demonstrated that the Law of Rescue in Canada more 
closely follows that in the United States of America, than it does that in England: 
 
a) Compared to the three (6%) of the fifty-one states in the USA that impose a legal 
duty to carry out easy rescues, one province (Quebec) out of the ten main 
provinces in Canada (10%) does so; 
 
b) Further, and rather like in the USA, where all states provide Statutory protection 
from suit of one kind of another for rescuers (provided they do not act with gross 
negligence), all bar one of the Canadian provinces (i.e. excluding New Brunswick) 
also provides similar Statutory protection; 
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c) Both US Law and Canadian Law provide the facility for rescuers to obtain 
compensation if they suffer losses in cases: where someone has caused a 
dangerous situation to arise, the rescuer’s intervention is foreseeable, and the 
rescuer does not act in a foolhardy manner.      
 
 
5.4 The Law of Rescue in Australia 
Australia is the last Common Law based jurisdiction that I have looked at by way 
of comparing the position with England and Wales. 
 
The situation in Australia has some similarity to that applying in the USA, and also 
in Canada. As a country Australia also has a ‘federal’ system of law with each of 
the seven main ‘states’ (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Western Australia, Northern Territory, and Tasmania) having the capacity to 
legislate locally (in fact the Northern Territory is, as its name suggests, a ‘territory’ 
rather than a state, but one which has the right to self- government).   
 
5.4.1. Legal Duty to Rescue in Australia 
The Northern Territory is the only Australian ‘state’ which makes it a criminal 
offence to fail to help citizen in distress. Section 155 of the Territory’s Criminal 
Code states: 
“Any person who, being able to provide rescue, resuscitation, medical treatment, 
first aid or succour of any kind to a person urgently in need of it and whose life may 
be endangered if it is not provided, callously fails to do so is guilty of a crime and 
is liable to imprisonment for 7 years”329. 
 
This section of the Northern Territory’s criminal code is unusual in Common Law 
jurisdictions, and in suggesting the reason for its genesis, Tim Pardun, commenting 
                                           
329 Northern Territory Criminal Code Act, Section 155  
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in his article ‘Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective’ states: “its basis lies in 
a concept of Social responsibility”330, and there is an indication that the Section 
was passed following a number of heinous cases of individuals simply ignoring 
other citizens in distress when their rescue could have been achieved with little 
effort and no risk. 
 
It is understood that there has only been one case in the Northern Territory where 
Section 155 has been tested (and this also involved a particularly shocking set of 
circumstances). In the case of Salmon v Chute (1994)331 a driver was involved in 
a road traffic accident, and having knocked over a child, simply drove away without 
trying to provide assistance.  The child died as a result of the accident and the hit 
and run driver was convicted of the Section 155 offence, and sentenced to 12 
month’s imprisonment. However, Salmon appealed against his conviction on the 
basis that he had not acted callously, as required by the Section, but had simply 
panicked, in the heat of the moment. 
 
The higher court decided that the offence required four elements to be proved: the 
offender must be capable of responding; the responder must be in a position to 
provide rescue/ first aid etc; the ‘victim’ must be in need of urgent, life-saving 
assistance; and the offender must act callously. In the Appellant’s case the first 
three elements were proved, but in relation to the fourth element, it was necessary 
to show that he had been callous i.e. had thought about the situation, and had 
intentionally decided to abandon the victim. The court decided that this point was 
not proved, and that the appellant had actually left the scene in panic, not as a 
deliberate act. The conviction was therefore overturned. 
 
                                           
330 Pardun J T, ‘Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective’ Los Angeles International 
 and Comparative Law Journal 594 (1997) 
331 Salmon v Shute and Dredge (1994) 4 N.T.L.R. 149, 151 
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As mentioned above this is the only case that appears to have arisen under the 
Legislation, and demonstrates that the courts are likely to be loathe to find 
someone guilty of the offence. It is therefore somewhat unlikely that the Law will 
lead to any significant practical benefits in the Northern territory. It is not therefore 
surprising that the other Australian States have not followed suit. 
 
 
5.4.2  The Law Protecting Good Samaritans in Australia 
Unlike the situation regarding a Legal Duty to Rescue, all the Australian States, 
other than Tasmania and Western Australia, have introduced various types of 
Statutory protection for individuals who step forward as Good Samaritans: 
 
The wording most apposite to my project is that adopted by Southern Australia, in 
its Civil Liability Act (formerly the Wrongs Act)1936:  
  
“74   Good Samaritans 
 
“(1)  Good Samaritan means – 
 
 (a) a person who, acting without expectation of payment or other consideration, 
comes to the aid of a person who is apparently in need of emergency assistance 
 
 or 
 
(b) a medically qualified person who, acting without expectation of payment or 
other consideration, gives advice by telephone or some other form of 
telecommunication about the treatment of a person who is apparently in need of 
emergency medical assistance”332 
 
 
(2) A good samaritan incurs no personal civil liability for an act or omission 
done or made in good faith and without recklessness in assisting a person in 
apparent need of emergency assistance”. 
Given that the Northern Territory of Australia is the only ‘state’ to impose a legal 
Duty to Rescue, it is interesting to also look at the way in which it protects 
Rescuers, via its Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003: 
                                           
332  The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) 
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8 Good Samaritans 
(1) A good Samaritan does not incur personal civil liability for a personal injury 
caused by an act done in good faith and without recklessness while giving 
emergency assistance to a person.  
…[and interestingly] 
(3) This section does not apply if the Good Samaritan was intoxicated while giving 
the assistance or advice. 
  
5.4.3  The Law of Rescue in Australia in terms of Compensating Rescuers   
 
The situation regarding the right of a rescuer in Australia to recover compensation 
if they are injured in carrying out a rescue is consistent with that applying in the 
other main Common Law based Jurisdictions (e.g. USA and Canada), and 
recovery is possible provided that it was reasonably foreseeable that the Rescuer 
would intervene to assist. 
 
This approach was confirmed at a general (National) level in Australia in the case 
of Chapman v Hearse (1961)333. 
 
In the Chapman case, Mr Chapman had negligently driven his car on a winding 
road in poor weather conditions and crashed it. The driver of an oncoming vehicle 
was a Dr Cherry, who seeing the accident left his car to go to Mr Chapman’s aid. 
 
Unfortunately, another vehicle was approaching driven by Mr Hearse who was also 
going too fast in the conditions, and before he could stop he ploughed into Mr 
Chapman’s car, killing Dr Cherry. 
 
                                           
333 Chapman v Hearse (1961) HCA 46 
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The doctor’s executors sued for compensation, and the State court found in their 
favour holding both Mr Hearse and Mr Chapman responsible - the former as the 
direct cause of Dr Cherry’s death, and the latter as the person creating the original 
accident, and having thereby led Dr Cherry to attempt the rescue (such rescue 
being entirely foreseeable in the circumstances). The court held Mr Chapman to 
be responsible to a degree of 25%).  
 
Mr Chapman then appealed the decision to the National Appeal court seeking a 
ruling that Mr Hearse should be 100 % responsible, on the basis that his actions 
were a Novus Actus Interveniens. 
 
The Appeal court disagreed and reconfirmed, under the Common Law principle 
that if it was reasonably foreseeable to a person who causes an accident (the 
‘actor’) that a well-intentioned passer-by would attempt a rescue, then provided the 
rescuer did not act recklessly the actor would be liable to compensate the rescuer 
for any appropriate injury or loss sustained.    
 
On this basis the Court rejected the Appeal, and upheld that both Hearse and 
Chapman were liable to compensate Dr Cherry’s estate (Chapman again at 25%) 
 
5.4.4 Conclusions on the Law of Rescue in Australia   
 
As in the case of Canada, the Law of Rescue in Australia more closely follows that 
in the United States of America, than it does that in England and Wales: 
 
a) One of the states/territories in Australia (the Northern Territory), like Quebec in 
Canada, has followed the three States in the USA and imposes a legal duty to 
carry out easy rescues. 
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b) In addition, and similar to the USA (where all states provide some degree of 
Statutory protection from suit for rescuers,) and like Canada (where all but one 
province does so) all parts of Australia, except Tasmania and Western Australia, 
provide similar protection 
 
c) All three of the Common Law based legal jurisdictions of USA, Canada, and 
Australia enable rescuers to obtain compensation if they suffer losses in cases, 
where someone has caused a dangerous situation to arise, the rescuer’s 
intervention is foreseeable, and the rescuer does not act in a foolhardy manner.      
 
The next Sub-Sections in this thesis move on to look at the position in the two 
continental European countries of France and Germany. 
 
5.5    The Law of Rescue in France 
Unlike the situation in the Legal Jurisdictions in the previous Sub-Sections, the 
French Legal system is founded on Civil Law (Roman Law) principles, rather than 
Common Law principles. The present French Law essentially emanates from the 
Napoleonic Code of 1804334, which itself was very much drawn from traditional 
Roman Law, codified in the “Corpus Juris Civils” in the time of Justinian in 534335. 
 
Unlike the English Common Law System, Civil Law systems are generally much 
less hesitant in applying sanctions for Omissions, and hence it is not surprising that 
under many Civil Law systems there is a positive duty to attempt a rescue (albeit 
an Easy Rescue) of fellow citizens in distress. 
 
                                           
334 Code Napoleon 1804  
335 Corpus Juris Civilis, 534, Justinian I 
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5.5.1  French Law in Terms of a Legal Duty to Rescue 
French Law traditionally included an express Statutory Duty to Rescue, and the 
modern formulation now appears in the French Criminal Code at Article 223-6: 
“Any person, who by his immediate action could have prevented a felony or 
misdemeanour against the bodily integrity of an individual, without risk to himself, 
or to third parties, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five year’s 
imprisonment or a fine of €75,000 [c. £60,000]. 
 
The same penalties apply to anyone who wilfully fails to offer assistance to a 
person in danger which he could himself provide without risk to himself or to third 
parties, or by initiating rescue operations” [my emphasis]336  
 
The source for this law in its present form originated in somewhat unusual, and 
definitely distasteful, circumstances which arose in France in 1941 in the Second 
World War, during the occupation of the Country by Germany. The occupying 
German Army was obviously unpopular with the local communities, and in some 
instances attacks were made on German soldiers. On one particular occasion 
when some German soldiers were attacked in this way, the local French citizens 
ignored their plight and refused to come to the aid of the individual soldiers injured 
in the attack. One of the soldiers was a German Officer and as a reprisal for the 
failure of the citizens to help him, 50 hostages were taken and shot. As a 
consequence the French Vichy Government passed Article 223-6 into Law337. 
 
Despite this somewhat dubious history, the Article is now well and truly a part of 
French Criminal Law, and acts as a helpful encouragement to rescue action (or a 
deterrent to inaction) in typical rescue situations. The current Article contains four 
operative elements: 
 
                                           
336  French Penal Code Article 223-6 
337  Tunc A, ‘The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan’ in The Good Samaritan and the Law 
Ed. J Ratcliffe, (Gloucester Mass, Doubleday & Co 1981) 
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a) knowledge that a fellow citizen is in distress 
b) an ability to rescue that citizen 
c) absence of risk to the rescuer 
d) a wilful failure to provide assistance 
 
In effect these elements characterise the French legal duty to rescue as being 
limited to ‘Easy Rescues’, and this echoes the preferred format in other jurisdictions 
which have duty to rescue laws i.e. some states in the USA (Vermont, Minnesota, 
Rhode Island), Quebec in Canada, and the Northern Territory in Australia. 
 
The French approach of limiting the duty to rescue, to easy rescues clearly reflects 
the philosophical debate referred to earlier in this work, that if a positive duty is to 
be imposed on a bystander the level of that duty should not be excessive given 
that when judging would-be Good Samaritans we are firmly in the territory of moral 
dilemmas, and given that being present at an emergency situation generally only 
arises due to Bad Luck, then Moral Luck is also a factor. Where Morality and Luck 
intercept it can be viewed as unreasonable to apply too high a level of affirmative 
action, and perhaps it is in recognition of these aspects that French Law is satisfied 
if the bystander simply “initiates rescue operations” i.e. summons the emergency 
services. 
 
5.5.2  French Law in Terms of Protecting Good Samaritans 
The position in French Law in terms of the liability and protection of Good 
Samaritans, is also entirely clear, being set out explicitly in Statute. 
In the first instance, the basic French Law in terms of the tort of Negligence is set 
out in Article 1382 of the Civil Code which, translated, states: 
“Any act which causes harm obliges the one whose fault caused the harm to make 
reparation for it”338. 
                                           
338 French Civil Code, Article 1382  
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At first this looks unhelpful for the Good Samaritan, in that if in attempting to save 
someone from danger, the attempt actually causes additional harm then the 
Rescuer could be pursued for that additional harm. By way of an example, if 
someone appears to have lost consciousness from drowning, and a rescuer 
performs CPR (Cardiovascular Pulmonary Resuscitation) to try and save them, 
then if in doing this, they crack the unconscious person’s rib, then under the basic 
French Law they could be sued for that rib injury, regardless of the fact that they 
actually saved the individual’s life. 
 
However, the position is not so bleak, given that French Law also enshrines the 
principle of “Etat de Necessite” (Status of Necessity), as set out in the Criminal 
Code: 
“A person is not criminally liable if confronted with a present or imminent danger to 
himself, another person, or property, he performs an act necessary to ensure the 
safety of the person or property, except where the means used are 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the threat”339. 
 
Whilst this article of the French Code specifically covers Criminal Liability, it has 
since, 1894 been fully applied to Civil Liability, as defined in essential case law340. 
 
The protection provided by the Status of Necessity has four elements: 
 
 Imminent Danger (to a person himself, or to a third part, or to property) 
 Performance of an Act 
 Necessary to ensure the Safety of a person or property 
 Proportionate to the seriousness of the threat 
 
These elements are relatively straightforward, and the first clearly limits the 
protection to a major incident; the second and third elements are routine, and the 
fourth point about proportionality is really a question regarding the standard of care 
                                           
339 French Penal code, Article 122-7 
340 Cass. Civ. 8 Janvier 1894 
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that the Good Samaritan must meet. As in most legal systems, the standard 
required is that of the reasonable ‘conscionable’ man – which in French Law is 
defined via the principle of the “bon pere de famillle” (or the good father of the 
family). Consequently, if the Good Samaritan performs a rescue with proper care 
and attention then he will be protected from suit. However, if he is reckless/ grossly 
negligent, the protection will not apply. 
 
5.5.3   French Law in Terms of Compensating Good Samaritans for any losses 
The position in French Law regarding compensating Good Samaritans is also very 
clear but relies on a concept common in Roman Law based jurisdictions (but 
virtually unknown in Common Law ones) i.e. the principle of “Actio Negotiorum 
Gestorum”, which can be traced back to Cicero around 70 BC341.                                      
 
The encyclopaedia definition of the term is “a person who intervenes without 
authority in the affairs of another, for the latter’s benefit, is entitled to claim 
reimbursement and indemnity”342. 
 
The principle has two parts and that which is of most interest for my work is 
described as the “actio negotiorum gestorum contraria” providing the right for an 
Intervener to recover reasonable reimbursement or compensation for expenses or 
losses (or injuries) incurred as a result of stepping in to assist the ‘Gestio’.    
 
This concept in French Law became enacted into Statute as the “Gestion d’affaires 
d’autrui” (Management of the Affairs of Another), being part of the Napoleonic Code 
at Article 1375: 
                                           
341 Cicero, ‘Topica XVII 66’ in Kortman J Altruism in Private Law: Liability for Nonfeasance 
and Negotiorum Gestio, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,2005) 
342 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online last accessed on 14/03/13.at 
 www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/408120/negotiorumgestio     
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“The Principal (“Maitre”) whose affairs have been well administered must perform 
the obligations which the Manager (“Gerant”) has contracted in his name, 
indemnify him for all personal obligations that he took upon himself, and reimburse 
him for all the useful and necessary expenses which he incurred”343 [my emphasis].  
 
5.5.4  Conclusions in relation to French Law   
It will be seen from the above that French Law provides all three forms of Good 
Samaritan law: the Penal Code imposes a duty to perform ‘Easy’ Rescues; the 
Civil Code provides protection from suit in appropriate cases; and the ‘gestion d’ 
affaires’ principle (enshrined in the Civil Code) allows rescuers to recover 
compensation for losses or injury in reasonable circumstances. 
 
5.6 The Law of Rescue in Germany 
The German Legal system is, like its French counterpart, based on Roman Law, 
and hence it too features all three of the ‘Standard’ Good Samaritan provisions. 
 
5.6.1 German Law in terms of a Duty to Rescue 
The obligation in German Law to go to the aid of a neighbour in distress is set out 
in Section 323(c) of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), the German Criminal Code: 
 
“he who fails to provide help in cases of disaster or imminent danger or distress, 
although this is necessary and reasonable under the circumstances, and especially 
without significant danger for himself, will be penalised with imprisonment of up to 
one year or a fine”344.      
 
 
As with the provision in French Law, this section is subject to a number of 
conditions i.e. there must be a disaster, or imminent danger/distress; the 
intervention must be necessary, the help required must be reasonable, and in 
                                           
343  Kortman J (2005) Altruism in Private Law: Liability for Nonfeasance and Negotiorum   
  Gestio, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) at 103   
344  German Criminal Code, Section 323 (c)  
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particular the intervener must be able to provide the assistance without significant 
risk to himself. 
 
5.6.2 German Law in terms of protecting Good Samaritans 
The protection of Good Samaritans in German Civil Law follows similar principles 
to that in French Law, and the concept of ‘State of Necessity’ also applies, but, in 
the form of the “Geschaftsfurung ohne Auftrag” i.e. the agent of necessity345. If a 
bystander goes to the aid of someone in distress, and is then sued by that person, 
then the concept of the agent of necessity will provide a defence to such a suit as 
confirmed in Section 680 of the Burgelishes Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German Civil 
Code:     
 
“If the voluntary Agent acts to ward off danger threatening the Principal, then the 
agent is only responsible for deliberate intent and gross negligence”346  
 
The stipulation that that the Agent should be responsible for any intentional harm 
caused to a Principal is simply a statement of the general tort liability to 
compensate others for damage caused to them. The reference to gross negligence 
in Section 680 follows the general approach adopted in most legal systems that 
have Good Samaritan laws i.e. ‘ordinary’ negligence whilst attempting a rescue will 
not be actionable, but fault in the nature of gross negligence will create legal 
liability.  
 
5.6.3 German Law in terms of Compensating Good Samaritans 
  
The term “Geschaftsfurung ohne Auftrag” also enshrines the Civil Law principle of 
‘Negotiorum Gestio in German Civil law.  The “Geschaftsfuhrer” is the ‘Gestio’ who 
intervenes to protect the affairs of the “Geschaftsherr”, and provided certain 
                                           
345   German Civil Code, Section 677  
346   German Civil Code, Section 680 
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conditions are met the intervener will be able to recover his expenses in providing 
assistance (and he/his Executor will be able to obtain compensation if he suffers 
injury/dies)347 . The conditions are the usual ones: 
 The Intervener must be a Volunteer i.e. he must be under no legal duty (e.g. 
 a contract) to act for the Principal (this excepts the Criminal Law duty to 
 attempt easy rescues348. 
 
 The intervention must have been carried out for the benefit of the Principal 
 
 The intervention must have been reasonable (as in French Law, this 
 requirement is ‘measured’ against the Roman Law principle of conduct 
 consistent with that of the “bonus pater familias” (the good father of the 
 family))349      
  
5.6.4    Conclusions as to Good Samaritan Law in Germany 
In almost the same way as applies in French Law, the position in Germany is 
relatively straightforward with all three aspects of Good Samaritan Law well 
defined. The legal duty to attempt ‘easy rescues’ is defined in the German Criminal 
Code; the protection of Rescuers from suit is defined in the German Civil Code; as 
is the basis of providing rescuers with reimbursement of expenses, or 
compensation for loses or injury.     
         
5.7 Summary of the incidence of Good Samaritan Laws in various 
 ‘Western’ Legal Jurisdictions 
As will be seen from the foregoing Sub-Sections, there is a widely varying practice 
around the jurisdictions analysed in this part of this work. The most comprehensive 
approach is adopted in France and Germany where, based on the Roman Law 
origins of their Legal Systems, all three of the generic Triumvirate of ‘Good 
Samaritan’ laws are present (and generally enshrined in Statute) i.e. (1) a law 
requiring citizens to attempt ‘easy rescues’; (2) a law protecting rescuers from suit 
                                           
347   German Civil Code, Section 683 
348   Op Cit, Note 343 at Page107 
349   Ibid, Page 49  
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(providing they are not grossly negligent); and (3) a law compensating rescuers for 
losses/ injuries. 
 
The position in the USA, Canada, and Australia is less comprehensive, with most 
of their ‘States’ only including Good Samaritan laws in their legal systems in terms 
of the last two elements of the Triumvirate i.e. providing protection from suit, and 
providing for compensation for loses/injuries. However, in each Jurisdiction, at 
least one State (and three in the USA) provides the full range of Good Samaritan 
laws, including the duty to attempt easy rescues.  The reasons for including the 
duty to rescue element differs in the USA/Australia, as compared to Canada. 
 
In the latter case, it is the Province of Quebec which includes the Duty to Rescue 
law (but this is not surprising given the Province’s French characteristics). In the 
former case each of the three States of the USA, and the one Territory of Australia, 
have enacted legislation as a result of the incidence or one or more heinous 
examples where citizens had simply stood by and watched when terrible omissions 
took place and where they could have intervened to help at no (or very little) risk 
to themselves.  
 
In terms of the fundamental questions considered in this thesis, these conclusions 
are instructive: in Civil Law jurisdictions there appears to be a complete willingness 
to combine both legal and moral elements into Laws which compel Easy Rescues 
(and provide Protections for Rescuers) with no philosophical imperative of 
maintaining a separation of the two. The information obtained in this Chapter also 
indicates that whilst Common Law systems are generally reluctant to follow suit, at 
least 3 such jurisdictions have, albeit in a relatively minor way, enacted Easy 
Rescue Laws. However, in all three Jurisdictions it is a very small minority of 
‘states’ which have taken this step (and generally only as a result of notorious 
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incidents of bystanders ignoring the plight of neighbours in distress). Having noted 
this, it remains the case that in the large majority of cases, the ‘states’ in the 
‘Western’ jurisdictions considered, have apparently left any sanctions for 
omitting to assist a neighbour in distress, as solely a moral one.  
 
Returning to England and Wales at this point, it is apposite to reiterate that there 
is a complete absence of any Statutory compunction to attempt an Easy Rescue 
(Statutory or otherwise), and no explicit Statutory exemptions exist in relation to 
the other two aspects of the Triumvirate of Good Samaritan Laws i.e. there is no 
Legislation providing rescuers with immunity from suit (albeit the new Social Action, 
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 – seeks to guide courts to adopt a lower duty 
of care in emergency situations), and there is no Legislation providing the right to 
compensation for losses/ injuries (although a common law right is well 
established). 
 
The reasons for the lack of Statutory prescription, may be suggested as being our 
long jurisprudence of preferring to keep a separation between Law and Morality, 
our long and complicated history of a Common-Law approach to the development 
of our legal system (which by and large maintains a distinction between Acts and 
Omissions), and in relation to Easy Rescues, the lack of any particularly notorious 
incident to prick the national conscience. It is also highly likely that with aspects of 
Luck playing such a pronounced role in Rescue Scenarios that, an instinctive 
recognition of Moral Luck, has meant that there is considerable reluctance to even 
apply moral sanctions for failures to Rescue, let alone legal ones. 
 
However, and as referred to earlier in this work, my three suggested types of Good 
Samaritan Law can be viewed as a hierarchy of influences which could encourage 
individuals to step forward to assist their neighbours in distress.  At the first level, 
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people may be more inclined to act as a Good Samaritan, if they understand that 
if they proceed to attempt a rescue, and in doing so they incur losses or injuries, 
then they will be compensated. 
 
At the next level, any reticence in coming forward as a Good Samaritan, might be 
overcome if a potential Rescuer feels safe in the knowledge that (Gross Negligence 
excepted) if they go to the aid of someone in distress, they will be protected from 
being sued, if the rescue proves unsuccessful. 
 
Finally, a legal obligation to attempt an easy rescue, could be considered as the 
most compelling reason for people to step up to the task when someone else is in 
danger.  
 
Given the failure of the English Legal System to enthusiastically embrace specific 
Good Samaritan Laws, it is not surprising that over the last 25 years or so there 
has been considerable Jurisprudential debate in England and Wales as to whether 
Legislation should be enacted in one or more of these categories. I will be looking 
at these aspects in the next Chapter of this Thesis.  
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6. Recent Initiatives on Liability for Omissions/ an English Good Samaritan Law 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this work, there has been a considerable 
degree of discussion within the upper echelons of legal debate in England and 
Wales regarding three particular aspects which have a direct bearing on my work: 
(a) The Creation of a Criminal Code, (b) Clarifying Criminal Responsibility for 
Omissions (which might include the Failure to Rescue), and (c) The emergence of 
a Compensation Culture and the need to reassure those who volunteer their 
assistance that they will generally be protected. 
 
6.1 The Creation of a Criminal code? 
Unlike many modern Legal Jurisdictions which have a fully Codified system of 
Criminal Law (a Criminal Code: such as in France or Germany), England and 
Wales has a mixed system i.e. some law enshrined in Statute, and some residing 
in the Common Law.  As an example, the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 
includes a wide range of offences, but not the crime of Murder, which still remains 
anchored in the Common law. 
 
The most recent attempt to fully codify the position was begun by the Law 
Commission in 1989, when they launched Law Commission Consultation Paper 
177 entitled “A Criminal code for England and Wales, with Draft Bill and 
Commentary attached”350. This paper proposed a wholesale revision of the 
Criminal Law, and following favourable reviews the Commission began to prepare 
more specific proposals in relation to particular areas of criminal law i.e. Homicide. 
The Law Commission’s formal Report in this respect was published in  
1993: “Legislating the Criminal Code, Offences Against the Person and General 
Principles”351. 
                                           
350  Law Commission No. 177 1989 
351  Law Commission No. 218 1993 
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Interestingly the ‘preamble’ to the Report set out some of the reasons why the law 
Commission had embarked on their ambitious task: 
 
“… [to replace] both the antique and obscure language and the irrational 
arrangement of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, with a set of simple 
offences expressed in modern and comprehensible terms”352             
 
 
“… A codifying Statute … plays a vital role in making the existing law clear, 
accessible, and easy for citizens to understand and use”353    
  
Unfortunately, the optimism around this time for such improvements in our Criminal 
law never came to fruition, and over 15 years later the Commission’s Annual 
Report was still expressing the hope that progress would be made i.e. the Report 
for 2008/9 stated (in relation to Offences Against the Person): 
 
“The Government has said that it plans to legislate on the … recommendations 
that it has accepted in principle when Parliamentary time allows”354. 
 
The lack of Parliamentary time was a continual excuse for delaying progress, but 
in reality it was also a lack of Parliamentary will that was behind this inertia. This 
became clear when the Commission’s Annual Report of 2009/10 rather closed the 
door on the general project when it stated: 
“The Government now takes the view that neither the Report, nor the 
Government’s own proposals based on the Report, can be enacted in their present 
form”355.  
 
6.2    Clarifying Criminal Responsibility for Omissions (e.g. Failure to Rescue) 
Although the Law Commission’s project to Codify the Criminal Law stalled, it drew 
attention to a wide range of aspects of the criminal law which were considered to 
                                           
352  Ibid, Paragraph 2.1  
353  Ibid, Paragraph 2.4 
354  Law Commission Annual Report 2008/9 at www.lawcom.gov.uk  last accessed 02/04/2013. 
355  Law Commission Annual Report 2009/10 at www.lawcom.gov.uk  last accessed 02/04/2013. 
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be overdue for review. A key aspect for the purposes of this Thesis was a 
consideration of clarifying the position in relation to criminal liability for Omissions. 
 
This debate was at its most heightened in 1989 when the original project began, 
and as referred to earlier in this work (at Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2.2) two particular 
legal commentators (Andrew Ashworth, and Glanville Williams) took up the debate 
in a somewhat contentious exchange of views 
 
It is not necessary to repeat here the detail of the debate between Ashworth and 
Williams, but in Summary the former tried to distinguish between a “Conventional 
View” which he ascribed to Williams (and under which the law should not generally 
impose liability for Omissions – unless a pre-existing duty is involved); and a 
“Social Responsibility View” which Ashworth favoured, (and which suggests that to 
be a good citizen and to share in Society’s privileges, the citizen should be 
prepared to assist their fellow citizens generally, particularly, in times of danger). 
 
Both writers rehearsed the arguments against expanding criminal liability for 
omissions i.e. that it would unduly intrude on personal autonomy if too many 
positive duties to act were imposed on citizens; it would be overly-paternalistic and 
interfere with self-determination; it would encourage a society of busy-bodies if we 
insisted on people Involving themselves in other individual’s lives; it would be 
impossible to define just how far someone would need to go to assist other 
individuals (i.e. would we need to give up all personal belongings and become 
missionaries); and with the proliferation of offences, it would make it nigh on 
impossible for the average citizen to know with sufficient certainty what the law  
demanded of him/her. Williams accepted that there should be no difference 
between an Act and an Omission to perform a duty (when each results in similar 
harmful consequences). However, he stated that he was not prepared to go further 
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than that, and hence would not support the general criminalisation of Omissions, 
i.e. he would not support going beyond imposing liability in pre-existing Duty 
situations. 
 
Interestingly both Ashworth and Williams viewed the obligation to attempt an Easy 
Rescue as a key pre-existing duty situation and recommended that an offence of 
this nature should be included in any new Criminal Code. 
 
Despite their views and those of many others, the eventual Law Commission 
Report did not propose a widespread criminalisation of Omissions to act, but did 
clarify a recommendation that from a linguistic point view it should not matter if 
certain offences were phrased in the positive (i.e. by reference to Acts) or in the 
negative (i.e. by reference to Omissions).  The actual words used in their Report, 
or more accurately in the Draft Bill accompanying the Report, stated: 
 
“For the purposes of an offence which consists wholly or in part of an omission, 
state of affairs or occurrence, reference in this Act to an “act” shall, where the 
context permits, be read as including references to the omission, state of affairs, 
or occurrence by reason of which a person may be guilty of the offence, and 
references to a person’s acting or doing an act shall be accrued accordingly.”356   
 
     
The Draft Bill also took up the point that Omissions should be criminalised where 
a pre-existing legal duty was involved i.e: 
“17. – (1) … a person causes a result which is an element of an offence when – 
(a) he does an act which makes more than a negligible contribution to its 
occurrence; or 
 
(b)  he omits to do an act which might prevent its occurrence and which he is under 
a duty to do according to the law relating to the offence”357 
 
However, whilst this might have been considered promising in relation to the 
possible creation of an offence of omitting to attempt an Easy Rescue, it can be 
                                           
356  Op Cit, Note 353 (Section 16) 
357   Ibid (Section 17) 
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seen from the preceding Sub-Section, that the Law Commission Report was 
eventually discarded.   
        
6.3      A Private Member’s Bill 
Given the lack of progress in the Criminal Law arena, and the fact that there was 
no likelihood of extending the scope of omissions liability (let alone for the specific 
case of Failure to Rescue), attention turned from this first limb of my Triumvirate of 
Good Samaritan Laws, to the second limb i.e. protecting would-be volunteers from 
Civil Liability if their intervention turned out unsuccessfully. 
 
The initial route followed was an attempt to pass a Private Member’s Bill in the 
House of Commons, and the opportunity arose when in early 2004, Julian Brazier 
MP came fourth in the Parliamentary Ballot for such Bills. The Bill was called the 
“Promotion of Volunteering” Bill358 and contained 5 main Sections: 
 
Section 1  Introductory 
Section 2 Requiring Courts to recognise the Special position of Volunteers 
Section 3 Clarifying Indemnity Insurance arrangements for such Volunteers  
Section 4 Simplifying Data Protection Obligations relating to Volunteering 
Section 5 An Immunity for Volunteers in relation to well-intentioned acts 
 
The key Section of relevance to this thesis was Section 5 which stated: 
“Any person who – 
 
(a) without payment or the expectation of payment, assists any other person, and 
(b) has reasonable grounds for believing that the other person is suffering or 
injured or faces imminent serious injury, 
 
shall not as a consequence of any action performed by him in good faith be liable 
at law for any harm caused to that person unless he intended to cause harm”359.      
 
                                           
358  “Promotion of Volunteering Bill” 2004, Hansard 27 February 2004, TSO 
359  Ibid 
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The Bill seemed to gain initial support from a wide cross-section of the House and 
proceeded to its Second Reading on 5th March 2004360. However, this was its high 
watermark and support waned such that when it was due for its Third Reading on 
16 July 2004 it was talked out of time. 
 
The failure of the Bill was ascribed to a plethora of problems raised by a wide 
variety of commentators. In particular the Bill was criticised for attempting to 
change too many aspects of Volunteering at one and the same time. Indeed, one 
particular senior lawyer assisting my Employers, St John Ambulance, argued that 
there would have been a much higher prospect of success if the Bill had simply 
focused on the Immunity provisions361.   
 
Professor Watson-Gandy actually proposed some specific wording for such 
Legislation but this was not adopted by the Government, nor any individual MP, 
and hence the prospect of progress via a Private Member’s Bill came to an abrupt 
halt. The likely reason for the lack of support of the Professor’s initiative was that 
his drafting was limited to proposing protection for just a particularly narrow 
category of Volunteers i.e. First Aiders trained to a specific level of competency362. 
 
6.4  An Inquiry into the Possible Emergence of a Compensation Culture  
The previous Sub-Section looked at one attempt to make progress within the Civil 
Law, but if this and earlier attempts did not make much headway they certainly 
kept the subject on the table and helped prompt a separate debate into the 
possibility that a Compensation Culture had taken hold in the UK (fuelled by the 
aggressive marketing of so called Accident Claim “Specialists”) 
 
                                           
360  “Promotion of Volunteering Bill” 2004, Hansard 5 March 2004, TSO 
361  Professor Mark Watson-Gandy, 30 April 2005, 13 Old Square, Lincoln’s Inn, London 
362  Ibid 
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The problem was seen as a rapidly increasing phenomenon, given the growing 
and wide perception that many members of the public were being discouraged 
from coming forward and attempting acts of Public ‘Goodspiritedness’, because 
our Society appeared to have embraced a Compensation Culture, whereby ‘No 
Win - No Fee’ litigation had become established, and whereby individual citizens 
were showing a willingness to sue their fellow citizens for any unfortunate event 
which occurred regardless of whether the defendant had acted in a morally 
praiseworthy manner or otherwise. Discussion of this problem continues in 
Government and in Parliament today and there is also evidence that the rise of 
such a Compensation Culture has had a ‘chilling’ effect on Volunteering, and the 
willingness of individuals to come forward and volunteer within Charities and 
elsewhere.     
 
The main impetus to the debate arose in an official context via the launch of an 
Inquiry by the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee in 2005 on the 
subject of the “Compensation Culture”363 
 
The Terms of Reference of the Inquiry referred to a number of questions including: 
 
a) Does the “compensation culture” exist? 
b) Is the notion of a “compensation culture” leading to unnecessary risk aversion? 
c) Should any changes be made to the current laws relating to negligence? 
 
The Inquiry also reviewed relevant draft Legislation being introduced by the 
Government of the day, and in particular the “Compensation Bill” which was 
progressing through the House of Lords at the time364. 
                                           
363 “Compensation Culture” Constitutional Affairs Committee 1st March 2006 TSO 
364 “Compensation Bill [Lords]” House of Lords, First Sitting 20 June 2006 TSO  
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The particular aspects of the Committee’s deliberations that I wish to consider 
under this heading relate to their investigation into the possible development of a 
culture of risk-aversion in England and Wales, and the subsequent enactment of 
the Compensation Act 2006 as a partial reaction to this. 
 
The Committee heard a considerable amount of evidence from a variety of sources 
indicating concerns that a Compensation Culture had established itself in England 
and Wales, and that this ‘Culture’ was leading to a wide range of agencies and 
individuals acting in a risk averse manner e.g. Local Authorities deciding not to 
place hanging baskets of flowers in their streets (due to the risk of things falling 
onto members of the public, who might then sue them)365; Schools deciding to ban 
children from playing ‘conkers’ in school playgrounds (due to the risk of a conker 
hitting a child, and their parents possible suing the school)366; Volunteer Groups 
deciding not to take young people on camping trips (due to the risk of parents suing 
them for minor injuries e.g. the case of the Girl Guides being sued when a girl 
suffered a minor burn when the sausage she was cooking over the campfire, fell 
onto her leg causing a small blemish!)367; Doctors hesitating to come forward when, 
say, a patient became unwell at a theatre; or members of the Public being reluctant 
to become volunteers (due to concerns that the people they help might sue them 
for potential harm or injury i.e. Scout Leaders fearful of being accused of Abuse; 
or First Aid volunteers fearing they could be sued in trying to help or rescue people 
in distress)368. 
 
                                           
365 “Compensation Culture” Vol II Constitutional Affairs Committee 1st March 2006, Ev 206  
366  Ibid, Ev. 186 
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Despite these specific examples, the Inquiry nevertheless took a considerable 
amount of evidence from various commentators relating to the potential impact of 
Contingency Fee Arrangements (CFAs) i.e. the No Win - No fee structure that was 
introduced into English Law in 1995 whereby Lawyers could offer to act for 
claimants ‘free of charge’ recovering their fees from the defendant if the case was 
successful (and covering the fees by insurance if the case was lost). Many 
commentators stated that the introduction of CFAs had encouraged members of 
the public to bring forward many more claims for what in a large number of cases 
were rather dubious ‘losses’. Indeed, one of the experts who provided testimony to 
the Committee (District Judge Michael Walker – on behalf of the Association of 
District Judges) quoted the experience of Knowsley District Council which in the 
five years following the introduction of CFAs saw personal injury claims against 
them (for tripping) rise from some 150 cases per year to over 1700369. 
 
However, much of the evidence indicated that it might not be CFAs themselves 
which were creating the increase in potential claims, but rather it was the spread 
of the new Claims Management Companies which were responsible for the rise, 
by capitalising on the situation (especially as the operation of the CFA system in 
practice had enabled some of these companies to recover ‘success’ fees equal to 
100% of the amount of the damages they were securing for their clients370). Indeed, 
there was evidence that in order to avoid incurring such large fees, a number of 
Insurance Companies were settling claims quickly and out of court at lower levels 
of fees, typically 12%, rather than risk losing much more expensive court cases371 
(this practice then itself exacerbating the problem).  These Claims Management 
Companies were developing a very poor reputation in terms of artificially inflating 
the incidence of personal injury claims and were being commonly referred to as 
                                           
369  Ibid, Ev. 6 
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371  Ibid, Ev. 19 
 216 
“Claims Farmers”372. In one case the Inquiry heard of a   Claims Company setting 
itself up in the reception area of a hospital to advertise its services to people as 
they attended hospital to have injuries attended to373. 
 
The Commentators also blamed ‘sensational’ Press Headlines for contributing to 
the problem i.e. headlines which drew attention to the fascinating facts of a case 
(because they were particularly outrageous), but which failed to follow the stories 
to their full conclusion, where in many instances the Claims were rejected by the 
Courts as being without merit374. 
 
This aspect of the Courts rejecting many of the more spurious types of claim raises 
a very interesting paradox i.e. despite the strong evidence to the contrary the public 
perception was vastly different, and there had been an undeniable concern (if not 
fear) that there now existed a real and pervasive compensation culture that put 
them at risk if they were to consider putting their ‘heads above the parapet’, and 
attempt any sort of discretional activity for the benefit of their fellow citizens (rather 
than simply ‘keep their head down’ and just look after themselves),  The strength 
of this paradox was highlighted in written evidence to the Inquiry which quoted both 
the, then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs citing the emergence of a compensation culture as blighting public 
perceptions375. 
                   
The testimony and written evidence provided to the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee was therefore often contradictory and inconsistent. It is not very 
surprising that the actual outcome of the Inquiry was generally inconclusive, and 
                                           
372  Ibid, Ev. 12 
373  Ibid, Ev.  3 
374  Ibid, Ev. 17 
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no major initiatives arose from the Committee’s Report, other than the successful 
passage of the Compensation Bill through Parliament (and even this was 
independent of the Inquiry i.e. the Inquiry itself actually concluded that the Bill was 
unnecessary and possibly even harmful!). The actual words of the Committee, in 
its Summary, were: 
“Finally …risk aversion is a concerning modern phenomenon that has an adverse 
effect on both individuals and the economy as a whole. Instead of a statutory 
provision restating the law of negligence what is required is a clear leadership by 
the Government. This should include an education programme making clear that 
risk management does not equate to the avoidance of all risk …”376.  
 
6.5 The Compensation Act 2006  
The Compensation Bill was introduced into Parliament in the House of Lords on 
27 March 2006 and contained three main proposals: the introduction of the concept 
of ‘Desirable Activity’ into the Law of Negligence, the Regulation of Claims 
Management Services, and a special provision to provide compensation for 
sufferers of Mesothelioma.  
 
For the purposes of this work, I intend to concentrate on the first part of the 
Legislation which deals with possibly amending the Law of Negligence, although it 
was also encouraging that Parliament wanted to introduce a system of Regulating 
Claims Management Companies. 
 
The Bill received its second reading on 8 June 2006 and the House of Lords took 
considerable time and a great deal of interest in the proposed wording of Part 1 
which read as follows: 
 
“1.  Deterrent effect of potential liability 
 
A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in 
determining whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a 
                                           
376 “Compensation Culture” Constitutional Affairs Committee 1st March 2006 TSO 
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standard of care (whether by taking precautions against a risk or otherwise), have 
regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might - 
 
(a) prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent or in 
a particular way, or  
 
(b) discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable 
activity.”377    
 
 
The idea behind the introduction of the concept of ‘Desirable Activity’ was to modify 
the Courts’ approach to applying an appropriate standard of care towards 
defendants who are pursued for alleged negligence.  
 
As an example of how the concept was envisaged to work it is instructive to take a 
scenario of, say, a Girl Guide leader interested in taking some Guides on a 
camping trip. There is no doubt that the idea of taking a group of young girls on 
such an activity includes a number of risks, but there is also no doubt that doing so 
would broaden their experience, confidence, and horizons (which would clearly be 
‘desirable’). The Guide Leader would wish to carry out a risk assessment, and then 
carry out reasonable steps to reduce such risks to an acceptable level. 
Nevertheless, the only way the Leader could actually reduce the risks involved to 
Nil would be to actually cancel the trip entirely.   
 
However, cancelling such a trip in order to reduce risk to zero would have a very 
unfortunate outcome, and if everyone thought in this way, then we would wrap 
young people up in cotton wool and restrict them to living in padded rooms, to 
prevent them from coming to any possible harm. But in doing this we would create 
introverted, ‘stay at home’ individuals, scared of their own shadows, and with no 
confidence to make their own way in the world. This idea was articulated very well 
by Professor Heinz Woolf, who was quoted in the evidence provided to the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee Inquiry (described in the last sub-section) as 
                                           
377 The Compensation Act 2006 Ch 29, Part , TSO 
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saying that in addition to needing the normal vitamins for healthy growth, young 
people also need “Vitamin  R” or “Vitamin Risk”378.  
 
In order to address these sorts of issues the Legislation was drafted to provide 
Courts with a revised test for negligence in such a situation, so that Judges would 
ensure that an appropriate standard of care was applied in cases before them. If it 
was suggested to a Court that too-higher standard should have been applied (such 
that the event involved would have been cancelled entirely) then it would be open 
to the court to conclude that this was a caution too far, and disproportionate, or (if 
you will) undesirable.          
 
The various aspects of the Bill were discussed in great detail during the second 
reading, and on the particular aspects of Part 1 the major criticism of the drafting 
was in relation to the perceived difficulties of adequately defining the concept of 
“Desirable Activities, and the risk that by introducing a new ‘measure’ into the law 
of negligence, this would simply spurn a whole new category of satellite litigation 
focussed on just what is, and what is not desirable. 
 
Definitions of ‘Desirable Activity’ suggested during the debate in the House, 
included recognition that there should be an element of “Public Good”379. It was 
also suggested that the term should involve “taking account of the wider social 
value of activities. The Emergency Services are a good example of that”380.  
 
Digressing a moment, I was particularly interested in this suggestion when it was 
raised in the House of Lords, as I saw Emergency Services as also including 
Volunteer response organisations such as my employer St John Ambulance. I 
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therefore personally submitted evidence to the Constitutional Affairs Committee on 
behalf of St John Ambulance when the Committee was reviewing the Bill. The 
suggestion I made was that in order to address concerns regarding the need for a 
suitable definition of desirable activities, the Legislation should include a Non- 
Exhaustive list of examples, one of which should cover First Aiders going to the 
rescue of people in distress381.      
 
Another major criticism of the Bill was that it would confuse the present legal 
position, especially since a very similar concept had already (and quite recently) 
been established as an integral part of the Common Law through the judgement of 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in the case of Tomlin v Congleton 
Borough Council (2003)382. In this case, which was another of the ’shallow diving’ 
variety, Lord Hoffman stated that: 
 
 “the question of what amounts to ‘such care as in all the circumstances of the case 
is reasonable’ depends on assessing, as in the case of common law negligence, 
not only the likelihood that someone may be injured, and the seriousness of the 
injury which may occur, but also the social value [my emphasis]) of the activity 
which gives rise to the risk, and the cost of preventative measures”383.  
 
One of the other Law Lords who decided the Tomlin case was Lord Hobhouse, and 
part of his Judgement was specifically quoted in the debate on the Compensation 
Bill: 
“[It should never be] the policy of the law to require the protection of the foolhardy 
or reckless few to deprive, or interfere with, the enjoyment by the remainder of 
society of the liberties and amenities to which they are rightly entitled. Does the 
law require that all the trees be cut down because some youths may climb them 
and fall? Does the law require the coastline and other beauty spots to be lined with 
warning notices? ... The pursuit of an unrestrained culture of blame and 
compensation has many evil consequences, one of which is certainly the 
interference with the liberty of the citizen”384. 
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The concern expressed during the Parliamentary debate was that the law was 
already sufficiently clear, and that in deciding whether a standard of care had been 
breached it was now necessary to also consider the “Social Value” of the activity 
involved. By trying to introduce another new, duplicatory and nebulous concept of 
“Desirable Activity” into the law, the Bill would not clarify the situation but actually 
confuse it. 
 
Despite considerable reservations raised regarding Part 1 of the Compensation 
Bill, the Act reached the Statute Book on 25 July 2006 and it was expected that the 
success or otherwise of its introduction would be measured via the subsequent 
cases decided by the Courts. 
 
However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the Act did not lead to any clarification of 
the law, and a review on the impact of the legislation was carried out by Mr Toby 
Gee, a law of negligence barrister who published a paper on the subject in 
November 2010385 which concluded that there had only been one case in which 
the terms of the Act had been considered, in the 5 years or so since its inception. 
This was the case of Robert Lee Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Ltd (2010)386, 
another shallow diving case, where in reaching his decision Field J stated: 
 
“It [is] common ground that in the context of this case, Part 1 of the Compensation 
Act 2006 adds nothing to the common law”387. 
 
 
This was an unfortunate outcome for the supporters of the Compensation Act, and 
it seems that the Judiciary did not see it adding value to their work in deciding on 
negligence cases (preferring the “Social Value” approach of Lord Hoffman in the 
Tomlin case). It was therefore apparent that part 1 of the Compensation Act was 
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‘stillborn’. Any hope that it would make the law clearer for the average citizen had 
been overly optimistic, and it therefore did little to dispel the commonly held 
perception that if a member of the public ‘steps up to the plate’ and performs a 
well-intended intervention for Society, there is a very real risk they will be sued if 
the result is less than perfect. It was clear that a much more explicit Good 
Samaritan Law was required. 
 
6.6      Common Sense, Common Safety 
Given the lacklustre impact of the Compensation Act 2006, or perhaps because of 
it, the Prime Minister, David Cameron decided to commission a report on the 
seemingly relentless growth of a risk averse Society and unbridled litigation. Mr 
Cameron asked Lord Young of Graffham to produce the report and in his letter 
commissioning it he stated: 
 
“A damaging compensation culture has arisen, as if people can absolve 
themselves from any personal responsibility for their own actions, with the spectre 
of lawyers all too willing to pounce with a claim for damages on the slightest pretext 
…We’re going to put a stop to senseless rules that get in the way of volunteering, 
stop adults from helping out with other people’s children, and penalise our Police 
and Fire services for acts of bravery”388. 
 
Lord Young himself expanded these sentiments in his foreword to the Report and 
stated: 
“I believe that a Compensation Culture driven by litigation is at the heart of the 
problem … last year over 800,000 compensation claims were made in the UK”389           
 
He summarised his findings in his report by referring to two distinct issues: an over-
zealous application of aspects of Health and Safety in the Workplace; and an over-
exaggerated fear of litigation amongst Society generally, which was having an 
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adverse effect in respect of: “schools and fetes, voluntary work, and everyday 
sports and cultural activities”390. 
 
The Report made 12 specific Recommendations ranging from: reducing 
unnecessary Health and Safety requirements; to specifying minimum qualifications 
for Risk Assessment consultants; to simplifying Civil Litigation; and also “to clarify 
(through Legislation if necessary) that people will not be held liable for any 
consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their part”391. 
 
Clearly this last mentioned recommendation is the one which is most germane to 
my project, and it is interesting that the detailed section of the report on this subject 
is entitled: “Good Samaritan Clause”. The Section includes the statement: 
 
“One of the great misconceptions, often perpetuated by the media is that we can 
be liable for the consequences of any voluntary acts on our part. During winter 
2009/10 advice was given on television and radio to householders not to clear the 
snow in front of their properties in case any passerby would fall and then sue. This 
is another manifestation of the fear of litigation. In fact there is no liability in the 
normal way, and the Lord Chief Justice himself is reported as saying that he had 
never come across a case where someone was sued in such circumstances”392. 
 
Lord Young concluded his remarks under this heading by saying: 
 
“It is important to have clarity around this issue and at some point in the future we 
should legislate to achieve this if we cannot ensure by other means that people are 
aware of their legal position when undertaking such acts …There is no Liability in 
such cases unless Negligence can be proved”393 [given the experience in many of 
the other Western jurisdictions which have Good Samaritan Acts, I would suggest 
that Lord Young’s reference to simply “Negligence, should have been to “Gross 
Negligence]”. 
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In order to try to give impetus to his report Lord Young agreed to oversee the 
implementation of its recommendations, and he also set out an outline timetable in 
the Annex of the report394.  
 
This seemed very promising but unfortunately, shortly after the publication of the 
Report, Lord Young made some ill-advised remarks about the economic recession 
afflicting the UK at the time, and despite the major hardships facing the large 
majority of the population, he stated that: “Most Britons have never had it so Good”. 
These comments were considered politically naïve, and in order to prevent 
prolonged embarrassment to the Government, Lord Young promptly resigned. 
Regretfully the momentum of the Report on “Common Sense, Common Safety” 
largely went with him! 
 
6.7   The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 
Fortunately, the impetus to try to reassure the Public was not lost entirely, and in 
the Autumn of 2014 the Ministry of Justice commenced a number of consultations 
in advance of bringing forward a new Bill to try to clarify the legal position. 
Consequently, the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill was introduced 
into Parliament by the Ministry of Justice on 10 November 2014   
 
The Bill was very concise and sought to clarify the law of negligence by indicating 
that when the Courts assess the Duty of Care to be applied in any particular case, 
they must include an assessment as to the degree to which the defendant was 
acting in a public-spirited manner. The Bill quoted three particular types of public 
spiritedness: ‘Social Action’, ‘Responsibility’ and ‘Heroism’ (gaining the mnemonic 
SARAH): 
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Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill 
  
1 When this Act applies 
 
 This Act applies when a court, in considering a claim that a person was 
 negligent or in breach of statutory duty, is determining the steps that the 
 person was required to take to meet a standard of care. 
 
2 Social Action 
 
 The court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach 
 of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of 
 society or any of its members.  
 
3 Responsibility 
 
 The court must have regard to whether the person, in carrying out the 
 activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of 
 statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach 
 towards protecting the safety or other interests of others. 
 
4 Heroism 
 
 The court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach 
 of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by 
 intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger, and without 
 regard to the person’s own safety or other interests”395. 
 
 
For the purposes of my thesis, the aspect of Heroism was of prime interest, and it 
was quite clear that the actions of First Aiders going to the rescue of individuals in 
distress were an integral part of this category. This was endorsed by the fact that 
St John Ambulance (my employer) was invited at an early stage to input advice 
and comments to the Ministry (this was, in part a result of my previous contributions 
to the development of the earlier Compensation Act and subsequent discussions). 
 
A number of objections were raised at the various readings of the Bill, both in the 
House of Commons and in the House of Lords (where most of the debate took 
place). In particular it was asserted that the Legislation would not change the Law, 
but would simply require the courts to weigh up all the factors which should be 
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borne in mind in reaching their decision – a duty which already applied. However, 
evidence submitted by St John Ambulance (based on research with the public) 
indicated that there was still a significant perception that individuals could be sued 
if they attempted to help in Emergencies and something went wrong396. In 
particular nearly half of those surveyed (49%) in one part of the country cited this 
threat as the main reason they were hesitant to become a volunteer First Aiders 
(elsewhere the main reason dictating whether someone would become a first–
aider was if they had received First Aid training and whether they felt confident in 
using these skills – their level of confidence being influenced by a number of 
factors, including the fear of legal repercussions) 
 
Other concerns were expressed in relation to Clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill and the 
worry that they might be used by unscrupulous Employers to avoid duties towards 
their workers. This element of the Bill was not germane to this thesis, but in any 
event sufficient reassurances were provided by the Government to ensure that 
these objections did not interrupt progress.  
 
Returning to Clause 4 regarding Heroism, I and St John Ambulance had a major 
concern with the last eleven words of the Section: “, and without regard to the 
person’s own safety or other interests”. The problem with the words was that St 
John Ambulance First Aid Training makes it clear that Individuals should not 
generally respond in an emergency without carrying out an appropriate risk 
assessment. The words in the Bill were therefore unacceptable to the Charity and 
submissions were made to the Minister’s team to have them removed.  
 
These submissions were considered very seriously and the Author and colleagues 
(including a representative of the British Red Cross Society) were invited to a 
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meeting by the Minister of State for Justice, Lord Faulks (who was steering the Bill 
through the House of Lords) to discuss the matter. Our views were accepted by 
the Ministry and an Amendment to remove the words was approved at the House 
of Lords Committee Stage where Lord Faulks stated: 
 
“The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, supported by the noble and 
learned Lord Hope have proposed in Amendment 10 to remove the final words of 
the Clause [Clause 4] which refer to acting “without regard to the person’s own 
safety or other interests”. I am grateful to them for tabling this amendment because 
we have been considering this issue carefully following correspondence received 
from St John Ambulance…If its misgivings can be allayed through the omission of 
the words in question, that is certainly something we would be willing to consider 
…”397. 
 
The relevant amendments to the Bill at that stage were then Approved. 
 
The passage of the Bill was thereafter relatively straightforward and it was passed 
by the House of Commons on 2 February 2015, with Justice Secretary, Chris 
Grayling (Lord Chancellor), stating as part of his summary that: 
 
“We debated a proposed amendment that emanated from St John Ambulance 
[deleting the last 11 words of the original Clause] ... I did as I undertook to do and 
went away and thought carefully about the measure. I listened to debates in the 
Lords and decided there was no reason not to accept the St John Ambulance 
recommendation …”398 
 
 
The new Act received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015, and came into force on 
13 April 2015. It now remains to see whether it will have the desired effect in setting 
aside the strong public perception that Rescuers who step forward to assist citizens 
in distress, are in danger of being sued if despite their best efforts the rescue is not 
successful. 
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Whilst the author was very pleased with the outcome of the passing of the SARAH 
Act, it must still be said that it is unlikely to be the most effective way to reassure 
potential rescuers that (other than in cases of gross negligence) they will not be 
sued in Rescue situations. The preferred approach would still be for explicit 
Legislation to be passed which specifically exempts liability (i.e. along the same 
lines as is provided in all the other Western Jurisdictions which I considered in 
Chapter 5 above).  
 
6.8       Conclusions in Relation to Recent Initiatives to amend English Law 
Although there have been regular initiatives in relation to the possible introduction 
of a comprehensive suite of Good Samaritan Laws in England and Wales over the 
last 25 years or so, there has actually been little practical progress in this field. 
 
An attempt to introduce a Statutory Criminal Code, to include an extended criminal 
liability for Omissions (and including the failure to attempt an easy rescue) 
eventually failed due to the lack of Parliamentary time, and interest. 
 
Despite this, two particular legal commentators (Andrew Ashworth and Glanville 
Williams) tried to resurrect the movement to extend numerous aspects of the 
existing Criminal Law from simply covering positive actions, to additionally cover 
some specific omissions (again making particular reference to the Failure to 
Rescue within their ambit). These two commentators recommended that the failure 
to rescue should be an integral part of the Law Commission Report No. 17, but 
again due to the lack of political will, most of the Report’s major recommendations 
(include a legal duty to rescue) never came to fruition. 
 
Given the failure to make progress in the Criminal Law sphere, interest seemed to 
turn to the problems that appeared to have surfaced in the Civil Law arena. In the 
 229 
first instance this took the form of the introduction of a Private Member’s Bill, but 
this was unsuccessful, due predominantly because it was too ambitious and too 
wide-ranging. The second initiative attracted more interest and focussed on an 
investigation into the rise of the so-called “Compensation Culture”. This was 
particularly considered by the Parliamentary Constitutional Affairs Committee 
which investigated the matter and published their conclusions in March 2006. 
Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the Committee did not conclude 
that such a culture had emerged (mainly on the basis that the actual number of 
cases before the courts had actually reduced over the period covered by the 
Inquiry’s research). This conclusion failed however to consider cases settled out of 
court and most importantly it gave little credence to the fact that perceptions are 
sometimes more important than reported facts, and that the British Public had 
definitely perceived the emergence of a Compensation Culture. 
 
Although the Committee’s Report into a possible compensation culture decided 
that the Compensation Act 2006 was unnecessary, the Legislation actually 
proceeded. However, the recourse to a new embryonic legal concept of a 
“Desirable Activity” seemed somewhat ‘stillborn, and given the lack of enthusiasm 
of both Legal commentators generally, and more importantly the Courts and 
Judges in particular, the Legislation led to little if no improvement, and it certainly 
had little effect in terms of clarifying the law for the general public. 
 
The situation moved on and in 2010 the Establishment seemed to have accepted 
that the’ Compensation Culture’ was very real, and very debilitating, and a 
promising Report was produced by Lord Young of Graffham which foreshadowed 
the possible introduction of a specific Good Samaritan Act to make the liability 
position clearer to would-be volunteers. Unfortunately, this initiative generally lost 
momentum alongside Lord Young’s resignation from Government.    
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All was not lost however and Lord Young’s report was resurrected in the Ministry 
of Justice in 2014, and subsequently on 12 February 2015 the Social Action, 
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 became law. Whilst this is generally 
welcome, it could be said that the approach adopted in the Act is again too obscure 
in that it does not explicitly exempt Good Samaritans from legal liability. Instead it 
attempts to provide reassurance by making it a requirement that the Courts must 
bear in mind the public spirited intention of the individual when deciding liability. 
 
This is not ideal but is the best result achievable in the current political climate, and 
reflects the prevailing theme in the English Legal System which is generally 
reluctant to introduce Laws in situations where Moral Censure or Moral Conscience 
would appear to cover the situation. However, I maintain that in order to dispel the 
negative perceptions that have arisen as a resultant of the emergence of a 
Compensation Culture, it is essential for a more explicit Good Samaritan law is put 
in place to encourage more volunteer rescuers to step forward. A strong 
recommendation to this effect therefore emerges when I provide the Conclusion to 
my work in the next, and final, Chapter of this thesis. 
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7. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendation 
 
7.1 Review of Chapters 1-6 
I began Chapter 1 by explaining that I am the General Counsel and Company 
Secretary of the St John Ambulance charity, which has some 40,000 volunteers, 
who work tirelessly to provide an emergency First Aid service to the public. They 
do this 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and come across situations which range 
from requiring minimum intervention to full scale Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation, 
where lives are literally saved. 
 
Despite these public-spirited intentions, First Aid intervention can sometimes be 
unsuccessful, and it is not unknown for the charity and the volunteers to be pursued 
for negligence where the outcome is adverse. These First Aiders are clearly Good 
Samaritans, and I wanted to investigate the problem of Good Samaritans being 
inappropriately sued. I also wanted to consider the legal position more fully, and 
given that First Aiders are also a category of Rescuer, I wanted additionally to 
investigate the degree to which Rescuers may be considered to have a Duty to go 
to the aid of citizens in distress. 
 
St John Ambulance First Aiders are not the only type of volunteers who are 
concerned that when they provide services in the community they may be laying 
themselves open to the threat of being sued. In my Introduction I also drew 
attention to the ‘chilling’ effect that inappropriate litigation against volunteers was 
having on new volunteers coming forward for recruitment in all areas of public 
service, and on the retention of existing volunteers (indeed from Footnote 10, I 
quoted a statement from the Deputy Chief Executive of Volunteering England who 
suggested that up to 1 million individuals may have been considering giving up 
volunteering because of the fear that they may be litigated against). I also 
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commented that this concern cannot be ‘calibrated’ by looking at the actual number 
of legal claims made against volunteers, since - as is the case in many other walks 
of life – it is perceptions that are more damaging than reality. 
 
I introduced the concept of Moral Luck into my thesis, as this was the unique and 
intriguing factor that caused me to look at the Good Samaritan problem in a novel 
way (especially as my Literature Review had indicated that no one else appeared 
to have juxtaposed these two ideas). Moral Luck was first posited as a concept by 
Bernard Williams in 1967 when he suggested that it was not possible to pre-judge 
the morality of any given decision, until the outcome of that decision was fully 
known (with many outcomes being prone to Luck in various ways) Thomas Nagel 
took the concept of Moral Luck further and subdivided it into four categories: 
Constitutive Luck (the type of person you are); Circumstantial Luck (the kind of 
situations you face); Causative Luck (the chain of events that has occurred); and 
Outcome Luck (the way things turn out). 
 
It appeared to me that Volunteer First Aiders are affected by all these types of 
Luck, which then impinge upon their decisions to go to the aid of people in distress, 
and upon the moral framework within which Society will judge their actions. In a 
Rescue situation where someone has been injured (usually emergency situations) 
it is a matter of luck whether the volunteer is a ‘brave’ person who is prepared to 
intervene (Constitutive Luck); it is a matter of luck if they happen to be present at 
that place at that time on that date (Circumstantial Luck), it is a matter of luck that 
a series of particular events have conspired to cause the emergency (Causative 
Luck); and it may be a matter of luck as to whether the volunteer’s efforts are 
successful i.e. if the victim survives and if they do, whether s/he emerges with 
debilitative brain damage (Luck in Outcomes). 
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It is the scope for all these types of luck to occur, in an emergency situation, which 
led me to suggest that any evaluation of the volunteer’s behaviour, whether morally 
or legally, is highly susceptible to the effects of luck, and must recognise that the 
volunteer will not be in full control of events. A moral or legal judgement as to 
whether they should have intervened (or whether they should simply have ignored 
the victim’s plight - like the Priest and the Levite who walked by on the other side 
in the Parable of the Good Samaritan) is influenced substantially by factors of luck.  
 
It seemed to me that if, despite the heavy influence that Luck can play on the 
motives, circumstances and outcomes involved, the Volunteer nonetheless steps 
forward to help, then the least the Law can do is to protect them from being sued 
if things inadvertently go wrong, and provide them with compensation if they are 
injured/suffer loss.    
 
There then remained the other aspects of Moral Luck in Rescue situations and I 
was also keen to investigate further whether these might mitigate towards or 
against the creation of a Legal Duty to Rescue (especially in situations of ‘Easy’ 
Rescue), or whether as is the case in English law (but not in many other Western 
Jurisdictions) any obligation to attempt a Rescue should be left to moral 
considerations rather than legal ones. 
 
Having taken a cursory look as to how Rescue laws had been developed in other 
Jurisdictions, I put forward in the second part of Chapter 1, a hypothesis as to how 
such matters might be translated into English Law. I did this by proposing a draft 
Good Samaritan Act (which is reproduced again here, on the following page): 
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Hypothetical Good Samaritan Act 
 
Section 1. Duty to Attempt an Easy Rescue  
Subject to no unreasonable risk to themselves, anyone who fails to attempt the 
Rescue of another person in an Emergency, shall be guilty of an offence 
punishable by a fine not exceeding level [2]* on the Standard Scale. 
 
Section 2. Protection of Volunteer Rescuers 
Any Volunteer who attempts to Rescue another person in an Emergency, shall not 
be liable for any loss or harm so arising provided they have acted reasonably and 
without Gross Negligence. 
 
Section 3. Compensation for Volunteer Rescuers   
Any Volunteer who, acting reasonably, attempts to Rescue another person in an 
Emergency, and who suffers harm or loss, shall be entitled to Compensation. 
 
 
Interpretation 
“Emergency” means an unexpected and/or uncontrolled situation which involves 
danger or serious harm to human life.  
  
“Rescue” means a response to an immediate emergency, whereby a human 
being is saved (or might be saved) from the danger of loss of life or serious harm. 
Such response includes, as a minimum, the summoning of the Statutory 
Emergency Services, where the Rescuer has a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
   
“Volunteer” means an individual who acts without expectation of payment or 
other remuneration. 
 
* Level 2 on the date of drafting this specimen Act was £500.      
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This hypothesis could be seen as an ‘ideal’ solution, but it soon became very clear 
from my further researches (described in the Chapters 2 to 6) that there were 
competing considerations which were likely to make the adoption of statutory Good 
Samaritan laws in England and Wales very challenging.  
 
In Chapter 2 of my work I investigated the two competing theoretical constructs of 
Natural Law, and Positive Law (the former advocating that Law is just there and 
reflects the inherent morality of the Society involved; the latter advocating that Law 
is just the Legal Rules and Principles posited by that particular Society and nothing 
more). Positivists generally prefer a position whereby there is no necessary 
connection between Law and Morality. A consequence is that some legal systems 
might be more inclined to include laws relating to Rescue as either Legal (and 
possibly Statutory) in nature, or alternatively matters solely for the Moral sphere.  
 
In taking this aspect of my research forward, I traced the views of the prominent 
philosophers on both sides of the argument and conclude by adopting the 
philosophy of Herbert Hart, I did this because I was convinced by his rationale that 
a legal system has more credibility if Law and Morality are separate. If the Legal 
System is a combination of both the Legal and the Moral, then it is not possible to 
make independent moral criticisms of its content i.e. if the most immoral conduct 
is incorporated in and condoned by the Law e.g. the persecution of Jews in Nazi 
Germany, then it cannot be (internally) challenged. By keeping Law and Morality 
separate, the opportunity to express Morale criticism of the Law is more effectively 
preserved. 
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Chapter 3 of my work covered the seminal part of my research and investigated, 
in detail, the concept of ‘Moral Luck’ and its influence on the arguments advanced 
for Good Samaritan Laws (particularly on the possibilities of imposing legal duties 
to Rescue; and on providing legal protections for Rescuers who go to the aid of 
strangers, and run the risk of being sued if things turn out adversely). 
 
Sub-Section 3.1 introduced the ‘Paradox of Moral Luck’ and cited Bernard 
Williams’ book of similar title. Williams reiterated some of the ideas of earlier 
philosophers (especially Locke and Mill) that for human beings to live lives worth 
living they need to be autonomous, with control over their own destiny. They should 
therefore only be held responsible (either legally or morally) for circumstances 
within their control.  However, he also realised that Luck plays a significant part in 
all our lives, and that the vagaries of Luck often mean that we cannot fully control 
what happens to us. For Williams this is the Paradox of Moral Luck: the idea of 
Luck, or Fate, or the Gods, determining our lives stretching right back to the 
classical Greek philosophers, as fully discussed by Martha Nussbaum in 1986. 
 
The idea that we are all responsible for what happens to us regardless of whether 
Luck interferes in our lives is disturbing, and one philosopher in particular, 
Immanuel Kant, insisted that the moral evaluation of our actions should be immune 
to luck. He did this by emphasising “Good Will” as his categorical imperative, which 
could transcend all the brickbats that Luck can throw at us.  
 
Williams did not accept this and used a Gauguin-like figure to demonstrate that 
even the moral judgement of a person is subject to luck. He suggested that if a 
budding artist deserts his wife and family and sails to the South Pacific to fulfil his 
artistic promise, it is not possible to morally evaluate his decision until the outcome  
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of his emigration is known. If he becomes a phenomenal artist whose works bring 
pleasure to millions then this could be judged to outweigh the suffering brought to 
his wife and children, from their desertion. However, the question of whether he 
becomes a successful artist is subject to a high degree of luck (not least that he is 
not lost at sea sailing around the Cape). Williams described this as outcome luck, 
or luck in the way things turn out, and was satisfied that outcome luck 
fundamentally affects the moral assessment of the individual involved. 
 
Thomas Nagel took the idea of Moral Luck further and indicated that Williams’ 
Outcome Luck was only one of the ways in which Luck can impact on the Moral 
evaluation of human conduct. Nagel put forward four categories where luck will 
play a part: Consequential Luck (i.e. Williams’ principle of the way things turn out); 
Constitutive luck (i.e. in the way a person’s nature has been formed); 
Circumstantial Luck (i.e. the situations we find ourselves in); and Causative Luck 
(i.e. in the way we are involved in the series of events which cause an outcome). 
 
Nagel provided various examples of how luck interferes with human conduct in 
these various ways, and reached the unnerving conclusion that in reality we are 
unavoidably prone to luck, and that this is very difficult to reconcile with our wish to 
be responsible for our own lives and actions. He concluded his work with the 
challenging admission that he did not have an answer to the problem. 
 
I decided to pursue Moral Luck further and investigate how various subsequent 
writers had attempted to solve the Paradox.  
 
I looked further at the work of Martha Nussbaum, and her conclusions that Moral 
Luck definitely exists and that to a large degree we just have to accept what luck 
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throws at us and make the best of it. The alternative of living in a sterile ’bubble’ to 
make sure we are immune to luck is just as, if not more, unpalatable. 
 
I looked at the work of various writers who sought to dispel the idea of Moral Luck, 
but found that in most cases their arguments were somewhat circular and simply 
replaced ‘Moral Luck’ with alternative Luck definitions. In the case of Judith Andre 
she introduced ‘Character Luck’, Norvin Richards, ‘Desert Luck’, Brian Rosebury, 
‘Epistemic Luck’, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Blame Luck. I also looked at an 
article by Nicholas Rescher who seemed to accept that luck plays a large role in 
our lives, but that we should ignore it, given tools such as insurance and the welfare 
state would look after the ‘unlucky’. I rejected this as unpalatable since it implied 
that we should take no responsibility for what happens to us in the world, and 
simply proceed though our lives as automatons. 
 
Having considered a number of writers who sought to reject the idea of Moral Luck, 
I then turned my attention back to those who fully, or at least partially, accepted 
the concept and considered the work of Susan Mendus, Margaret Urban Walker, 
Tony Honore, Michael Zimmerman, and Donna Dickenson. 
 
Susan Mendus began her article by acknowledging that Kant’s ‘Goodwill’ can, in 
most cases transcend adversity (i.e. the Dove will trump the Serpent – the basis of 
the title of her article), but accepted that Luck will sometimes interfere with morality, 
stating that something can be both morally disagreeable but also morally right. She 
also considered that the Kantian view represented an Ideal world, but we live in 
the Real world, and need to celebrate its wonderful unpredictability. I fully 
concurred with this view. 
 
Margaret Urban Walker enthusiastically embraced Moral Luck and made the point 
that whilst we have to accept what life throws at us, we must then make the best 
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of our ‘lot’. It is this rising above adversity which she celebrated as living a “distinctly 
human life” (rather than suffering a brutish existence, blaming everything that 
happens on nature, and taking responsibility for nothing). In fully embracing Moral 
Luck she demonstrated that this makes us caring and selfless individuals (who are 
prepared to go to the aid of people who are visited by bad luck). She indicated that 
the alternative, of being selfish automatons who simply cross to the other side of 
the road (like the Levite and Priest in the Parable of the Good Samaritan) when 
someone else suffers bad luck, would saddle us with lives simply not worth living. 
I can only repeat that I found Walker’s approach to Moral Luck most uplifting and 
inspiring, and one of the major reasons why I persist in the hope that English Law 
will eventually and explicitly protect Good Samaritans from the threat of undue 
litigation. 
 
During my review of Margaret Urban Walker’s article, I also came across relevant 
material from Tony Honore and Michael Zimmerman. Neither of these writers 
specifically commented on the Paradox of Moral Luck, but they both recognised 
that in establishing responsibility for a person’s acts or omissions it is necessary to 
factor in the impact of Luck. Honore suggested that individuals have to accept the 
impact of both bad luck and good luck in their lives and should be comforted by the 
likelihood that over the long term they will “win more than they lose” Michael 
Zimmerman put forward a similar point when he posited the idea of the “Ledger of 
Life” where having posted both our negative (debit) and positive (credit) 
experiences in the same, most individuals will find that, as intrinsically good people, 
our ledgers will end up with a balance in the credit column. 
 
The last writer that I considered in my review of Moral Luck was Donna Dickenson, 
whose work (predominantly in the field of Medical Ethics) I also found uplifting and 
inspiring. Dickenson began by proposing her devastating challenge to Kantian 
thought i.e. what if having a ‘goodwill’ is a matter of luck! She then concentrated 
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on Outcome Luck and Constitutive Luck and gave examples of how these regularly 
occur in the world of medicine e.g. the outcomes of surgery, or the lottery of 
incurring diseases/injuries. She fully embraced the impact of luck in these areas 
and demonstrated how this forces the medical profession to develop strategies to 
cope with uncertainty, and equally importantly, how medical ethics plays its part, 
with the challenge being to approach medical uncertainty in a virtuous manner. 
Indeed, she stated that without these ‘coping’ strategies Medical Professionals 
would simply descend into an abyss of depression as they faced daily, the 
catastrophes that luck throws at their morally innocent patients. 
 
Very interestingly, Dickenson re-directed me to the realisation that Moral Luck in 
the way things turn out is one form of Consequentialism, and hence in the medical 
world in particular, Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian ‘felicific calculus’ is extremely 
helpful in resolving moral dilemmas. Dickenson stressed that with demand always 
outstripping supply in her world (e.g. the number of patients needing liver 
transplants, always exceeding supply of donor organs) it has to be the case that 
decisions are taken on the basis of the greatest good to the greatest number, or, 
maximising benefit whilst minimising harm.    
 
Having demonstrated the incidence of Luck in the medical arena, Dickenson 
outlined various strategies for dealing with the moral dilemmas that then arise. She 
particularly looked at Luck in the way things turn out and gave the example of a 
surgeon facing a difficult operation where the outcome has a high degree of 
uncertainty, and introduced a solution based on the notion of consent, so that the 
surgeon can neutralise the effect of moral luck on his conduct by ensuring that the 
patient specifically consents to the element of risk in the operation. 
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Dickenson also looked at Constitutive Luck and the complications that arise when 
there are far more patients with defective organs than there are donor organs 
available for transplant. In this example she explains how by considering 
probabilities of prognosis it is possible to reach a morally defensible position as to 
who should receive an organ, even though luck (bad luck) prevents the lives of all 
deserving patients to be saved. 
 
These highly practical approaches to the acceptance of Moral Luck, and the 
problems these throw up in the medical arena were very instructive and led me to 
conclude that in my area of investigation (the moral duties and protections of Good 
Samaritan First Aiders) Moral Luck must be acknowledged and consequently our 
legal system should recognise this in its approach to this special category of 
Rescuers. In particular I narrowed down three particular aspects which the law 
should address to respond to the impact of Moral Luck on Good Samaritans. 
 
Firstly, given the huge impact of Luck in the creation of Rescue (Emergency) 
situations it would be inappropriate to impose criminal responsibility to carry out 
Rescues (an exception might be situations of Easy rescues). 
 
Secondly, if despite the vagaries of Luck a person intervenes as a Rescuer, then 
unless s/he is grossly negligent it should be incumbent on the State to protect such 
individuals from suit by an injured rescue/their personal representatives. 
 
Thirdly, if in carrying out a rescue, the rescuer has the bad luck of being injured (or 
suffers loss to their property) then I believe that it is entirely appropriate that they 
should be permitted to recover compensation for such injury or loss. 
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As I reached the end of Chapter 3 of my thesis, I recognised that the different ways 
in which Luck intersected with the Moral and Legal consequences of Rescue 
situations, once again reinforced a separation between Morality and the Law, and 
perhaps an explanation of why in the English legal system there were no Statutory 
Good Samaritan Laws. I realised that if luck played such a pervasive role in our 
lives, then it might be better if any duty to rescue was left in the Moral, rather than 
the Legal, sphere. However, I considered that if a citizen (despite the effects of 
Luck), attempted a rescue, then the least Society should do is to enact a specific 
law exempting such a person from suit if (absent Gross Negligence) the rescue 
was unsuccessful. This had consequences for my hypothetical good Samaritan 
Act. 
 
Turning to Chapter 4 of my project I looked at the main philosophical aspects of 
Emergencies and Rescues, under the heading: “Causation, Responsibility, 
Omissions, and Failure to Rescue”. 
 
I commenced the Chapter by looking at the vital concept of Causation. My 
approach was to start with the work of the ‘Neo-Classical’ philosophers such as 
David Hume and John Stuart Mill. The former reduced to writing the intuitive idea 
that an Event must be preceded by a ‘Cause’. However, this explanation was too 
simplistic in that it only allowed that, generally, each event only had one specific 
cause. John Stuart Mill took the idea further and recorded that an Event will 
generally have a number of causes i.e. there is a chain of causation. He expanded 
this further to talk of a set of significant conditions being required to cause an event, 
but also that there was always a Necessary Condition within that set, which was 
the prime cause of that event. 
 
Sub-Section 4.1.3 leapt forward to the work of Herbert Hart and Tony Honore, and 
their seminal work “Causation in the Law”.   They took a linguistic approach to  
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causation, and looked at how Courts generally reached decisions in real cases, 
where the analysis of causation was the key element. They found that such 
decisions were generally the result of the interaction of human interventions AND 
policy considerations. Hart and Honore stated that they preferred a ‘Causally 
Minimal’ approach which ignored the distraction of policy aspects and concentrated 
solely on the human activity involved. In particular they deplored the many linguistic 
devices which they believed had been developed by the courts as simplistic tools 
to either artificially limit or artificially expand the extent of the cause of an event 
where they felt policy considerations required this e.g. “Proximate Cause”, 
Remoteness”, “Foreseeability” etc. etc. 
 
Nonetheless, Hart and Honore preferred one particular linguistic device: the “But 
for Test” given that it assisted the analysis of factual causation (without the 
confusion of ‘Policy’ factors). They accepted that the test would generally enable 
the correct cause of an event to be determined, but pointed out that in some cases 
the test would not enable a single unique cause to be identified e.g. their ‘two 
gunmen’ cases. They therefore developed an improved approach which has been 
termed the ‘NESS’ test. This test prescribes that, to be the cause of an event a 
Condition should be the Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set of Conditions. 
 
There were some later criticisms of Hart and Honore’s work (particularly those of 
Jane Stapleton) but most commentators generally accept that their modified ‘But 
for Test’: “NESS”, remains the most effective way to decide what the operative 
cause of an event is.  
 
Having established a sufficiently reliable means of establishing the Cause of an 
event, I moved in Sub-Section 4.2 to look at how Responsibility can be assigned 
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for that Cause. I did this by looking at the work of various philosophers and started 
again with some Neo-Classical writers i.e. John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and 
Jeremy Bentham. John Locke posited the principle of Personal Liberty, tempered 
with not infringing other people’s liberties, and being held responsible any such 
infringement. 
 
Jeremy Bentham expressed this another way by making it clear that he accepted 
that it was expedient to punish a man for injuring his neighbour (i.e. to hold that 
man responsible for the injury). John Stuart Mill reinforced this by positing that it is 
acceptable to exercise control over someone to prevent harm to others. He did this 
by emphasising the idea of a “Social Contract” whereby the State provides us with 
individual liberties, but holds us responsible if we wrongfully interfere with, or limit, 
those of others. Mill also differentiated between cases where a person ‘should’ be 
held legally responsible, and other case where a person might only be held morally 
responsible.  
 
Criminal Law and Civil Law in England and Wales in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
generally developed along the lines of these principles, and my next step was to 
consider the later works of 20th and 21st Century philosophers and in particular 
those of Hart and Honore, Joel Feinberg, John M Fischer and Mark Ravizza. 
 
Hart and Honore looked at practical examples as to when people are generally 
held responsible for harm to others, but (in keeping with one of Hart’s common 
themes) they also pointed to rarer cases where people were held responsible for 
things which were not actually their fault (e.g. Vicarious Liability); or alternatively 
case where people are excused from liability despite being responsible, because 
the law applies a limiting factor (e.g. Foreseeability). In effect they stated that 
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Causation is a matter of fact, but responsibility is also a matter of Public Policy. 
They particularly homed in on “Fault” as a useful tool for assigning Responsibility. 
 
Joel Feinberg pursued a different but similar tool to help allocate responsibility, and 
he concentrated on ‘Harm’ as the measure, describing it as a valid liberty-limiting 
principle (by reference to Mill’s doctrine). Feinberg defined ‘Harm’ as a “setting 
back of interests” and confirmed that not all setting backs should incur legal 
responsibility (some should only receive moral censure, and some could be 
excused by applying Public Policy i.e. in a case such as where a person charged 
with assault is excused because they acted in self defence). 
 
John M Fischer and Mark Ravizza looked at aspects of ‘Control’, ‘Choice, and 
‘Capacity’ in deciding whether someone should be held responsible for setting 
back another’s interests. In short they considered that someone should only be 
held responsible for harms if a) they sufficient knowledge of the situation, and b) 
they were in a position to control the outcome (i.e. did they have any choice in what 
happened, or any capacity to change what happened?). 
 
Putting all these ideas together I concluded that in reaching decisions on 
responsibility, all the foregoing points needed to be considered: personal liberty, 
the social contract, policy, harm, fault, control, choice, and capacity. I then moved 
on to consider responsibility in the complicated area of ‘Omissions’. 
 
Sub-Section 4.3 began with a review of the writings of a number of Classical 
philosophers. In particular I looked at the works of St Thomas Aquinas who 
recognised that sins can be committed both by commission and omission, and who 
concluded that they should be considered equally wrong, especially when the harm 
to the third party was equally detrimental. However, he also concluded that 
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commissions are typically more blameworthy than omissions. I then rolled forward 
to 16th Century England and the opinion of Edward Coke who, in stating that 
generally we should only be responsible for what we do rather than for what we do 
not do, set the scene for English Law for the next four hundred years. 
 
This naturally led me to the so-called “Acts and Omissions Doctrine” which has 
traditionally held sway in English Law i.e. that intuitively we find it more 
reprehensible to take a life rather than to avoid saving one (famously articulated 
by the poet Arthur Clough as “Thou shall’t not kill, but need’st not strive officiously 
to keep alive”). Jonathan Glover rejected this idea when he wrote in 1977 and 
(echoing Aquinas) claimed that the doctrine masked a more correct, case by case 
analysis, and especially in cases where the commission or omission had identical 
consequences in terms of moral evaluation. 
 
The most well-known public debate on the value or otherwise of the Acts and 
Omissions Doctrine was between Andrew Ashworth and Glanville Williams in the 
late 1980s. The former suggested that there were two views, the conventional one 
that liability only existed for omissions in very limited and specific ‘duty’ scenarios 
(e.g. the parental duty to look after a child, or the doctor’s duty to look after a patient 
etc.); and the wider social responsibility view that we should be responsible for all 
our conduct (including omissions), if we are to be conscientious members of 
society. Ashworth continued by stating that he preferred a wider approach (in a 
reference to Mill), and suggested that we should all accept a social responsibility, 
drawn from an acceptance of a social contract, to do all we reasonably can, to not 
only help ourselves but also to help others. He then went on to suggest that 
Glanville Williams was of a more “Conventional” view, which took a narrower (and 
allegedly a more selfish stance). 
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This prompted Williams to respond by stating that he rejected the allegation that 
the Conventional view was more selfish, but nonetheless he preferred an approach 
which concentrated on defining specific wrongful acts, and specific ‘duty situations’ 
rather than one which left open the possibility that every possible omission could 
result in a legal sanction (he indicated that this would be an unacceptable 
interference with personal freedom and autonomy). 
 
Williams’ standpoint received substantial reinforcement from the decision of the 
House of Lords in the well-known case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland in 1993 
(where withdrawing life support for a terminally ill patient was rejected as being a 
criminal offence). This Minimal rather than Maximal approach to criminalising 
omissions was also supported by Tony Honore in 1999, and also by more recent 
writers such as Card, Cross and Jones in 2006.   
 
I therefore reached the conclusion that the Acts and Omissions Doctrine is still 
alive and well, and that English Law continues to draw a distinct difference between 
actions and omissions, albeit that more and more ‘duty’ situations are being 
established where legal liability for Omissions will be recognised. 
 
I then proceeded to consider the degree to which a Failure to Rescue might 
become one of those duty situations where an omission might attract a legal 
sanction in England & Wales. I had noted earlier in my work that many other 
Western Jurisdictions impose Statutory obligations to go to the Rescue of fellow 
citizens in distress (e.g. most of Europe). Despite this, it was entirely clear that no 
such duty existed in this country, and the main reason for this repeated the earlier 
philosophy of Locke, Bentham, and Mill, which stressed the importance of personal 
autonomy, and which suggested that imposing an ever increasing range of positive 
obligations would be essentially offensive to this principle. Whilst I accepted the 
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general thrust of this approach, I noted that in those Jurisdictions which impose a 
Duty to Rescue, this had often arisen as a result of a particularly heinous example 
of a failure to rescue e.g. the Kitty Genovese case in the North Eastern United 
States of America (where a large number of people ignored the plight of a young 
women who was murdered when, at no risk to themselves, the onlookers could 
have saved her life by at least calling the Police).  
 
The idea of introducing a Duty to attempt an Easy Rescue in England & Wales had 
gained some weight amongst many commentators, and not least with Ashworth 
and Williams who, despite their philosophical differences, both indicated that such 
a failure was a type of duty situation which might warrant the introduction of a 
sanction. 
 
The research in this Chapter was persuasive in terms of maintaining a separation 
of Moral and Legal aspects. In terms of Causation I had established that normally 
the causes of an event were generally a matter of fact, but in some cases the 
identification of causes was either extended or limited for public policy reasons. It 
was clear in this scenario that Moral considerations should only focus on the facts, 
even if the Law was prepared to adopt a wider remit. Similarly, in relation to 
Responsibility I identified that the concept of Control was critical in determining 
when individuals might, or might not be held responsible in particular situations. 
Again there were examples where for policy reasons responsibility might be 
extended or excused, and this led me to conclude that in the Moral sphere, 
responsibility is generally limited to cases where the actor is able to exert control 
over outcomes, even if the Law is prepared to go further. Once again this had 
significant consequences for my hypothetical Good Samaritan Act. 
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It was through my research into the interrelationship of all these factors that I began 
to recognise that categorising human conduct into either Acts or Omissions might 
be too simplistic, and identified that a different approach might be useful, to gauge 
how the law might respond to different types of Rescue scenario. I pursued this 
different approach in the latter part of Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
 
In outlining my different way of looking at the situation I challenged the polarised 
Acts and Omissions approach and suggested a third category of analysing human 
conduct. I did this because whereas the concept of actions can be clearly 
understood, the same cannot be said for omissions, given that the term itself is 
pre-loaded with fault i.e. to “omit” implies a pre-existing obligation to actually do 
something. I considered that this is inappropriate and that sometimes simply 
‘waiting in neutral’ or remaining in “Stasis” was a legitimate position. 
 
Relying on this, I emphasised a new three dimensional approach to evaluating 
behaviour i.e. Action; Stasis; and Omission. I also demonstrated that Rescues 
could also be analysed on a similar three dimensional basis i.e. Hard, Intermediate 
and Easy rescues.  
 
I pointed to the ‘usual’ example put forward to describe an Easy rescue being that 
of a toddler having fallen face down in a shallow pool of water (where pulling the 
child from danger would involve no significant risk to an onlooker). I also gave the 
example of a Hard Rescue where for example a petite non-swimming onlooker 
might be faced with a large and panicking man struggling in a raging torrent of 
water in a swollen river.  
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Whereas virtually all commentators leave the matter at this stage, I explained that 
Easy and Hard rescues are at the extremes and that there is a continuum of 
Rescue situations with many cases being capable of description as Intermediate 
Rescues. I gave the example of an onlooker who is a strong swimmer faced with 
rescuing say a 10 year old child who has knocked himself unconscious falling into 
a shallow stream, close to the bank.  
 
Having analysed responsibility into three categories, and Rescues into three 
categories, and recognising that there are three systems of applying sanctions to 
human behaviour (Criminal, Civil, and Moral), I put forward a different rubric for 
evaluating all these variables. I also took account of what I had learnt about Moral 
Luck and in combining all these factors, I postulated that Omissions to attempt 
Easy Rescues might justify a Criminal sanction; Not attempting Immediate 
Rescues (and remaining in Stasis) might incur a civil law sanction, but if anything 
would probably be a simple matter of Moral censure; whereas any Failures to 
attempt Hard Rescues should definitely not incur legal sanction (nor any moral 
criticism). These differing approaches to different combinations of circumstances 
once again underlined the way in which the English legal system separated various 
Moral and Legal responsibilities. 
 
Most strikingly, I came to the realisation that as the Acts and Omissions Doctrine 
was very much alive and well in our Legal system, it would probably operate 
against a legal duty to rescue from forming part of our Statute law for the 
foreseeable future. This indicated that my hypothetical Good Samaritan Act might 
be too optimistic, but reinforced my resolve that there should nonetheless be 
Statutory protections for rescuers. 
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I therefore began Chapter 5 of my thesis by reviewing the existing position 
regarding Good Samaritan Laws in England and Wales, and analysed this by 
reference to what I had by then termed the ‘Triumvirate of Good Samaritan Laws’ 
i.e. a Legal Duty to Rescue; a Legal Right to Protection from Suit, and a Legal 
Right to Recover Compensation.  
 
In addition, I described these as a hierarchy in terms of the degree to which they 
would incentivise volunteers to come forward as Good Samaritans. I suggested 
that as a bare minimum there should be compensation for any losses incurred, 
then there should be protection from inappropriate law suits, and as a final 
‘encouragement’ it should be unlawful to fail to attempt an Easy Rescue. 
 
Starting with the idea of a Criminal Law Duty to attempt an Easy Rescue, I 
established that there was no such law in England & Wales and reiterated the 
traditional reluctance of the English Legal System to impose responsibility for 
Omissions. In particular the case of Gautret v Egerton (1867) confirmed this 
position in the case of Failure (omission) to Rescue. 
 
I therefore proceed to consider whether there was any Civil Law Duty to rescue i.e. 
was there a Tort of failing to attempt an Easy Rescue. There was clearly no existing 
tort of this kind, but I reviewed the manner in which English law had expanded the 
categories of Tort in the last 80 years or so. I naturally concentrated this review on 
looking at Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) the ultimate ground-breaking case which 
opened up the scope for new actions within the tort of negligence, and introduced 
Lord Atkins’ “Neighbour Principle” (which as he acknowledged drew heavily from 
the Parable of the Good Samaritan). Given this widely acknowledged precedent, I 
suggested that if an appropriate case arose, a court could use the Neighbour 
principle to establish the Tort of Failure to Help a Neighbour in Distress. 
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I then demonstrated how subsequent cases had continued to expand tortious 
liability for certain omissions and cited Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd (1970) 
as a key case expanding liability to include failure to prevent some Borstal Boys 
from causing damage (but this hinged on the Home Office being under a pre-
existing duty to properly supervise the boys). I also cited Anns v Merton Borough 
Council (1978) where the courts went further and held the Council liable in a case 
where there was no pre-existing duty to properly inspect building foundations (but 
only a power to do so). This gradual expansion of the Law of Tort for omissions 
was encouraging, but this was the high-water mark, because in the final case in 
the sequence of cases that I looked at (being Stovin v Wise (1996)), the court drew 
back from expanding the law any further and found against the Plaintiff who sought 
to suggest that a Highway Authority had an obligation to remove any natural feature 
close to a road which might partially obscure sight lines (whether on the Authority’s 
land or not).  
 
I therefore concluded that the scope for the emergence of a new Legal offence of 
Failing to Attempt an Easy Rescue was closed for the time being, and turned my 
attention to the second limb of the Triumvirate: did English Law include protection 
for Good Samaritans against suit if a rescue turned out unsuccessfully.  
 
Having established that there was no Statutory Protection in this respect, I looked 
at a number of court cases starting with Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd 
(1946), where it was held that in cases of emergency a defendant may sometimes 
be excused for acting (or omitting to act) in a way which, absent the emergency, 
might be held to be tortious. I then looked at Watt v Hertfordshire County Council 
(1954) where again, in an emergency situation the court absolved the defendant 
from liability by applying a lower than normal standard of care. Next, and the main 
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case I looked at (Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee (1957)) involved 
the standard of care expected of Medical Practitioners, where it was decided that 
the standard of care to be applied was that of the ordinary competent man 
practising that particular skill. In effect Bolam decided that a professional person is 
not required to apply the highest possible level of skill, but the level of skill to be 
properly expected of a person with typical training and experience in that 
profession. I was keen to highlight how this approach had been applied in one case 
concerning First Aiders who also operate in the medical sphere, and often in 
Rescue scenarios, and I referred to Cattley v St John Ambulance (1988) where the 
court excused the Charity (my employer) from liability when it demonstrated that 
its volunteer first aiders had provided assistance at an accident, strictly in 
accordance with Procedures set down in the industry standard First Aid Manual. 
 
The last case I looked at in this category was Day v High Performance Sports Ltd 
(2003), where the courts re-emphasised the point that there was no general duty 
to attempt a rescue (of someone stuck at the top of a climbing wall). However, it 
was also decided that once a rescue had been commenced the rescuer must 
proceed with reasonable care and skill.  In the Day case the court proceeded to 
find that the actions of the defendant were acceptable in the emergency 
circumstances. 
 
Having reviewed the cases with some optimism, I was nonetheless left to conclude 
that the legal position was not sufficiently clear to allay the concerns of would be 
volunteers. This was because public perception, shaped by the perceived 
emergence of a Compensation Culture, was clearly of the view that the risk of 
liability was substantial (which was deterring volunteers from coming forward), and 
also because the regular stream of court cases clearly indicated that the law was 
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not conclusively defined (as it would have been if there was specific Statutory 
protection). 
 
The last aspect I looked at in English Law was whether there was a well-defined 
right to recover compensation if in carrying out a Rescue the individual suffered 
harm or loss of property. It was once again clear that there is no Statutory 
protection, so I again looked at the common law and four specific, decided cases. 
 
In Cutler v United Dairies (1933) the courts reached a disappointing conclusion 
that a bystander who helped stop a runaway horse should not be entitled to recover 
compensation for injuries sustained in the intervention, because he had been 
under no obligation to assist (applying the old maxim: volenti non fit injuria). 
 
The outcome was more favourable in Haynes v Harwood (1935) where in 
somewhat similar circumstances a policeman intervened to stop a bolting horse 
which was approaching a mother and child. He too was injured but the court held 
that he should recover from the defendants. However, the outcome was 
complicated by the fact that as a public servant, the policeman was recognised has 
having a pre-existing duty to go to the aid of the public.  
 
The next case I looked at was Baker v T. E. Hopkins (1959) which was very tragic 
when, as a rescuer, a doctor went down a well in which workmen had been 
overcome by fumes from the pump they were using. The doctor got into difficulties 
and died alongside the workmen. The Doctor’s estate was able to recover (but I 
once again questioned whether the doctor might have been considered to be under 
a doctor/patient duty in going to the aid of the workmen). 
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The final case I looked at was Videan v British Transport Commission (1963) where 
a railway stationmaster was killed in leaping on to the tracks to save a child from a 
runaway truck. The courts found for his estate but here too complicating factors 
existed: as the stationmaster was employed to keep his station safe, he might have 
been considered to be under a duty of Employment to intervene, and more 
pertinently he was the child’s father and so could have been considered to have 
been under a parent/ child duty. 
 
Consequently, having looked at all four cases I was unable to identify an example 
of Compensation being provided to a Rescuer, in circumstances where the 
intervener could be a considered as a complete stranger to the situation (i.e. under 
no pre-existing duty to assist). 
 
I therefore summarised that the position in England & Wales was that: (1) there is 
no Duty under the Criminal Law to Attempt an Easy Rescue, and whilst there is 
conflicting case law regarding civil liability for omissions to perform duties or 
powers – there is certainly no Statutory Sanction; (2) there is no Statutory 
Protection for Rescuers from being Sued if a rescue is unsuccessful, and although 
there is some case law indicating protection for some classes of intervener, the 
situation is obscure and the strong public perception is that volunteers can be sued 
all too readily (fuelled by fears about an increasing Compensation Culture); and (3) 
there is no Statutory right for rescuers to recover compensation if they are injured 
or suffer loss, and although there is some case law indicating that recovery may 
be successful, the cases are generally based on pre-existing duty situations.  
 
This absence of Legislation in respect of all three categories in my Triumvirate of 
Good Samaritan Laws, well and truly demonstrated that under English Law there 
was definitely a separation between the Moral reactions and Legal reactions to the 
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problems that arise in Rescue scenarios. Furthermore, whilst the English Common 
Law contained some examples of individuals being excused from liability, or being 
awarded compensation, these were generally limited to their special 
circumstances, and I was left with the conviction that in these areas the position 
would be much more satisfactory, if explicit Legislation was passed 
 
In the subsequent parts of Chapter 5 of this work I contrasted the position in 
England & Wales (in relation to the Triumvirate of Good Samaritan Laws), with that 
in some other Western jurisdictions, and commenced with the United States of 
America in sub-Section 5.2. 
 
Starting with the Legal Duty to Attempt Easy Rescues, I found that whilst the large 
majority of States did not impose any Statutory duty to rescue, three particular 
States (Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island) had not only legislated in this 
respect, but had actually made the Failure to Attempt an Easy Rescue a criminal 
offence (in response to the particularly heinous case of the murder of Kitty 
Genovese”). 
 
By contrast, and turning to the protection of Good Samaritans, I found that 100% 
of States provided some kind of exemption from liability (albeit the classes of 
person covered, and the extent of the cover varied considerably, although all 
States require that the Good Samaritan must not have acted with Gross 
Negligence). 
 
The position of Compensating Rescuers for injury or losses is also much clearer in 
the USA, given the pivotal case of Wagner v International Railway Company 
(1921), where Judge Benjamin Cardozo made his very famous statements that 
“Dander invites Rescue” and “The Emergency begets the man”. This case provided 
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an entirely clear precedent regarding the entitlement to compensation, and has 
been followed consistently across the country. 
 
In Sub-Section 5.3, I looked at the position in Canada which was very similar to 
that in the USA i.e. (1) whilst most Provinces do not have a Statutory duty to 
Attempt an Easy Rescue, one particular Province does so (albeit this is Quebec 
which, with its French roots, has a Civil Law rather than a Common Law pedigree); 
(2) nearly all Provinces have Good Samaritan laws to protect Good Samaritans 
provided they have not acted with Gross Negligence – (New Brunswick being the 
exception); and (3) all Provinces have a well developed common law system of 
compensating Good Samaritans for injury or loss (with Quebec actually providing 
a statutory right to the same). The common law right being particularly reinforced 
via the famous Ogopogo (Horsley v McLaren) Case. 
 
The next Jurisdiction I considered was Australia in Sub-Section 5.4, and my 
findings were similar to those relating to the USA and Canada. Most ‘States’ do not 
impose a legal duty to attempt Easy Rescues (but one, the Northern Territory does 
so under its criminal law). By contrast all the ‘States’, except Tasmania, and 
Western Australia, have laws protecting Good Samaritans from suit, providing they 
have not been Grossly Negligent. Further in terms of compensating Rescuers, the 
position in Australia is generally clear and the court decision to reimburse a rescuer 
in Chapman v Hearse (1961) has National application. 
 
I decided that Sub-Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 had provided a sufficient review of 
some other typical Common Law jurisdictions, and hence in sub-Sections 5.5 and 
5.6 I looked at two Civil Law jurisdictions. 
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In Sub-Section 5.5 I considered the situation in France, and demonstrated that the 
Continental Civil Law Tradition stretches right back to Roman Law (AD 534), and 
imposes an explicit obligation to assist a fellow citizen in distress. The French Legal 
System makes it a Criminal offence to fail to attempt an Easy Rescue, and this was 
first fully embodied in the Napoleonic Code of 1804, and is now codified in Article 
223-6 of the Criminal Code. Referring next to the protection of Good Samaritans 
under French Law, the position is also entirely clear with the relevant provisions 
being set out in Article 1382 of the French Civil Code which applies the long 
standing Civil Law concept of the ‘Agent of Necessity’ (although the protection of 
the Agent only applies where he acts reasonably and without Gross Negligence - 
i.e. in the fashion of the bonus pater familias, or good father of the family). 
 
The position in relation to compensating Good Samaritans for injuries or losses is 
slightly more complicated and is based on the ancient Civil Law principle (unknown 
to the Common Law) of “Actio Negotiorum Gestorum” which is traceable to Roman 
Law. The French equivalent is the ‘Geston d’affaires d’autri’ which was also part of 
the Napoleonic Code and now forms Article 1375 of the French Civil Code. The 
concept applies generally and not just to Good Samaritan Rescuers, the overall 
principle being that if the intervener (the Gerant) acts voluntarily, in an emergency, 
and in a reasonable manner to assist a stranger, then s/he will be able to recover 
for losses incurred. 
 
It can therefore be seen that in France all three of the Triumvirate of Good 
Samaritan Laws are firmly in place and all three have the full force of Statute. 
 
The final ‘Western’ Jurisdiction that I looked at in Sub-Section 5.6 was Germany 
and unsurprisingly, given that German Law is also drawn from the same Civil law 
source as French Law, the position is almost identical to that applying in France. 
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The legal duty to attempt an Easy Rescue is also a Criminal Law obligation and in 
Germany it is set out in Section 323(c) of the Criminal Code. The Protection of 
Good Samaritans is also confirmed by Statute, with the relevant provision being 
Section 680 of the German Civil Code (which as usual excludes conduct amounting 
to Gross Negligence). The remaining element of Good Samaritan Law in Germany 
is the Compensation of Rescuers, and like the position in France the Civil Law 
principle of ‘Actio Negotiorum Getsorum’ again applies, with the German 
equivalent being ‘Geschaftsfurung Ohne Auftrag’ which is enshrined in Section 683 
of the German Civil Code. 
 
I therefore concluded Chapter 5 of this Thesis by indicating that despite the 
reluctance of the English Legal System to provide explicit, Statutory Good 
Samaritan Laws, the situation is different to varying degrees in the other main 
Western ‘Common Law’ jurisdictions, and also in the two leading Western ‘Civil 
Law’ jurisdictions. The reluctance within the English Legal system seemingly being 
a result of our legal system being fundamentally a ‘Freedoms’ based system (rather 
than a ‘Rights’ based one) and also because we appear to be more willing to accept 
that the paradox of Moral Luck is real and can seriously distort allocations of legal 
responsibility.  
 
However, the fact that many other major ‘Western’ jurisdictions had seen fit to 
enact Statutory Good Samaritan Laws (to varying degrees), led me to the 
conviction that something more needed to be done under English Law. In particular 
it reinforced my resolve to put forward my own Good Samaritan Act, albeit that 
(unlike in my original hypothesis), it would probably be a Statute with only two 
operative Sections - the idea of a Criminal Offence of Failure to attempt an Easy 
Rescue having become very much relegated in my ambitions. 
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However, before forming a definitive conclusion on the matter, I decided to review 
recent initiatives and discussion in England & Wales in this area, which I did in 
Chapter 6 of this work. 
 
I commenced the penultimate Chapter of my project by looking, in Sub-Section 6.1, 
at the work of the Law Commission in England and Wales in the 20th Century to 
codify the Criminal Law, or in other words create a Criminal Code. I especially 
looked at the attempt to introduce criminal liability for a wider class of omissions, 
and, in particular, the suggestion by some commentators that there should be a 
new criminal offence of Failing to Attempt an Easy Rescue. 
 
In Sub-Section 6.2 I looked again at the debate between Andrew Ashworth and 
Glanville Williams, and despite each commentator holding a different view on 
Omissions generally, they both suggested that the Failure to attempt an Easy 
Rescue was in the category which might be criminalised. However, no such 
initiative came from this debate, and indeed the work of the Law Commission, 
generally, to create a Criminal Code fizzled out through the lack of Parliamentary 
time and interest. 
 
Sub-Section 6.3 concentrated on the Protection of Rescuers and investigated the 
attempt to introduce a Private Member’s Bill on the subject, but noted that this was 
talked out of time by those who felt that it was too wide-ranging/pervasive. 
 
In Sub-Section 6.4, I looked at the wider issue of whether a ‘Compensation Culture’ 
had become established in England and Wales, and the extent to which this might 
be adversely affecting individuals in coming forward as volunteers. In particular, I 
looked at the proceedings, and Report of the House of Commons Constitutional 
Affairs Committee on the “Compensation Culture” which commenced in 2005, and 
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as part of its remit looked at the ‘nascent’ Compensation Bill which was proceeding 
through Parliament at the time. 
 
In Sub-Section 6.5, I considered the eventual passage of the Compensation Act 
2006 onto the Statute book. The Act has two main Sections which are germane to 
my project, with the first providing a degree of reassurance and protection to people 
carrying out “Desirable Activities”, and the second seeking the effective Regulation 
of Claims Management Companies. I welcomed both parts of the Act, but in 
particular, the first Section which sought to adjust the standard of care applicable 
when “desirable activities” were being performed. I was concerned however that 
this term was not defined and therefore in providing evidence to the Committee for 
my employers: St John Ambulance, I suggested that a non-exhaustive list of 
example activities might be helpful (with First Aid volunteers coming forward as 
Good Samaritan Rescuers being such an example). 
 
The Act appeared to have extended the Statutory Law of Negligence along the 
lines set out in Tomlin v Congleton Borough Council (2003), but regretfully only 
one case emerged between 2006 and 2010 (Robert Lee Uren v Corporate Leisure 
(UK) Ltd (2010), and in that case the Judge involved stated that he felt that the 
Compensation Act had added nothing new to the Law. 
 
This was not a very promising outcome and hence I turned my attention in Sub-
Section 6.6 to the Report commissioned by the Government in 2010 entitled 
“Common Sense, Common Safety”. This report covered a number of areas, one of 
which was to recommend immunity from suit for individuals carrying out well 
intentioned voluntary acts. Regretfully its author, Lord Young of Graffham, left the 
Government shortly after its publication and the situation stalled. 
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Finally, and somewhat more encouragingly, Lord Young’s report was resurrected 
in the Autumn of 2014, and in Sub-Section 6.7 of my thesis, I tracked the progress 
of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism (SARAH) Bill which quickly 
followed, and in relation to which I was able to personally make a contribution on 
behalf of St John Ambulance. Amongst other things the Bill sought to make it 
mandatory for Courts to consider the extent to which an individual was acting 
heroically when assessing whether or not they had met the standard of care 
necessary in the circumstances they were involved in. This approach was 
encouraging and Hansard records that St John Ambulance First Aiders were 
definitely in contemplation as a category of heroes in relevant circumstances (it 
also records the efforts made on behalf of the Charity to have the specific wording 
of the operative Clause amended to remove an unnecessary limitation on its 
application). These efforts were successful and the Social Action, Responsibility 
and Heroism Act (as amended) received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015. 
 
This outcome whilst promising in that it introduced some Statutory clarification on 
the protection of Rescuers, was disappointing in that it did not provide an explicit 
exemption from suit, and I personally consider that such a Statutory immunity 
would be far more preferable, and far more effective in allaying the fears of would-
be volunteers. 
 
Indeed, the most effective approach, from my point view, to encourage Good 
Samaritans to respond when their neighbours are in distress, would be for an 
explicit Good Samaritan Act to appear on the Statute book. This had been an early 
hypothesis, and at the very start of this thesis I proposed a Three-Section draft 
statute. However for the reasons described so far in this in this Chapter 7, I 
gradually came to an appreciation that a Two-Section statute was more realistic, 
and more likely to be adopted. My Two-Section draft Statute (excluding a Duty to 
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attempt Easy Rescues) represents my final Conclusions and Recommendation, 
and is set out on the final page of this thesis. 
 
7.2   Final Conclusions and Recommendation   
As can be seen from the foregoing, this thesis has looked at the question of 
whether there are specific Good Samaritan Laws in England and Wales 
(being of particular interest to me as General Counsel of the Country’s 
premier First Aid charity: St John Ambulance). In this work I have made it 
clear that I was looking at a Triumvirate of Good Samaritan Laws: a law 
imposing a duty to attempt easy rescues; a law protecting rescuers from suit 
if a rescue is unsuccessful; and a law to compensate rescuers for any 
injury/loss suffered in making a rescue. In recognition of this Triumvirate I 
originally put forward a hypothetical Three-Section Good Samaritan Act.   
 
I then explained that I recognised the reluctance of English Law to translate 
too many Moral responsibilities into Law and traced the long jurisprudence 
in our County which I believed underpinned this.  
 
I also explained the paradox of Moral Luck and suggested that the pervading 
influence of luck in our lives might be another reason for the separation of 
Law and Morality (if situations arise where Luck plays a significant part, then 
it would seem better to leave any sanctions in such cases as Moral ones, 
rather than legal ones). 
 
In pursuing my work I looked at aspects of Causation, Responsibility, and 
particularly responsibility for Omissions (especially the failure to attempt a 
Rescue). 
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In researching the traditional (Acts and Omissions) approach to these 
elements I deduced that a different approach was needed, and that human 
conduct can be categorised into three classes (rather than two): Actions, 
Omissions and Stasis, and that Rescues can also be categorised into three 
classes: Easy, Intermediate, and Hard.  
 
I used this insight to demonstrate that a kind of matrix approach might be 
applicable whereby (1) Positive Action is required in the case of Easy 
Rescues (with possible criminal sanctions for omission), (2) Stasis is more 
acceptable in the case of Intermediate Rescues (with the possibility of a Civil 
Law sanction, but probably with only Moral censure applying), and (3) No 
responsibility should attach in the case of Hard Rescues (neither Legal nor 
Moral). 
 
I reintroduced my findings in relation to Moral Luck to help in differentiating 
when Legal, or Moral (or Legal and Moral) censure was appropriate. I 
reiterated that this might be a reason why there were no explicit laws 
requiring Rescues to be attempted, but repeated that if despite the vagaries 
of Moral luck, a Good Samaritan steps forward and attempts a Rescue, then 
the least they should expect is that, provided they have acted reasonably, 
then the State should exempt them from civil liability if the rescue turns out 
unsuccessfully, and also compensate them if they suffer injury or loss. 
 
In order to ‘benchmark’ the position in England and Wales I carried out a 
review of the existence or otherwise of my Triumvirate of Good Samaritan 
Laws in this Country, compared to the position in a number of other leading 
Western jurisdictions. I found that in England and Wales there are no 
sufficiently explicit (Statutory) laws in respect of any of the three types of 
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Good Samaritan laws, whereas in all the other jurisdictions I reviewed, at 
least one of their ‘States’ imposed a criminal law Duty to Attempt an Easy 
Rescue; virtually all their States provided explicit Statutory Protection from 
Suit for Good Samaritans (except in the case of Gross Negligence); and all 
their States provided some form of clearly recognised Compensation to 
Rescuers for Harm Suffered or Losses Incurred).  
 
I therefore went on to review recent developments in English Law in this 
regard. However, I found that the Compensation Act 2006 had not brought 
about any significant changes, and had certainly not allayed the fears of 
Volunteer First Aiders (heightened by the advent of a compensation culture) 
that they might be sued if they went to the aid of someone who had been 
injured. I was however encouraged to some degree by the passing of the 
Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015. 
 
All these facts influenced my thinking in relation to my Three-Section 
hypothesis for a new Good Samaritan Act. It was clear that there were many 
factors hindering the prospect of Statutory Good Samaritan laws being 
introduced into the Legal system in England and Wales. The most compelling 
of those reasons were those relating to the preservation of personal 
autonomy; and the system’s pedigree of being a system based on Freedoms, 
rather than Rights; and the wish to avoid saddling individuals with an ever 
increasing body of positive duties. 
 
Allied to this is the acceptance by a considerable number of commentators 
(including myself) of the Paradox of Moral Luck, and hence an overall 
preference to assign incidents involving significant aspects of Luck, to the 
Moral sphere rather than the Legal one (the separation of Law and Morality, 
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in our legal system facilitating this more readily). It was also clear that with 
the traditional Acts and Omission Doctrine continuing to have sway, the idea 
of compelling individuals to attempt rescues was unlikely to ‘cut ice’ with 
Law-makers.  
 
During my studies I have noticed that it is often counterproductive to be too 
ambitious with proposed Legislation. Hence my final Recommendation, as 
the Conclusion to this thesis, is a Draft Good Samaritan Act with only two 
operative Sections (omitting a Duty to Rescue section) and this appears as 
the final Page overleaf. 
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Good Samaritan Act 
 
Section 1. Protection of Volunteer Rescuers 
Any Volunteer who attempts to Rescue another person in an Emergency, shall not 
be liable for any loss or harm so arising provided they have acted reasonably and 
without Gross Negligence. 
 
 
Section 2. Compensation for Volunteer Rescuers   
Any Volunteer who, acting reasonably, attempts to Rescue another person in an 
Emergency, and who suffers harm or loss, shall be entitled to Compensation. 
 
 
 
Interpretation 
“Emergency” means an unexpected and/or uncontrolled situation which involves 
danger or serious harm to human life.  
  
“Rescue” means a response to an immediate emergency, whereby a human 
being is saved (or might be saved) from the danger of loss of life or serious harm. 
Such response includes, as a minimum, the summoning of the Statutory 
Emergency Services, where the Rescuer has a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
   
“Volunteer” means an individual who acts without expectation of payment or 
other remuneration. 
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  APPENDIX – GLOSSARY: “EMERGENCY” AND “RESCUE” 
 
1.      Emergency   
In this work it has been necessary to limit in scope, the concept of an Emergency. 
My approach in doing this has been to define Emergencies more generally, and then 
contract these definitions to establish the type of emergencies which form the basis 
of the Rescue interventions that underpin the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Dictionary Definition of Emergency 
“A serious, unexpected, and potentially dangerous situation requiring immediate 
action”399 
 
This definition raises a number of avenues for consideration around the words: 
“serious”, “unexpected”, “dangerous”, “immediate”, and “action”. These are 
analysed later in this Glossary. 
 
1.2  A Statutory Viewpoint of Emergency 
Emergencies are defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as follows: 
 
“(1)  In this Part “emergency” means –  
 
(a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare …, 
 
(b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment …, 
 
(c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security … “400   
 
 
The legislation continues in Section (2) as follows: 
 
 
“(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a) an event or situation threatens 
 damage to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause – 
 
(a) loss of human life,  
(b) human illness or injury, 
                                           
399 ‘The Concise Oxford English Dictionary’, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006)  
400  Civil Contingencies Act (2004), Chapter 36, Part I 
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(c) homelessness, 
(d) damage to property, 
(e) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy, or fuel, 
(f) disruption of a system of communication, 
(g) disruption of a system for transport, or 
(h) disruption of services relating to health”401   
 
This statutory definition also raises specific elements which require more detailed 
consideration. However, I would wish to confirm at this point that the reference to 
“human welfare” deliberately excludes the question of danger to animals, which is 
beyond the scope of my Thesis.  In a similar way I would also confirm that danger 
to the environment is beyond the remit of this particular Work. I will nonetheless 
consider these aspects in a little more detail in the following parts of this Glossary. 
 
1.3 “Danger” 
The dictionary definition of emergency includes a reference to dangerous 
situations and hence it is instructive to also consider a dictionary definition of 
“Danger”: 
 
“an element of risk, peril, hazard, jeopardy, endangerment, imperilment, 
precariousness, insecurity, instability”402       
 
This definition points to the harm that may arise or has arisen, but does not 
differentiate between whether the harm is foreseen or unforeseen (in my view it is 
the combination of the unexpected nature of a situation, and the attendant danger 
involved, which categorises an emergency). 
 
 
                                           
401  Ibid 
402  ‘Oxford American Thesaurus of Current English’, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 1999) 
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1.4  Force Majeure” 
Picking up the point of foreseeablity, the concept of Force Majeure (most 
commonly found in contract law) is helpful in looking at this aspect. There are 
various definitions of the term, which originates from the French Civil Code (a 
particularly succinct definition for my purposes is from a Dictionary of Finance and 
Banking); 
 
“Force Majeure (French: Superior Force) An event outside the control of [a] party 
… (such as a … riot, war, act of God)”403. 
 
When such a Force Majeure clause is used in a legal contract it generally recites 
a wide range of possible events that are considered to be beyond the foresight of 
the parties and which therefore excuse them from fulfilling their obligations. A 
typical list would include: “violent storm …, extraordinary high tide, unprecedented 
rainfall, extraordinary flood, earthquake, fire …, lightning, an extraordinary frost or 
snowfall etc.”404, 
 
This definition introduces another element and that is the degree of uncontrollability 
presented by an emergency. It is not simply that an event is unexpected, which 
causes the emergency, it is also whether or not the protagonists are able to control 
the situation that arises (plus the degree of danger that accompanies the event). 
 
1.5 Further Analysis 
Considering these various definitions together, there are clearly a number of 
recurring concepts which require elaboration: 
“Serious”        
                                           
403  ‘A Dictionary of Finance and Banking’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) 
404  ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England, Contract Vol 9(I), (London, Butterworths Law 1997) 
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“Unexpected” (unforeseen)  
“Dangerous” 
“Human Welfare” (loss of life, human illness or injury) 
“Outside the Control” 
 
1.5.1  “Serious” 
The question of the seriousness of an incident is indicative of whether or not an 
emergency has arisen. However, the notion of whether an incident is serious is not 
the same as whether the incident is dangerous.  
 
A serious incident could certainly call for a response from the State Emergency 
Services (and might also illicit a response from the average citizen, albeit not by 
virtue of any “Duty” to respond). By way of an example, a large spillage of oil from 
an oil tanker could cause a serious incident in terms of threat to the coast-line and 
the environment. Nonetheless such a spillage is unlikely to represent a danger to 
human life and hence would probably not be termed dangerous in this respect. The 
state would no doubt wish to respond to protect the environment, and animal 
welfare volunteers would seek to protect wildlife. However, neither of these 
responses would have the character of a Duty to Rescue. 
 
On a different tack, some incidents even though they could be harmful to human 
beings, may not be sufficiently serious to justify being classed as an emergency. 
For example, there could be an outbreak of the common cold in a particular local 
community, which has the capacity to cause harm to, say, vulnerable people. 
However, the common cold is a routine part of day to day life and would not 
ordinarily be considered an emergency.  However, if in any particular year, the 
incidence of people catching colds grew unusually, then it might escalate to 
epidemic proportions. This would probably then be considered to be an 
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Emergency. But even here the factor which causes it to be viewed as an 
emergency might well be that it has become serious in terms of people being 
unable to attend work, or operate public services etc, it need not relate to any major 
increase in the danger of the situation to the average person’s health or welfare. 
In this sense the incident might be termed an emergency by reason of the 
seriousness of its economic consequences, but not necessarily by reason of the 
danger it presents to human life or welfare.      
  
I have therefore taken the view that seriousness, in the context of this Section 
relates more to the quantitative aspects of the incident, rather than the qualitative 
(in terms of the capacity to cause danger) aspects (see also 2.2.5.3 below for a 
review of the element of danger). 
 
1.5.2 “Unexpected” 
It is almost by definition that an emergency will be unexpected. If a certain set of 
circumstances was either known about in advance or was reasonably foreseeable, 
then they are less likely to represent an emergency when they occur.  For example, 
if a weather pattern develops which indicates a major snowfall in the next 72 hours 
then this could indicate a serious threat to the transport routes in the vicinity, but 
given the advance notice, steps can be taken to respond: roads can be gritted, 
journeys can be rescheduled, snow ploughs can be at the ready. In the 
circumstances the event is not unexpected and given the steps taken, it may not 
represent an emergency. By contrast if a freak snowfall occurs without warning the 
situation could be very different. No preparations will have been made, roads will 
be treacherous, serious accidents could arise, and large numbers of people are 
likely to be stranded. The unexpected nature of the situation is likely to cause 
danger to human welfare and an emergency! 
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To illustrate a further feature of an unexpected event, take the example of a 
collapsed building. If this was an expected event, say, a controlled demolition, the 
area would have been evacuated and it would not represent an emergency. 
However, if the collapse was unexpected then it will lead to unusual reactions from 
individuals at the scene. People may panic, people may run, people may abandon 
ordinary courtesies. These responses themselves can lead to the situation taking 
on the character of an Emergency. People may be trampled, limbs might be 
broken, human life may be in danger. The unexpected nature of the event has 
raised the stakes, created an emergency and might well prompt the intervention of 
would-be rescuers. 
 
1.5.3 “Dangerous” 
As mentioned above deciding whether an incident is dangerous can raise similar 
types of issues to that arising when discussing the Seriousness of a situation.  
 
However, the key difference with incidents that are dangerous, is their potential to 
cause the loss of human life or a threat to human welfare. 
 
The earlier definition of danger refers to terms such as risk, peril, hazard, jeopardy, 
endangerment etc. These words imply harm as opposed to mere seriousness 
(which might only relate to economic consequences). 
 
In considering whether an incident is dangerous we really need to consider 
whether it has the capacity to cause substantial harm to an individual. If the incident 
threatens loss of life or a major injury, the incident will almost certainly represent 
an Emergency. On the contrary, if an incident merely threatens to inconvenience 
an individual or perhaps cause them minor bruising, then the incident will be 
unlikely to represent an emergency. However, where the dividing line between an 
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Emergency, and a mere incident cannot be exactly defined, much would depend 
upon the amount of danger inherent in each particular case. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that a situation which commences as a mere 
incident, could become an Emergency as the degree of danger increases, and vice 
versa. 
 
Interestingly, if the question of the degree of danger can be said to determine 
whether an emergency exists, it can also be considered to be the trigger which 
may cause a would-be rescuer to intervene. If the risk of danger to the victim is 
high and the associated risk of danger to the rescuer is low, then a rescue may 
well be attempted. If the risk of danger to the victim is low and the associated risk 
of danger to the rescuer is high, then a rescue is unlikely to be attempted. If the 
risk of danger to the victim is high and the associated risk of danger to the rescuer 
is also high, then the possibility of a rescue being attempted is uncertain.  
 
This relationship between danger, an emergency and rescue was neatly summed 
up by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in the seminal American case: Wagner v 
International Railway Company (1921) when he said “Danger Invites rescue” … 
“The emergency begets the man”405. The question of when an emergency might 
demand a rescue is considered in depth in the substantive parts of this Thesis. 
 
1.5.4 “Human Welfare” (loss of human life, human illness, or injury) 
One of the key definitions of an Emergency makes reference to the risk to human 
welfare. This raises an important distinction in that, for the purposes of considering 
whether any duty to attempt a rescue arises, it is the threat to human welfare which 
generally provides the key impetus. 
                                           
405  Wagner v International Railway Company (1921) 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437. 
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This is not to say that if another type of living organism was endangered, it would 
not be laudable (or indeed economic) to attempt to rescue it e.g. if a stable of 
champion racehorses caught fire, there would be a great deal of concern to try to 
rescue the animals. However, in terms of a duty to rescue as referenced in my 
thesis, most people would only see a duty arising when human life was at stake, 
not the life of a lower level animal. 
 
On a similar basis, some of the dictionary definitions of Emergency point to other 
consequences i.e. damage to property and damage to the environment. 
 
There is no question that an incident which threatens to destroy property or to 
destroy the environment is serious, and a great deal of human effort might be 
expended to try to avoid such consequences. However, in the general case there 
will not be an immediate threat to human life arising from such incidents and hence 
emergencies of these types do not beget rescues and do not come within the remit 
of this Work. 
 
1.5.5   “Outside the Control” 
This element of the definitions considered earlier in this Appendix, touches on the 
degree to which events are outside the control of the actors who have been forced 
into playing a role in an incident. 
There are similarities to the concept of whether an event is expected or not. But 
again there are significant differences. In particular an event may be entirely 
expected, but the fact that the circumstances are outside the control of the 
protagonists may nonetheless categories the event as an emergency. 
 
As an example, the annual yachting event at Cowes on the Isle of Wight is an 
entirely expected (and indeed planned for) event each year and the sailing 
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fraternity expect choppy seas and strong winds as a necessary part of the week. 
Ordinarily the combination of these conditions will not represent an emergency. 
 
However, if on a particular day, in any particular year, there is a sudden violent 
storm along the English coast, the nature of the event might change dramatically, 
possibly with overturned yachts, sailors in the water, and possible drownings. In 
such a situation it is not necessarily the fact that very choppy seas and very high 
winds have arisen that might determine that an emergency has occurred (after-all 
these types of conditions are entirely expected and perhaps necessary for good 
racing). What changes the situation is that, whereas the desired good racing 
conditions are generally within the control of the individuals, the sudden escalation 
of the conditions has taken them outside their control. It is this feature, being 
outside the control of the actors, which here constitutes the Emergency. 
 
Force Majeure was a term defined earlier in this Glossary, to provide a pointer to 
the types of situation which, being beyond the control of the individuals involved, 
may constitute an Emergency. There are a number of generic situations which 
come within the term Force Majeure and which very many people would describe 
as “Acts of God”.  Typical examples are fire, storm, flood and earthquake. 
The reasons why these types of event create emergency situations is that they are 
generally beyond the control of the actors affected by them. Questions as to 
seriousness and danger arise again e.g. whilst an earthquake is an Act of God, if 
it is not severe, or it takes place in an unpopulated area (or under the sea), then it 
may not represent an emergency. 
 
Before leaving this topic, it presents an opportunity to introduce the idea of Moral 
Luck into the discussion about emergencies. The key Chapter of my thesis dealing 
with Moral Luck covers the subject in considerable detail, but it is apposite to 
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mention here that one of the fundamental characteristics of an Emergency is that 
it involves matters beyond a person’s control. We often use language along the 
lines of “it is just a matter of luck” that someone might find themselves in an 
emergency situation, or put more pointedly “it was a matter of bad luck” (or 
alternatively it was an Act of God). 
 
Hence if a person is unlucky enough to find themselves present at an emergency, 
and the situation involves circumstances which are beyond his/ her control, then it 
is possible to advance a very compelling argument that such a person should not 
have a duty to rescue imposed upon them (certainly not a legal duty and probably 
not even a moral one). It is this whole line of argument that is at the crux of my 
entire project. 
 
1.6 Summary of the Situation in relation to Emergencies  
The foregoing analysis regarding the nature of an emergency, enables the 
‘concept’ to be narrowed down, for the purposes of my Substantive work. 
My Project specifically addresses the question of whether in this Country a duty to 
rescue should exist either legally or morally. But before considering this question it 
is essential to understand what types of emergency fall within the remit of the 
project. 
 
From the discussion of the various definitions considered earlier, it is appropriate 
to state that in my Work an emergency means: 
 
“An unexpected and/or uncontrolled situation which involves danger to 
human life or the danger of serious harm to human beings”. 
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2. Rescue 
   
In the same way that the concept of an Emergency needed to be limited in scope for 
the purposes of my Thesis, it is necessary to do likewise regarding the concept of 
Rescue – not all situations in which individuals might try to go to the aid of their fellow 
human beings are within the remit of my research. 
 
2.1 The Dictionary Definition of Rescue 
 
 
“Save from a dangerous or distressing situation”406 and  
 
“Action to Save People or Property from Danger”407  
 
The key concepts in relation to Rescue therefore seem to be “Saving”; “Danger”; 
“Distress”; “People”; and “Property”. 
 
I have considered each of these aspects, but in somewhat reverse order. 
 
 
2.1.1 “Property” 
In much the same way as discussed in relation to the term “Emergency”, the 
possibility of an individual attempting to rescue property is, whilst commendable, 
beyond the interest of my Work. Particular agencies will often attempt to ‘rescue’ 
property e.g. the Fire Service seeking to extinguish a building on fire. Furthermore, 
in the sense that domesticated animals are property, an attempted rescue of say, 
a horse in peril is again commendable, but this type of act does not form part of 
the subject of my research. 
 
 
                                           
406  ‘The Concise Oxford English Dictionary’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 
407  ‘Oxford Dictionary of Law’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) 
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2.1.2 “People” 
Clearly the rescue of human beings is entirely central to my Work and little more 
needs to be said about the matter. 
 
2.1.3 “Danger” 
This concept was reviewed when considering the term “Emergency”. Similar issues 
arise again in relation to Rescue. My interest in my substantive Work was to 
consider when a threat of danger/harm to a human being warrants rescue. Not all 
instances of danger would raise the question of rescue: if an individual has been 
hurt in a rail accident, the degree of harm could run from a small cut on their finger, 
to the severing of a major artery. In the first case rescue is very unlikely to be 
necessary. However, in the second case, if a rescue is not performed (and a 
tourniquet - or other suitable pressure – is not applied correctly to the limb) the 
victim will almost certainly die. 
 
In this sense danger is a question of degree and using another term discussed in 
relation to “Emergency”, it is pertinent to suggest that the need to rescue only 
generally arises when serious danger to an individual is involved. 
 
2.1.4 “Distress” 
Distress is a different matter and suggests a degree of harm below that of danger. 
As mentioned above, danger occasioning rescue may be described as danger of 
loss of life, or danger of serious injury. Distress suggests scenarios short of this i.e. 
the dictionary definition of: “extreme anxiety, sorrow or pain”408 
 
                                           
408   ‘The Concise Oxford English Dictionary’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 
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Of these aspects, the occasion of extreme pain probably fall into the more severe 
category, and is akin to serious injury (although it may not be life-threatening).  
 
However, even here not all instances of extreme pain might warrant a rescue (a 
dentist may unavoidably cause someone extreme pain for a short period of time, 
but this would not warrant them being rescued from the dentist’s chair). 
 
Turning to the elements of anxiety or sorrow, these are clearly important states of 
mind but do not generally take physical form and would not ordinarily indicate either 
a threat to life or threat of serious injury. As such, anxiety or sorrow of themselves 
will not normally warrant a rescue. 
 
As examples, consider some beggars on the street of one of England’s major cities. 
They may well be in distress and exhibit anxiety, but we would not generally 
consider that their situation is one which warrants rescue (having said this, a 
number of charities working with the homeless may well feel motivated to respond). 
Similarly, recently bereaved people may exhibit extreme signs of sorrow and grief, 
but generally they would not fall into the category of warranting a rescue (again 
certain charities may offer counselling services in this respect).  
 
2.1.5 “Saving” 
 
“Saving” as a term raises some interesting aspects and saving could be taken to 
encompass some specific situations: 
 
2.1.5.1  Saving from Death or Major Injury 
This activity is the one to which my research was specifically directed. However 
even here there are certain situations where saving a person’s life would not be 
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germane to my Work. For example, we may not have a duty to rescue someone 
who is adamant about committing suicide. More controversially it must probably be 
said that there should be no duty to donate bone marrow (or perhaps a kidney) to 
save another’s life. These are not types of rescue from death or major injury, which 
my work intended to cover  
 
2.1.5.2     Saving from Distress 
As mentioned earlier, unless distress is in the form of extreme pain, then the saving 
of someone in distress was unlikely to be a particular concern of my thesis. The 
example given earlier concerned beggars. However other situations can be 
envisaged where human beings are in a state of distress, but where rescue in 
terms of them being physically saved by the average citizen of this Country was 
outside my remit. Other examples could be saving: famine victims overseas; the 
poverty stricken (either here or overseas); or people with an untreatable disease 
etc.  It is not my intention to be callous in relation to such groups and I applaud the 
many, many professionals, organisations, and volunteers who do provide care in 
such cases. My purpose is simply to indicate that the concept of ‘saving’ someone 
raises many categories of interest. The only category that my Work was specifically 
concerned with, was the rescue of persons under threat of loss of life or serious 
harm, as a result of an Emergency, and even here it was only concerned with 
rescues by the average citizen (not, for example, rescues by the State). 
 
2.1.5.3     Saving from Confinement 
This is another area where the terms ‘saving’ or ‘rescue’ are often applied, and 
where generally the subject matter is, in virtually all cases, outside the scope of my 
thesis. Certainly the idea that an individual might be rescued from prison (or an 
escape might be facilitated) was not one for this project. Similarly, issues around 
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the rescue of a mentally ill person from a secure institution would be beyond my 
project remit. 
 
2.2 Further Analysis 
The last few pages have considered various components of rescues and numerous 
examples have been provided of certain types of situations which were deliberately 
treated as being outside the scope of my Work.  
 
In addition, there are some specific categories or classes of rescue which I also 
specifically excluded from my research. 
 
These exclusions can be helpfully defined, not in terms of the situation of the victim, 
but by reference to the nature of the rescuer. 
 
2.2.1    State Rescue Services (including allied bodies) 
There are a number of State Rescue services e.g. the Fire Service, the Police 
Force, the Ambulance Service, HM Coastguard etc. In addition, the Armed 
Services often play the part of a state rescue service in times of major emergency. 
Similarly, some Non-Governmental bodies also provide major services e.g. the 
Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) and the Mountain Rescue Service. 
 
These rescuers all have at least one thing in common in that they are likely to be 
under a statutory duty to carry out rescues, or a contractual duty to carry out 
rescues, or have assumed a specific duty to carry out rescues. 
 
The main interest of my Work was to consider whether and how a Duty to Rescue 
should be applied to the ordinary citizen: the private Good Samaritan. The fact that 
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the aforementioned formal services are obliged to carry out rescues will mean that 
in very many cases of emergency, a victim will be assured of being rescued.   
 
However, the more interesting situations arise when the formal emergency 
services are either unavailable, or over-stretched, and it falls on the ‘genuine’ 
volunteer to step forward and consider a rescue. 
 
The formal rescue services provide a vital service to the citizens of England and 
Wales, but my work was concerned with informal rescuers and whether any duty 
to rescue might apply to them, and also whether if they carry out a rescue, the law 
will protect them if they are sued as a result of an unsuccessful rescue, or whether 
the law provides for them to be compensated if they suffer loss.  
 
2.2.2   Individuals in Special Relationships to Victims 
Whereas it was stated earlier that there is no general duty to rescue in English 
Law, it was also stated that certain classes of people are in a special position, 
where a duty will be imposed. One class is the State Rescue Services, another is 
where the rescuer has a special relationship with the victim. 
 
2.2.2.1   Relationships of Dependence 
It is settled law that a parent has a duty to protect their child from danger (see 
Surtees v Kingston on Thames BC (1992)409, which interestingly was a foster 
parent case). In addition, schools have been held to owe such duties to pupils410. 
 
 
 
                                           
409 Surtess v Kingston Upon Thames Borough Council (1992)  P.I.Q.R. Page 101 
410 Woodbridge School v Chittock (2002) EWCA Civ 915 
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2.2.2.2   Contractual Relationships 
In numerous situations a contractual relationship between two parties may impose 
a duty on one of them to rescue the other e.g. an employer has a duty to assist an 
employee injured in an industrial accident, and a carrier at sea has a duty to rescue 
a passenger who falls overboard411   
 
2.2.2.3   Medical Professionals 
In certain situations Medical Professionals have been held to owe a duty to attempt 
to save a patient’s life. However, in England and Wales this is not a legal duty412. 
Nonetheless the Professional Body regulating Doctors in the UK imposes a 
professional duty on such professionals (the breach of which could result in such 
a doctor being struck off the Register)413. 
 
The issue is related not so much to when a doctor is acting in their employment 
(when they would no doubt could be considered as a part of the state emergency 
services or considered as under a contractual duty as an employee), but when they 
are acting in a private capacity i.e. if they face an emergency whilst at the theatre 
they are obliged to act as a Good Samaritan, or can just turn a blind eye. 
 
The position of other medical professionals is not so clear, and the situation of a 
Nurse or of a Paramedic who may be under different regulatory regimes to a 
doctor, raises interesting questions. Certainly First Aiders who will not ordinarily 
hold ‘professional’ qualifications are unlikely to be under any legal duty or 
professional duty to rescue. It will be recalled from the Introduction to my 
substantive Work, that it is the position of the average First Aider that interested 
me most in my research. 
                                           
411 Horsley v Maclaren, The Ogopogo (1971)  2. Lloyds Rep 410 
412 Dias R & Markesinis B, Tort Law (1992)  Oxford, Clarendon Press p.160  
413 General Medical Council (2006) Guidance on Good practice, Para 11  
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2.3.    Approach to Classes of Rescuers 
Whilst the special situation of certain kinds of would-be Rescuers are of interest 
(e.g. firemen, or parents etc.) it must be reiterated that my Thesis did not intend to 
address cases where the State, or persons under specific obligations are obliged 
to attempt rescues. The main focus of my Work was to look in considerable depth 
at the situation regarding individual, voluntary rescuers.    
 
2.4  Summary of the Situation in relation to Rescues  
As with the nature of Emergencies, it is now possible to more clearly define the 
types of Rescue that my research was primarily concentrated upon. 
It has been seen that the term “Rescue” can embrace a wide range of aspects and 
that many of them were to be specifically excluded from my research. From the 
points raised above it can now be confirmed that within my substantive Work, the 
term “Rescue” was taken to mean: 
 
“A direct response to an immediate emergency whereby a human being is 
saved (or might be saved) from the danger of loss of life or serious harm, by 
a Volunteer”. 
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TWO QUOTATIONS 
 
 
 
“The Darkest places in Hell are reserved for those   
 who maintain their neutrality in times of Moral crisis 
Dante Alighieri 1265-1321 
 
 
 
 
 
“Every Man is Guilty of all the Good he Didn’t Do” 
Francois-Marie Arouet (Voltaire) 1694 -1778 
 
 
 
